Egypt's Defense Expenditures:
$2.7 Billion or $14 Billion?
Shawn Pine
Introduction
The criteria used to determine a strategic threat is
assessing the capabilities of the potential threat to achieve its
strategic, military and political goals. Historically, strategic planners,
recognizing the difficulty in determining a country’s intentions, make a
worst-case scenario, assuming the worst intentions of a country, and
increasingly rely upon their assessment of the country’s capabilities as
the primary determinate of the probability of hostilities. 1
However, in the case of Egypt, it appears that Israel’s strategic planners
are making a critical error in their strategic threat assessment of the
potential medium and long-term threats that Egypt poses to Israel. Rather
than incorporate a worst-case analysis of Egyptian intentions, Israeli
strategic analysts have discounted Egypt as a potential threat and have
focused their attention on the short and medium-term threats posed by
Syria and Iran.
This section examines the capabilities of the Egyptian
military and its ability to facilitate achievement of that country’s
medium and long-term strategic goals. Two essential components are used to
assess Egyptian military capabilities. The first component examined is the
extent of the Egyptian military buildup.
Egypt, since 1985, has embarked on an unprecedented
military buildup. Relying on $2.1 billion of US aid, including $1.3
billion in military assistance, Egypt is approaching the qualitative and
quantitative levels of the Israeli Defense Forces.
The second component examined is the amount of
resources that Egypt is devoting to its military forces. In other words,
it is necessary to accurately determine Egypt’s defense budget and its
yearly military expenditures. Accurately determining and examining Egypt’s
defense expenditures facilitates accurate assessment of that country’s
intentions. Indeed, given Egypt’s extreme internal social, economic, and
political problems, coupled with the relatively small threat posed by its
neighbors, we should expect a relatively small amount of its resources to
be devoted to its military.
It is important to note that traditional sources of
military information have generally published statistics concerning the
military expenditures of third-world countries based upon data provided by
the countries in question. However, when independent sources conduct
detailed analysis of these budgets, they frequently find significant
discrepancies which have led to estimations far higher than those
officially disclosed. 2
Unfortunately, for the most part, acknowledged sources for foreign
military expenditures, such as: The Military Balance, The Jaffe Center’s
Middle Eastern Military Balance, and the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database, continue to
publish officially stated figures without independent verification or
analysis.
EGYPT’S MILITARY BUILDUP
Conventional Buildup
Notwithstanding the 1978 peace treaty, Egypt has
undertaken serious efforts to achieve conventional military parity with
Israel. Egypt, relying on $2.1 billion of financial aid from the US – $1.3
billion in the form of military assistance – is in the process of
transforming its forces into a modern, Western-based military. It
currently fields the 13th largest military in the world. 3
In 1994, Egypt surpassed the United States to become the second largest
arms importer, behind Saudi Arabia, in the world.4
Moreover Egypt, in a region that leads the world in the import of weapons,
is the only Middle East country to have increased its arms purchases
yearly since 1990.5
While the vast majority of Egyptians continue to live in
squalor, the Mubarak government has devoted much of the $28.8 billion in
total aid it has received from the United States since 1979, to
reconstitute, rebuild, and reorganize Egypt’s military to such an extent
that it is approaching the qualitative and quantitative levels of the
Israeli Defense Forces.6
Air Force
Since the early 1980s, Egypt has completed two
five-year plans, and has embarked on a third, to build up, modernize, and
increase its military capabilities. The first five-year plan, which
started in 1983, consisted of rebuilding Egypt’s military infrastructure
which was destroyed during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The primary focus of
these efforts was the construction of new bases and communications
