During the middle-1980s, some students of
Middle Eastern security issues began to speak plainly of Israel’s nuclear
strategy with particular reference to the question of disclosure.1
Specifically, these scholars asked whether this strategy should continue
to be implicit, deliberately ambiguous, and in the “basement”, or
whether it should be explicit, clearly articulated, and out in the
open.2 I entered the “debate” personally
with a series of lectures at Israeli strategic studies centers in 1984 and
1985, and with the first edited book on the subject in 1986.3
Today, this debate no longer seems vital to Israeli strategists. As
it is perfectly obvious, they reason, that Israel has some significant
numbers of nuclear weapons, there really is nothing further to disclose.
Israel is patently a member of the Nuclear Club. Everyone already knows
this. Case closed!4
But there is a serious problem with such
reasoning. The rationale of disclosure, of taking the bomb out of the
“basement”,5 would not lie simply in
expressing the obvious. Rather, it would lie in the informed understanding
that nuclear weapons can serve Israel’s security in a number of different
ways, and that all of these ways could benefit the Jewish state, more or
less, to the extent that certain aspects of these weapons and associated
strategies were disclosed. Indeed, as we shall now see, the pertinent form
and extent of disclosure6 could soon be
more critical than ever before because of the sorely misnamed “Peace
Process”.
For the forseeable future, Israel’s state
enemies – especially Iran, Iraq and Syria (but not excluding Egypt and
Jordan) – continue to enlarge and improve their conventional and
unconventional warfighting capacities. Although no one can say for certain
that such improvements are underway with especially Israel in mind, it
would be prudent for Jerusalem to assume the worst. Moreover, even if
enemy state intentions do not yet parallel capabilities, this could change
very quickly. Here, for example, enemy capabilties could determine
intentions, occasioning chemical, biological7
or nuclear first-strikes against Israel because of expected tactical
advantages.
To protect itself against enemy strikes,
especially those strikes that could carry existential costs, Israel must
exploit every component function of its nuclear arsenal.8
In this connection, the success of Israel’s efforts will depend in large
part upon not only its particular configuration of “counterforce” and
“countervalue” operations, but also upon the extent to which this
configuration is made known in advance to enemy states. Thus, before such
an enemy is appropriately deterred from launching first-strike attacks
against Israel, or before it is deterred from launching retaliatory
attacks following an Israeli preemption, it may not be enough that it
“knows” that Israel has nuclear weapons. It may also need to
recognize that these Israeli weapons are sufficiently invulnerable to such
attacks and/or that they are targeted on their own pertinent weapons and
associated command/control systems.
To fully understand the ambiguity/disclosure
question,9 we must first recall the
theoretical foundations of nuclear deterrence and nuclear warfighting as
they pertain to Israel. These foundations concern prospective attackers’
perceptions of both Israel’s nuclear capability and Israel’s willingness
to use such capability. Removing the bomb from Israel’s “basement” could
therefore enhance Israel’s nuclear deterrence and/or nuclear warfighting
postures to the extent that it would heighten enemy state perceptions of
Jerusalem’s capable nuclear forces and/or Jerusalem’s willingness to use
these forces in reprisal for certain first-strike and retaliatory attacks.
Conversely, failing to remove the bomb from the “basement” could undermine
Israel’s postures to the extent that it would lower enemy state
perceptions of Jerusalem’s nuclear capabilities and/or its willingness to
exploit these capabilities.10
Let us look at these requirements more
closely. To deter enemy attack or post-preemption retaliation, Israel must
be able to prevent that enemy, by threat of an unacceptably damaging
reprisal or counterretaliation, from deciding to strike. Here, security is
sought by convincing the would-be rational11
attacker (irrational enemies are an altogether different problem) that the
costs of a considered attack will exceed the expected benefits. Assuming
that Israel’s state enemies: (1) always value self-preservation more
highly than any other preference or combination of preferences; and (2)
always choose rationally between alternative options, they will always
refrain from attacking an Israel that is believed willing and able to
deliver an appropriately destructive response.12
Two factors must communicate such belief.
