The fundamental strategic premise, which has guided the IDF since the War of Independence in 1948, posited that Israel could only compensate for its significant inferiority in military, territory and population, by adopting an offensive strategy. An outstanding example of this was the Six Day War in which Israel routed its enemies with a pre-emptive strike. All of the IDF’s advantages were manifest in that war, beginning with the surprise factor, through great mobility and culminating in technological superiority. However, since then, the strategic concept of the Jewish state is undergoing a profound change, and the offensive concept has been replaced by a strategy of withdrawal and defense. The beginnings of this strategy can be found in the Camp David Accords in which Israel relinquished Sinai, one of the most important geo-strategic outposts in the world, to the Egyptians. Israel withdrew partially from the Golan Heights, withdrew from southern Lebanon and relinquished extensive territories in Judea and Samaria to Arafat’s terrorist organizations. The planned 2005 withdrawals from Gaza and northern Samaria as well as the willingness to relinquish the Golan Heights to Syria, which all Prime Ministers have been pronouncing at every opportunity, are designed to restore Israel to the June 4, 1967 borders, in accordance with the “road map” initiated by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and President Bush.

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