systems. From 1988 to 1993, Egypt channeled funds into the air force by
purchasing American F-16s and upgrading its command and control, and
air-defense capabilities. 7
In the current five-year plan, the air force continues
to receive the priority of aid. Egypt spends as much as 80% of US military
aid on the air force. As part of the Peace Vector Program, the Egyptian
Air Force has made five orders of F-16s, and will total 190 planes by the
time all the aircraft are delivered. About 130 F-16s have already arrived
and the last batch, which will be assembled in Turkey, started arriving in
1996. 8
Additionally, Egypt has received approval for the purchase of 21 F-16C
aircraft and for modification of its existing F-16 C/Ds including the
installation and integration of Harpoon and GBU-15 weapons capability.9
Egypt has equipped its aircraft with relatively modern accessories
including AN/ACR-69 radar warning systems, AN/ALE-40V chaff/flair
dispensers, and AN/ALQ-131V jamming pods.10
Moreover, Egypt has requested the purchase of services
for the modification and upgrade of F-16 A/B aircraft engines at a cost of
$86 million. 11
Today, Egypt can field a modern, sophisticated air force with about 550
airplanes, more than half of Western origin. The Egyptians have also
bought advance ordnance, avionics and accessories and is upgrading its
aging Soviet aircraft by equipping its MiG-21 fighter aircraft with night
vision capabilities.12
Egypt augmented its air-to-air missile capabilities by requesting the
purchase of 271 AIM-7M Sparrow and 314 AIM-9M Sidewinder missiles.13
These missiles will supplement its extensive air-to-surface missile
inventory that includes AGM-65A/B/D Maverick, Exocet AM-39, and Rockeye
missiles.14
Egypt has been cooperating with the US to develop an
advanced C31 system that will assimilate data from air and ground sources
into a single network so that aircraft and missile systems can engage
multiple targets simultaneously. 15
Egypt has enhanced its airborne early-warning capabilities by taking
delivery of five Grumman E-2C Hawkeyes, two CH-130Es, and four Beech
1990s.16 Moreover,
a $7.5 million contract was rewarded to Orbital Sciences Corporation to
provide Egypt with Mission Support Systems (MSS) which included: 16 MSS II
+ mission planning workstation subsystems and associated data; one MSS II
database preparation system, and 100 satellite imagery.17
The Egyptians are also acquiring a modern helicopter
fleet. Egypt has already received delivery of 24 Apaches (AH64A), and is
expected to take delivery of 12 more. 18 These helicopters posses state-of-the-art
night-flying equipment and carry up to 16 Hellfire antitank missiles and
38 rockets.19 These
helicopters will supplement Egypt’s existing arsenal of attack helicopters
consisting of 74 SA-342L, many of which are armed with HOT air-to-surface
missiles and 30mm guns.20
Nor is the improvement limited to equipment
acquisition. The Egyptian Air Force has adopted Western command and
control, attack techniques, support and aerial combat roles. Many Egyptian
pilots are being trained to Western standards, often at US training
facilities. Moreover, Egypt is building advance maintenance and training
facilities for F-16 repair depots and has expanded their support efforts
to provide depot level and other major maintenance. 21
Air Defense
Egypt has continued the Soviet practice of maintaining
separate air-defense command structure. As a consequence, Egypt’s
air-defense system is one of the largest and most complex systems in the
Middle East. 22
While Egypt still maintains large stocks of antiquated Soviet systems, it
has been steadily improving its air defense capabilities.
Among some of the notable Egyptian acquisitions are 12
Improved Hawk batteries with 72 Improved Hawk launchers and 12 Crotale
batteries with 24-36 Crotale missile launchers. 23
Egypt’s air-defense capabilities were also enhanced by the acquisition of
180 Hawk and 1,000 Hellfire II missiles.24
Additionally, Egypt improved its existing Hawk missile systems through the
purchase of Raytheon’s Phase III Product Improvement Program. The
estimated cost for this program is $303 million and includes modification
kits, systems engineering, remanufacturing of selected hardware and other
related items of system support.25
Egypt has also procured British-made Plessey AR-3D and TSR-2100 radars.26
Army
Egypt has also modernized its ground forces.