First, in terms of ability, there are two essential components:
payload and delivery system. It must be successfully
communicated to the prospective attacker by Israel that the Jewish state’s
firepower and its means of delivering that firepower are capable of
wreaking unacceptable levels of destruction after a first-strike or
retaliatory attack. This means that Israel’s retaliatory/counterretaliatory
forces must appear sufficiently invulnerable and
sufficiently elusive to penetrate the prospective attacker’s active
and civil defenses. It need not be communicated to the potential attacker
that such firepower and/or the means of delivery are superior. The
capacity to deter need not be as great as the capacity to “win”.
With the bomb kept silently in the basement,
Israel’s imperative communications could be compromised perilously. Unable
to know for certain whether Israel’s retaliatory/counterretaliatory
abilities were aptly formidable, enemy states could conclude, rightly or
wrongly, that a first-strike attack or post-preemption reprisal would be
cost-effective. Of course, it is conceivable that continued ambiguity
would be adequate for Israeli deterrence, but – then again – it might not
be adequate. Were it made more plainly obvious to enemy states
contemplating attack that Israel’s basement bombs met both payload and
delivery system objectives, Israel’s nuclear forces would likely better
serve their overriding security functions.
The second factor of nuclear communication
for Israel concerns willingness. How may Israel convince potential
attackers that it possesses the resolve to deliver an unacceptably
destructive retaliation and counterretaliation? The answer to this
question lies, in part, in the demonstrated strength of the commitment to
carry out the threat and in the precise nuclear weapons that would be
available. Here, too, continued nuclear ambiguity could create the
impression of an “unwilling” Israel. Conversely, movement toward some
as-yet-undetermined level of disclosure could heighten the impression of
an Israel that is willing to follow through on its threats.
What, then, are the plausible connections
between a more openly declared nuclear capability and enemy state
perceptions of Israel’s nuclear deterrent? One such connection concerns
the relation between disclosure and perceived vulnerability of Israeli
nuclear forces from preemptive destruction. Another such connection
concerns the relation between disclosure and perceived capacity of
Israel’s nuclear forces to penetrate the attacking state’s active
defenses. To the extent that removing the bomb from the Israeli basement,
or disclosure, would encourage enemy state views of an Israeli nuclear
force that is sufficiently invulnerable to first-strike attacks and/or is
capable of piercing enemy active defense systems, disclosure could
represent a rational and prudent option for Israel. The operational
benefits of disclosure would accrue from deliberate flows of doctrinal
information about such matters as dispersion, multiplication and hardening
of nuclear systems and about some other technical features of certain
nuclear weapons systems. Above all else, such carefully-controlled flows
would serve to remove enemy doubts about Israel’s nuclear force
capabilities, doubts which – if unchallenged – could undermine Israeli
nuclear deterrence. Removing the bomb from Israel’s basement might also
heighten enemy state perceptions of Jerusalem’s willingness to make good
on its nuclear retaliatory threats. For example, by releasing information
about its nuclear weapons that identified distinctly “usable” forces,
Israel could remove enemy doubts about Jerusalem’s nuclear resolve. Here,
a prospective attacker, newly aware that Israel could retaliate without
generating intolerably high levels of civilian harms (possibly because of
enhanced radiation13 and/or sub-kiloton
weapons) would be more likely, because of Israel’s disclosure, to believe
Jerusalem’s nuclear threats.
This brings us directly to the doctrinal
question of “counterforce” vs. “countervalue”. Counterforce strategies are
those which target an enemy’s strategic military facilities and supporting
infrastructures. Such strategies may be dangerous not only because of the
“collateral damage” they could produce, but also because they could
heighten the likelihood of enemy first-strikes. Should Israel be “going
for counterforce” with its nuclear weapons? If so, enemy knowledge of such
movement could encourage preemption planning by certain enemy states, but
it could also enhance the power of Israel’s nuclear deterrent (because
counterforce-targeted nuclear weapons are more likely to be judged
usable). Depending upon Jerusalem’s rank-ordering of nuclear strategy
values and its expectations concerning enemy state reactions, disclosure,
or taking the bomb out of the basement, could be more or less purposeful
for Israel.
