Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 109th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

 

 Vol. 151        WASHINGTON, MONDAY, JUNE 20, 20005           No. 82

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT
ON U.S. INTERESTS

HON. DAN BURTON OF INDIANA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 20, 2005

 Mr. Speaker, the death of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, the emergence of a new Palestinian leadership, and the government of Israel's proposed disengagement from Gaza and parts of the West Bank have created a high degree of optimism in the International Community that we are on the cusp of dramatic new openings in the Middle East peace process.

 As a senior Member of the House International Relations Committee, I have watched the often turbulent goings on in the Middle East for a few years to say the least, and my experience tells me that our optimism should be tempered by the lessons of the past. In fact, I believe we should take a very cautious view of the current round of Israeli Palestinian peacemaking, particularly with regard to Israel's withdrawal from Gaza and parts of the West Bank.

 I have met Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and I know that he is a fine man. I am sure he firmly believes that this "strategic retreat" from the Gaza Strip and four settlements in the West Bank is the best way to guarantee Israel's long-term security by allowing Israel to conserve and consolidate military and security resources, reducing opportunities for further friction with the Palestinians, and potentially reducing pressure on Israel to negotiate a final peace settlement on unfavorable terms. Personally, I will not second guess the Prime Minister's wisdom; I very much hope that he is right. But again, my experience tells me that if you take steps to appease an enemy you only give him a green light to put more pressure on you. In my opinion, it is imperative and critical to U.S. National Security that we as policymakers understand the consequences should the Israeli disengagement plan fail to live up to expectations.

 I was recently presented a copy of an interesting opinion piece by Ambassador Yoram Ettinger--former Minister for Congressional Affairs at Israel's Embassy in Washington, Israeli Consul General in Houston, and Director of Israel's Government Press Office; and currently editor of "Straight from the Jerusalem Cloakroom and Boardroom" newsletters--regarding the potential consequences of ceding Israeli territory to terrorists. I would like to have the text of this Op-Ed placed into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD following my statement.

[May 26, 2005]

JERUSALEM CLOAKROOM #178: THE IMPACT OF DISENGAGEMENT ON U.S. INTERESTS

(By Yoram Ettinger)

  1. Escalated Terrorism. The morally/strategically justifiable demolition of terror regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan is inconsistent with the creation/bolstering of a terror regime in Gaza, Judea and Samaria. The 1994-6 series of disengagement from 85 percent and 40 percent of the territory (and 100 percent and 95 percent of the population) of Gaza and Judea and Samaria have established the largest terrorist base in the world, led/harbored by PLO/PA graduates of terrorist camps in Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, Libya and Tunisia. Since 1993 the PA has harbored anti-U.S. terrorists. U.S. GIs in Afghanistan and Iraq were encountered by Palestinian terrorists.
     

  2. Higher U.S. Terror Casualties. The July 2000 disengagement from Southern Lebanon propelled Hizbullah from a local, to a regional, profile, haunting U.S. GIs in Iraq and Afghanistan and threatening U.S. homeland security.
     

  3. Contradicting U.S. War on Terrorism. Disengagement is perceived, by the Mideast, as cut and run, appeasement and cave-in, in sharp contrast to U.S. war on terrorism: No negotiation with--and no concession to--terrorists; no ceasefire with--but destruction of--terrorist regimes; no political--but military--solution to terrorism.
     

  4. Setback to Peace. The only peace attainable in the (inter-Arab) Mideast is deterrence-driven peace. Disengagement undermines deterrence; hence it sets the area farther from peace and closer to exacerbated terrorism and an all out war. Every square inch ceded by Israel to the PA, since the 1994 disengagement, has been transformed into a platform of hate-education and homicide bombing.
     

  5. Tailwind to Anti-U.S. Terrorists. While the 1976 Israeli Entebbe Operation constituted a tailwind to the U.S. war on terrorism, the 1993-2005 retreat by the role-model of countering terrorism (Israel) in face of the role-model of terrorism (PLO/PA) has added more fuel to the fire of terrorism. Disengagement has been heralded by the PLO/PA and other Arabs as a crucial victory, frequently compared to the U.S. flight from Beirut (1983) and Somalia (1993). It would nurture Arab hope that neither the U.S. nor Israel possess a marathon-like steadfastness, required for a long-term victory.
     

  6. PA Feeds Anti-U.S. Terrorism. A correlation has existed between the bolstering of PLO stock since Oslo 1993 on one hand, and the exacerbation of anti-U.S. terrorism on the other hand (since the 1993 Twin Towers I, through the 1995 Khobar Towers, the 1998 Kenya and Tanzania U.S. embassies, the 2000 USS Cole and 2001 Twin Towers II); the wider the maneuverability of the PLO/PA, the deeper the inspiration to regional anti-U.S. terrorism, irrespective of (and probably due to) U.S. and Israeli appeasement of--and unprecedented concessions to--the PLO/PA.
     

  7. Undermining the Stability of Pro-U.S. Regimes (e.g. Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, etc.). Disengagement would enhance the profile of the PLO/PA, a lethal threat to the Hashemite regime and a chief ally of radical regimes in the Mideast and beyond. PLO-Hashemite relations have been a classic case of zero-sum game: The stronger the PLO the weaker the Hashemites. The rise of the PLO/PA has emboldened subversive anti-U.S. terrorists in Jordan and in the Gulf area.
     

  8. Strengthening Anti-U.S. Mideast Regimes. Disengagement would buttress the PLO/PA, which has been a sustained ally of the Saddam and bin Laden forces, of Khomeini and his successors in Iran, of the terror regime in Sudan and other anti-U.S. Mideast regimes. A stronger PA would be a liability--to the U.S.--in the U.N. and in the context of Clash of Civilizations.
     

  9. Invigorating Mideast Profile of U.S. Global Rivals. The strengthening of the PLO/PA would facilitate the road to a re-assertive Russia in the Mideast. It would improve the strategic posture of China and North Korea in the region, at the expense of vital U.S. concerns, including U.S. standard of living.
     

  10. Ignoring Plight of Christians. The 1995 disengagement from Bethlehem and Beit Jallah has accelerated the flight of Christians, caused by PLO/PA oppression and desecration of churches.
     

  11. Setback to Mideast Democratization. Disengagement would promote the most corrupt and repressive Arab regime in the Mideast, rewarding a terrorist regime, thus dealing a blow to moderate Palestinians.
     

  12. Undermining Israel-Egypt Peace. The 1979 peace treaty disengaged Israeli and Egyptian military forces from one another. The Plan of Disengagement would reengage them in a terror-ridden area, thus fueling unintentional and intentional confrontations. It could drag the U.S. unnecessarily into such conflict. Egypt has facilitated/tolerated the smuggling of terror hardware, missiles and mortars into Gaza. It has undermined U.S. interests in Africa, in the Red Sea and in the U.N., and it has spearheaded anti-Jewish Arab/Palestinian hate education (PA hate education employs Egyptian school text books).
     

  13. PLO's Track Record of Inter-Arab Treachery. Abu Mazen Abu Ala', Inc. fled Egypt (late 1950s) for subversive activities. They escaped Syria (1966) for betraying their hosts. They were expelled from Jordan for attempting to topple the Hashemite regimes via terrorism. They exacerbated a series of civil wars in Lebanon since 1975. They spearheaded Saddam's invasion of Kuwait (1990), which hosted them since the 1950s. Their systematic violent violation of the 1993 Oslo Accords have been consistent with their inter-Arab back-stabbing. Disengagement would be viewed--by the PLO/PA as a reward to treachery, which would vindicate the aforementioned track record.