Until the late 1970s, the Egyptian army comprised 10 divisions, only half
of them either mechanized or armored. Today, the army has 12 divisions;
all but one of them is either mechanized or armored. Egypt plans to field
a total mechanized army by 2005. 27
The result is that the Egyptian army is now capable of fielding a modern
mechanized military that can move with the speed and firepower equal to
that of most modern armies. The mechanized divisions revolve around some
4,500 armored personnel carriers, the core of which consists of 2,000 US
M-113s. Egypt, in order to further modernize its infantry ground forces,
has contracted for the delivery of 611 Dutch YPR-765 armored infantry
fighting vehicles to replace its aging BMP forces.28
Egypt is also upgrading its Fahd-30 AIFVs with BMP-2 turrets.29
Additionally, Egypt has substantially improved its anti-tank capability
with the acquisition of 2,372 TOW 2A missiles and its intention to buy 540
TOW launchers.30
The armored corps was also the focus of reform. In the
1970s, the Egyptian armored corps was comprised almost exclusively of
Soviet tanks, the best of which was the T-62. Today, Egypt’s armored corps
is comprised of some of the most modern tanks in the US inventory. Egypt
began the transformation of its armored forces by forming two armored
divisions following its acquisition of 850 M-60 A3s. Egypt currently has
1,700 M-60s (1,100 M-60A3s) and plans to upgrade all of its M60A1 tanks
to A3 standards. 31
Egypt is also improving its aging Soviet armor by contracting with UK
firms to provide those tanks with greater armor-penetrating ammunition.32
Navy
Despite enormous costs, Egypt has also taken steps to
improve its navy. Egypt is focusing on upgrading the Egyptian fleet of
eight submarines acquired from China. It has leased two former US Navy
Knox class frigates and is expected to receive 10 ex-US Navy Seasprite ASW
helicopters upgraded to SH-2G(E) standards. 33
Additionally, Egypt has requested the purchase of two PERRY class frigates
(USS Gallery and Duncan FFG10). The ships are equipped with MK-46 MOD-5
torpedoes and Phalanx Close-in-Weapon Systems (CIWS).34
As part of its inculcation of Western technology, the
navy holds joint maneuvers with units of the American, French, British and
Italian navies. Egypt is also modernizing four Chinese-built Romeo class
submarines with improved weapon systems including Harpoon missiles, fire
control systems and sonars. 35
WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT
Egypt is also expanding its own domestic production of
military armaments. The Egyptian government has approximately 20 military
arsenals under the Egyptian Military Factories (EMF) which are managed by
the Ministry for Defense and Military Production/National Organization for
Military Production (NOMP). Some of Egypt’s significant weapon development
efforts include the following:
Factory 200
After the Gulf War, the Egyptians began to assemble the
US-made M1A1, which is widely regarded as one of the finest tanks in the
world, under the “Factory 200” program. The M1A1 “Factory 200” program is
a major milestone in Egyptian efforts to achieve limited military
self-sufficiency. Egypt obtained US approval in 1984 to build a giant
factory to produce new tanks. Under the agreement, the Egyptians will
assemble 524 M1A1 tanks, and officials hope that the number will
eventually rise to 1,500 tanks. 36
Six production cycles were established with each increment increasing the
level of technology from General Dynamics Land Systems. The cost is
estimated at $3.2 billion. The Egyptians also will produce the 120mm
cannon as well as an increasing number of parts for the tank. Egyptian
officials say the goal is to make Cairo self-sufficient in tank
production.
Egyptian Infantry Fighting Vehicle Program
Egypt is testing the prototype of the Egyptian Infantry
Fighting Vehicle (EIFV). Development is being done by United Defense LP (UDLP)
of the US and Egyptian Ministry of Military Production. It is designed to
compliment the MiA1 battle tank and is armed with a 25mm M242 chain gun, a
7.62mm M240 co-axial machine gun and a twin launch for the TOW anti-tank
guided system. 37
Sakr Factory
The Sakr Factory for Developed Industries produces
artillery and missile systems of several types. Thus far, Sakr had
produced three families of 122mm multiple rocket launchers including: the
Saqr 36 with a maximum range of 36 kilometers, the Saqr 18, and the Saqr
10. 38 Egypt, in
addition to its imports, is modifying and experimenting with different
systems in an attempt to develop an indigenous production capacity. The
factory also developed the Saqr Eye (an improved version of the SA-7B
which is more sensitive and reliable than the original).39
Abu Za`abal Engineering Industries
This arms manufacturer produces automatic guns and
artillery pieces with a caliber up to 203mm. Among its projects is the
23mm Nile 23 and Sinai 23 air-defense gun vehicle, and manufacture of
105mm guns for upgrading T-55 tanks. It has also produced an indigenous
23mm weapon system (Ramadan 23), which combines two ZU 23mm fire units
with a Contraves Gun King laser/computer firing system. 40
Heliopolis Company
Heliopolis manufactures the SA-7 warheads as well as
100mm and 115mm tank ammunition, 122mm rockets, 100 AA ammunition, aerial
bombs, depth charges, and other associated products.