Countervalue strategies refer to the
targeting of an enemy’s cities and industries; in effect, the targeting of
civilian populations. Should Israel be content with developing the
relatively inaccurate apparatus of such an “assured destruction” posture,
it could probably limit the prospect of preemptive enemy
first-strikes. This prospect could even be limited further if the assured
destruction posture were accompanied by open and fairly precise disclosure
of Israel’s nonthreatening nuclear stance. At the same time, should this
posture fail to deter concerted enemy first-strikes, or enemy retaliations
for Israeli preemptions, its intrinsic damage-limiting inferiority to a
counterforce capability could produce much larger casualty figures. As we
will soon see, excessive countervalue targeting could impair Israel’s
nuclear warfighting needs.
If, on the other hand, Israel were to start
off with a declared nuclear warfighting or counterforce posture, enemy
state perceptions of inevitable war with Israel could be enlarged. With
such perceptions, belligerent leaders would have to decide whether or not
it would be more gainful to await an Israeli preemption or whether to
strike first themselves. Aware of this, Israel’s leaders must determine
not only the optimum configuration of countervalue and counterforce, but
also the most favorable means and levels of disclosure.
How should Israel choose following its
incomprehensible surrender of essential territories in exchange for an
illusory “peace”? If Jerusalem should opt for nuclear deterrence based on
assured destruction, it would run the risk of “losing” any nuclear war
that might arise. If it should choose counterforce, certain enemy states
could feel especially threatened, a condition that would likely heighten
the actual prospects of nuclear weapons use.
In making its nuclear choices, Israel will
have to confront a paradox. Credible nuclear deterrence, essential to
security and survival – especially in a world made even more dangerous by
the end of strategic depth and the creation of Palestine – would require
recognizably usable nuclear weapons. If, after all, these weapons
were inappropriate for any reasonable objective, they would not deter.
Yet, the more usable the weapons would become in order to enhance nuclear
deterrence – a usability communicated more or less effectively by a shift
away from deliberate ambiguity – the more likely it is that they will
actually be fired. Although this paradox would appear to recommend,
inter alia, the deployment of the least-harmful forms of usable
nuclear weapons, the likely absence of coordinated agreements with enemy
states on deployable nuclear weapons points toward a different conclusion:
Unless Israel were to calculate that the more harmful weapons would
produce greater hazards for its own population as well as for
target states, there would be no tactical benefit for Israel to opt for
the least injurious usable nuclear weapons.
Regarding issues of nuclear usability, an
excellent study has been offered by two target planners and theater force
analysts at Los Alamos National Laboratory. While interested exclusively
in the improvement of United States nuclear strategy, the arguments
presented by Thomas W. Dowler and Joseph S. Howard II pertain
instructively to Israel. In their analysis, Dowler and Howard evaluate
nuclear weapons with very low yields ranging from 10 to 1,000 tons.
Seeking nuclear weapons whose power is “effective but not abhorrent”, the
authors detail the particular benefits of “micronukes” (weapons with a
yield on the order of 10 tons or 20,000 pounds of high explosive);
“mininukes” (weapons with a yield of about 100 tons); and “tinynukes”
(weapons with a yield of about 1,000 tons or one kiloton).
For Israel, a micronuke employed as an
earth-penetrating warhead (EPW) could destroy all but the hardest command
bunkers. Deliverable by gravity bomb, tactical cruise missile or tactical
surface-to-surface missile, a micronuke EPW could also be used effectively
to neutralize airfields. As a single micronuke strike could put an
airfield out of commission for an extended time, use of these particular
subkiloton weapons could reduce exposure of Israeli pilots to enemy
defenses. This is because it would not be necessary to expect these pilots
to execute follow-on strikes.
