Jerusalem Cloakroom #137

The Importance of Judea & Samaria
in an Era of Modern Weaponry

by Yoram Ettinger
yoramtex@netvision.net.il

October 24, 2003 

Has Saddam's Demise Eliminated the "Eastern Front Threat" to Israel?

In 1967 Israel obliterated Egypt, Syria and Jordan, producing a “No Threat” delusion. The delusion was crashed by the 1973 War, when Israel barely escaped annihilation. In 1979 Iran was abruptly transformed from an ally to an enemy. The 1989 demise of the USSR gave rise to the illusion of global peace, but the world has become more violent. The 1993 Oslo vision of peace produced a nightmare of unprecedented terror. War on terrorism is Bush’s top priority; will his successor follow suit? A possible US retreat from Iraq would exacerbate terrorism. How would a demise of the Hashemite regime affect the Mideast, which is the most unpredictably violent region. Mideast precedents behoove Israel to be prepared for realistic scenarios, including “The Eastern Front Threat.”

Lessons of the 1991 AND 2003 Gulf Wars

Thousands of tons of daily bombing did not end the wars. Seventy percent of the bombing was inaccurate. Saddam was brought to submission when the ground forces reached Baghdad. The centrality of ground forces suggests the centrality of ground barriers (geographic depth and topographic edge). Ballistic missiles cause damage, but they don’t conclude wars. Without the ground forces, the wars would’ve been prolonged, causing more casualties and tension with allies, allowing Saddam to declare victory.

The USA Recognizes the Centrality of Ground Features

Being the #1 ballistic power, the US operates 100 overseas military installations, which control essential ground features. The US is aware that all wars are conventional, requiring ground forces (India-Pakistan, US-Afghanistan, US-Iraq, US-Panama, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Iran-Iraq, Morocco-Mauritania, etc.).

USA Generals on Role of Ground Barriers

The late Admiral Bud Nance: The eastern mountain ridge of the West Bank is one of the world’s best tank barriers. Invading tanks will have to climb a 3,000 ft. steep slope from the Jordan Valley. The western mountain ridge, which is a 2,000ft gentle slope, constitutes a dream platform of invasion to Israel’s narrow (8-15 miles) coastal plain. Control of the West Bank provides Israel the time to mobilize its reserves, which are essential to its survival during a surprise attack. General (ret.) Al Gray, former Commandant, US Marine Corps: Missiles fly over any terrain feature, but they don’t negate the strategic significance of territorial depth. The key threat to Israel will remain the invasion and occupation by armored forces. Military success requires more than a few hundred missiles. To defeat Israel would require the Arabs to deploy armor, infantry and artillery into Israel and destroy the IDF on the ground. That was true in 1948, 1967 and 1973, and it remains true in the era of modern missiles.

Ground Barriers Critical to Israel's Reserves Mobilization

A surprise war would accord invading Arab tanks a 7:1 edge, close to Israel’s “soft belly”, until Israel’s reserves mobilization (75% of the IDF). The 1991 primitive Scuds exposed the vulnerability of Israel’s roads and depots (backbone of reserve mobilization). The 2003 sophisticated missiles could jam and drastically delay reserve mobilization, and effectively target air force bases, which are critical to fend off invasions. The more prolonged the reserves mobilization, the more lethal the initial Arab edge, and the more crucial the role of ground barriers, which delay Arab invasions.

The Bottom Line

Judea & Samaria mountain ridges - 3,000 ft. above the Jordan Valley and 2,000 ft. above the 8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute The “Golan Heights” of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa.

Lt. Gen. (ret.) Tom Kelly, 1990/1 director for operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “Without the West Bank, Israel is only 8 miles wide at its narrowest point. That makes it indefensible.”