Arab-American Vehicle Co. (AAVCO)
AAV company is a joint Egyptian and American venture
formed in 1977. The company employs over 17,000 workers and produces
military jeeps and other light vehicles.
Arab-British Defense Co. (AB-DCO)
Formed in 1978 as a joint Arab-British project, AB-DCO
has produced well over 1,000 Swingfire ATGMs under British license.
Additionally, the company has produced a modernized Soviet 9M14M Malyutka
Sagger ATGM and is devloping a new warhead with greater armor-piercing
capability. The plant has also been involved in a joint manufacture
venture of SA-2 Guideline SM missiles with China or North Korea.
NON-CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
Nuclear
Egypt was one of the first countries to obtain nuclear
capabilities when it purchased a small research reactor from the Soviet
Union in the early 1960s. Despite this distinction, it appears that Egypt
has made the strategic decision to concentrate its efforts on increasing
its conventional forces and non-conventional chemical and biological
capabilities, rather than developing nuclear weapons. However, Egypt is
currently building a 300 MW Chinese-made reactor that will have the
capacity to manufacture four nuclear warheads a month. 41
Additionally, Egypt is believed to be seeking joint nuclear weapons
research with Syria and Saudi Arabia to defray the prohibitive costs and
allow Egypt to continue its conventional buildup.42
Chemical/Biological Weapons
Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, Egypt was believed to have
been working with Iraq for years on the production and stockpiling of
chemical weapons. 43
While the size of its arsenal is not known, it is probably similar to that
of Iraq prior to the Gulf War. Chemical weapons are part of the Egyptian
army’s “standard issue” and Egypt operates a chemical plant at Abu
Za`abal.44
Ballistic Missiles
Egypt has possessed long-range missile capabilities
since its acquisition of FROG-7 and Scud B missiles in the 1960s. Today,
Egypt has a highly advanced weapons production capacity, trailing only
Israel in the region. 45
Egypt has developed and deployed the Sakr-80 rocket, as well as the
Project-T (an enhanced Scud-C) missiles with a range of 450 kilometers and
a payload of 985 kg.46
The Sakr-80 with a maximum range of 80 kilometers and a payload of 200
kilograms was designed to replace Egypt’s aging FROG systems.47
Cairo is working with the North Koreans to upgrade the
Scud’s range and accuracy. The project began as early as 1981, Western
intelligence sources say, when Egypt transferred several Scud Bs to
Pyongyang, violating the Egyptian treaty with Moscow. The Koreans then
used reverse engineering to extend the range and improve the accuracy of
the Scud B. The result has been the Scud C and Scud D, with ranges of 600
and 1,000 km respectively. 48
North Korea, as part of its agreement, supplied several shipments of Scud
C missile materials to Egypt.49
The most ambitious Egyptian effort over the past decade
has been the Badr/Condor missile project. Conceived by Argentina,
developed further by German scientists and financed by Iraq, the Condor
resembled the US Pershing missile. Western intelligence sources say Egypt
wanted the Condor to counter Israel’s Jericho II missile, with a reported
range of up to 1,500 km. The Badr/Condor was designed to be an advanced
two-stage, solid-fuel, inertial guided ballistic missile with a 700 kg
payload over 1,000 kilometers and an accuracy to within 100 meters. 50
However, cooperation of the joint project was terminated in 1989 and the
missile was never fielded. However, the collaborate effort provided Egypt
with a wealth of missile-related technology that was undoubtedly used in
other projects.51
EGYPT’S DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
A cursory review of the official published figures of
Egypt’s military expenditures indicate that there exists serious anomalies
between the decade-long Egyptian arms buildup and its officially stated
annual defense budget. 52
Official figures of Egyptian defense expenditures have reflected a
dramatic decline in its yearly defense budget. However, contemporaneous
with its declining expenditures, Egypt has been in the midst of
transforming its military from a 1970s Soviet-based military to a modern
1990s Western-based military. For example, in 1985 only 20% of Egyptian
armor and some 50% of Egyptian aircraft were of Western origin. Today,
over 85% of Egyptian armor and almost 85% of Egyptian aircraft are from
the West.