Should deterrence fail to prevent a launch of
enemy missiles carrying nuclear or other mass-destruction warheads at
Israeli forces, either as a first-strike attack or as an enemy retaliation
for Israeli preemption, Israel would require an adequate defensive
capability. To acquire such a capability, Israel could benefit from an
anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM)14
carrying a mininuke warhead with a yield of
approximately 100 tons. Seeking to destroy incoming warheads in flight
(simply knocking the missile off-target might not neutralize its capacity
to inflict great harm on Israeli forces), a mininuke fired by Israel could
provide the needed power. Such power could prove vital because an incoming
nuclear, chemical or biological warhead must be destroyed as far from its
target as possible.
Once an armed conflict had actually broken
out between Israel and certain enemy states, tinynuke warheads with
yields of about 1,000 tons could prove effective against tank and troop
units. True battlefield weapons rather than agents of indiscriminate mass
destruction, these tinynukes – deliverable by tactical air-to-air surface
missile, tactical surface-to-surface cruise or ballistic missile, or
artillery round – could eliminate any company-sized unit. Intended for
very precise operations against known troop formations, these weapons
would display lethal radii on the order of 500 meters against tank crews
and 600 meters against infantry, artillery and support troops. As for the
collateral damage and safe standoff radii of these tinynukes, they would
range only to about 1,500 meters. Moreover, utilized as airbursts, they
should produce no significant local fallout.15
Returning to the original doctrinal question
of countervalue vs. counterforce, Israeli planners must commence prior
investigations of enemy state inclinations to strike first and in
retaliation, and of associated inclinations to strike all-at-once or in
stages. Should these planners assume, for example, that certain enemy
states in the process of “going nuclear” are apt to strike in an unlimited
mode – i.e., to fire all nuclear warheads immediately – Israeli
counterforce-targeted nuclear warheads, used in retaliation or in
counterretaliation, would likely hit only empty silos/launchers. In such
circumstances, Israel’s only rational application of counterforce doctrine
would be to strike first itself.
If, for whatever reason, Israel were to
reject the preemption option, given the above assumptions there would be
no good reason to opt for counterforce. From the standpoint of compelling
intra-war nuclear deterrence, a countervalue strategy could prove
substantially more purposeful under such assumptions. Should Israeli
planners assume that enemy states “going nuclear” are apt to strike first
and to strike in a limited mode, holding some significant measure
of nuclear firepower in reserve for follow-on strikes, Israeli
counterforce-targeted nuclear warheads, used in retaliation, could have
meaningful damage-limitation effects. Here, counterforce operations could
serve both an Israeli preemption or, should Israel decide, for whatever
reeason, not to preempt, an Israeli retaliatory strike. Moreover, should
an Israeli first-strike be intentionally limited, perhaps because it would
be coupled with a guarantee of no further destruction in exchange for an
end to hostilities, such operations could serve an Israeli
counter-retaliatory strike. This is the case because Israel’s attempt at
intra-war deterrence could fail, occasioning the need for follow-on
strikes to produce essential damage-limitation.
In order to examine fully whether Israel
would be better served by continued ambiguity or by disclosure (and if the
latter, by what degrees of disclosure), students of Israeli nuclear
strategy we must first identify and understand the reasons behind
Israel’s nuclear forces. What, then, are these particular reasons? Why,
exactly, does Israel need nuclear weapons? Once we can answer these
antecedent questions we will be able to determine if Israel’s bomb should
remain in the basement or if it should be brought, more or less, into the
country’s “upper floors”. In essence, therefore, future scholarship in
this area should be directed by the following hypothesis: If Israel
moves beyond “deliberate ambiguity” to certain apt forms of “disclosure”,
its nuclear forces will be better able to fulfil their seven essential
security functions.
This does not imply, however, that if
these seven essential functions were fulfilled, Israel would necessarily
be secure. Although I have hypothesized that various and incremental
levels of disclosure could enhance Israel’s nuclear deterrent and
associated nuclear functions, Israel should never give up its territory on
the assumption that it could rely entirely upon its nuclear threat.