This presents a serious anomaly since militaries
generally experience increased costs during transition periods, as more
funds are needed for training, familiarization, and maintenance costs. In
this respect, it is worth noting that Egypt is not only absorbing Western
equipment but is also adapting Western war-fighting doctrines and command
and control techniques. Consequently, it is incongruous to believe that a
country can transform a military consisting of: over 440,000 personnel,
3,500 Main Battle Tanks, and over 550 Combat Aircraft, in so dramatic a
fashion, while simultaneously reducing its expenditures by over 60%. This
is especially true of a third-world country lacking a history of fiducial
discipline and one that is hardly imbued with the traditions of thrift and
efficiency when it comes to its bureaucracy.
While ascertaining accurate Egyptian annual defense
expenditures is a challenging task, given the unavailability of accurate
data from the host country, it is by no means impossible. Given the
relative availability of open sources in the West, it is possible to
obtain general information on the Operational and Maintenance (O&M) costs
incurred in training, fielding, and sustaining various military units. 53
From this information, it is possible to extrapolate how much it would
cost Egypt to construct, train, field, and sustain its military.
While this analysis is far from precise, given the
enormous cultural and political discrepancies that would cause deviations
in the amount devoted toward maintenance and training, it is far more
accurate than relying on official published figures. This is due to the
relative stability in what a supplier or manufacturer charges for
consumable and repair parts. Indeed, if anything, the cost to a
third-world country to maintain its equipment should be incrementally
higher since the part in question is subject to a myriad of additional
costs associated with importing the component. This chapter analyzes the
costs involved to field, train, and maintain a military of the quality and
quantitative size, as that of Egypt, in an attempt to ascertain a more
accurate estimate of yearly Egyptian military expenditures.
ARMY
Heavy Divisions
Egypt currently fields and maintains four active
armored divisions and eight mechanized divisions. The majority of the
hardware of these weapons are US made M-60 Al/3s tanks, MJAl tanks, and
M-113 armored personnel carriers. According to a published Total Force
Policy Report to the Congress (December 31, 1990), the annual cost to
field and maintain an active US Army Armored/Mechanized division is $976
million dollars. 54
Of this amount, yearly operational costs for the armored division are $146
million and for the mechanized division $140.3 million.55
An additional $175 million is spent on equipment avg./yr., and the
remaining funds are associated personnel costs (military pay, family
housing, etc.). A more detailed breakdown of the yearly operational costs
are as follows:
|
Armored Division |
Mechanized Division |
Consumables |
$48.962 |
$47.995 |
Reparables |
$70.266 |
$65.267 |
POL |
$ 5.651 |
$ 5.470 |
Indirect |
$21.152 |
$21.609 |
|
$146.031 |
$140.341 |
Source: Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations. Cost figures are in millions.
This would put Egypt’s yearly operational costs for
maintaining its four armored and eight mechanized divisions at $584.1
million and $1,122.7 million respectively Consequently the total yearly
operational costs for Egypt to maintain its heavy divisions would be
$1,706.8 million or 46.3% of Egypt’s total officially reported annual
defense expenditures. Additionally, the annual cost for equipment avg./yr.
per heavy division is $185 million or a total of $2,220 million for
Egypt’s 12 heavy divisions. 56
This puts the total annual costs of maintaining Egypt’s 12
heavy divisions at $3,926.8 million (excluding personnel costs) or 133% of
Egypt’s total officially reported annual defense expenditures.
Additionally, Egypt maintains the equivalent of at
least one additional armored and mechanized division in the form of
independent brigades. These include a Republican Guard armored brigade,
two armored brigades, and four mechanized brigades. Moreover, the overall
costs associated with these units are approximately 30% higher given their
independent command structure. 57
Consequently, the addition of these two divisions adds approximately $853
million to the total costs for Egypt to maintain its heavy forces. These
additions put the total annual costs of maintaining Egypt’s heavy forces
at $4,779.8 million (excluding personnel costs).