Nuclear weapons, appropriately configured and disclosed, are necessary to
Third Temple Commonwealth survival, but they are not sufficient. Even a
nuclear armed state needs a broad range of weapons that are
purposeful to the entire forseeable spectrum of possible harms. It follows
that those Israelis who currently argue for a withdrawal to the 1949
borders because Israel has nuclear forces are altogether mistaken. Israel
must not become the first and only case in history of a state totally
dependent upon nuclear threats.
Optimally, Israel will take steps to maintain
its all-important conventional deterrence while, at the same time,
ensuring that its nuclear deterrence is informed by doctrine.
Should this doctrine be left implicit, as has been the Israeli case of
“deliberate ambiguity” for decades, enemy states would need to reconstruct
expectations about Israeli capabilities and intentions. Should this
doctrine be made explicit, as would be the case if the bomb were removed
from the “basement”, these enemy states could extrapolate expectations
from this doctrine directly. Of course, it is conceivable that more
explicit articulations of Israeli nuclear strategy would be distrusted or
even discounted, but disclosure would at least provide Israel with an
opportunity for some input into enemy state calculations.
For Israel, the advantages of disclosure
would likely be greater with respect to the deterrence of unconventional
attacks than with respect to deterrence of large conventional attacks.
This is because the presumed plausibility of Israeli nuclear reprisal is
apt to be greater when unconventional weapons are used for aggression. A
different assumption about disclsure’s advantages vis-a-vis large
conventional attacks could be reasonable if Israel were to couple its
nuclear retaliatory threats with far-reaching conventional disarmamemnt
and/ or with further territorial concessions, but such coupling, it now
goes without saying, would represent a tragic and potentially
irretrievable error for the Jewish state.
No less tragic for Israel would be a decision
to accept some form of internationally-imposed limitations on its nuclear
arsenal.16 With such a decision, the
question of disclosure would become moot. After all, “volitional”
denuclearization consistent with expected treaty commitments would leave
Israel with nothing to disclose. In consequence, Israel’s deterrence
requirements would all have to be met with conventional threats and/or US
“extended deterrence”. This would not be possible.
Israel requires both conventional and nuclear
weapons, complementary forces and doctrines to preserve the Third Temple
Commonwealth into the next millennium. Significantly, the “Peace Process”
has endangered both interrelated requirements. Already, this Process,
spawning shrinking strategic depth, has severely curtailed the capacities
of Israel’s conventional arms. For the very immediate future, it also
threatens the capacities of Israel’s nuclear weapons, a situation that
would not only leave the bomb in the basement, but bury it there.
One last word about essential Israeli nuclear
deterrence of enemy unconventional attack, a need that could be served
more or less effectively by some apt measure of disclosure. Normally,
strategic planners, examining the requirements of nuclear deterrence,
distinguish carefully between conventional and unconventional attacks. For
Israel today, however, such a sharp distinction could be misleading and
dangerous.
Why? From now on, it is unlikely that enemy
states would launch large conventional attacks against Israel unless these
states had backup unconventional (possibly but not necessarily nuclear)
forces. This means that the capacities of Israeli nuclear deterrence will
now always have to be assessed vis-a-vis enemy state unconventional
weapons. Hence, the question of disclosure will now always have to
be asked ultimately in reference to nuclear deterrence of unconventional
weapons.
It is conceivable, especially after Israel’s
unforgivable surrender of territories, that some combination of enemy
states, still effectively nonnuclear, could conclude that a combined
conventional attack against Israel would be gainful. To prevent such a
conclusion, thereby maintaining successful nuclear deterrence, Jerusalem
would need to convince these enemy states that their prospective combined
conventional assault could elicit a fully nuclear reprisal. This task
could be made easier by appropriate communications to enemy states
concerning disclosure, including purposeful communications of Israel’s
awareness that the conventional/unconventional threshold might still be
breached first by the “conventional” enemy state attackers. Although it is
likely that this task could also be made easier because of Israel’s
already-truncated strategic depth, the net effect of such truncation for
Israel would surely be negative. Halting the “Peace Process”, if this is
indeed still possible, is a clear and overriding strategic imperative.
The