Light/Airborne Divisions
In addition to its heavy divisions, Egypt also fields
the equivalent of two more divisions in the form of three independent
infantry brigades, 2 airmobile brigades and a parachute brigade. According
to a March 4, 1997, Department of Defense information paper submitted to
the House National Security Committee, the yearly operating costs for
infantry divisions are as follows: Light Infantry Division ($583 million);
Airborne Division ($733 million), Air Assault Division ($951 million).
As with the heavy units, the majority of expenditures,
approximately 65%, are derived from direct personnel (military pay,
housing, travel, etc.) expenses. After deducting the personnel expenses we
are left with the following yearly operating costs: Light Infantry
Division ($204 million), Airborne Division ($256.5 million), Air Assault
Division ($332.8 million).
However, since Egypt maintains these units in the form
of independent brigades, the costs associated in maintaining these units
are approximately 30% higher than if they were part of a division. This
raises the yearly operating costs: $272 million for the three independent
infantry brigades. $111.5 million for the independent airborne brigade,
and $295 million for the two independent airmobile brigades, thereby
putting the total estimated yearly operating costs to maintain its
independent light units at $678.8 million (excluding personnel costs).
Field Artillery
Egypt maintains 15 independent artillery brigades. Its
artillery strength consists of: over 1,100 major towed weapons including
D-20 152mm, A-19 Model 1931/1937 122mm and M-46 130mm weapons; 150
self-propelled weapons including M109A1 155mm howitzers; 200 multiple
rocket launchers; and more than 21 surface-to-surface missile launchers.
A breakdown of the yearly operational costs for an
artillery brigade is as follows:
Consumables |
$3.573 |
Reparables |
$9.633 |
POL |
$0.311 |
Indirect |
$1.822 |
|
$15.339 |
Source: Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations.
Cost figures are in millions and
are for a 155mm Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion.
These figures exclude
personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.
If we multiply the 15 brigades by the yearly
operational costs of $15.339 million we arrive at a figure of $230.08
million. Additionally, since these battalions are constructed in the form
of independent brigades, and have their own command and support
structures, an additional $4.6 million needs to be added to each brigade
thereby bringing the annual operational costs per brigade to $19.93
million and a total annual expenditure rate for Egypt’s field artillery
assets to $298.95 million (excluding personnel and equipment costs
avg./yr.).
Air Defense Command
The Egyptian Air Defense Command consists of
approximately 80,000 men and is organized into five divisions with over
100 battalions, These forces include over 90 SA-2/3/6 battalions, as well
as 12 batteries each of I-HAWK, Chapparal, and Crotale. Additionally, they
man a number of fixed-site AA guns including 23mm ZU-23, S7mm S-60, 8Smm
and 100mm KS-19 guns. A more detailed breakdown of the yearly operational
costs for an ADA battalion are as follows:
Consumables |
$1.45 |
Reparables |
$1.36 |
POL |
$0.11 |
Indirect |
$0.77 |
|
$3.69 |
Source: Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations.
Cost figures are in millions
and are for a US ADA Avenger Battalion.
These figures exclude personnel
and equipment costs avg./yr.
If we multiply the yearly operational costs of $3.69
million by Egypt’s 100 active duty ADA battalions, we arrive at a total
figure of $369 million for the maintenance of Egypt’s Air Defense Command
(excluding personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.). While the actual
costs of maintaining a lesser quality ADA Battalion may be lower, this
estimate is viable, and may be considerably lower in actual estimates,
when accounting for the fact that Egypt maintains a totally independent
command structure for its ADA assets.
Air Force
The Egyptian Air Force consists of over 550 aircraft
comprising seven squadrons of strike aviation aircraft and a fighter force
of 16 squadrons. These forces include some 190 F-16s, 100 Mirages, and
over 200 aging Chinese J series and Soviet MiGs. These forces are equipped
with a wide variety of missiles including AA-2 Atoll, AIM-7 Sparrows,
AIM-9 Sidewinders, AM-39 and Excoets. Egypt has a transport force that
includes 19 C-130Hs, five DHC-5Ds, and one Super King Air. Moreover, Egypt
possesses over 100 attack helicopters, comprising some 15 squadrons
including 24 AH-64s (with an additional 12 on order) and 74 French
Gazelles. Additionally, Egypt has 18 airborne warning and control aircraft
as well as a large number of rotary wing transport and support
helicopters. A detailed breakdown of the yearly operational costs for a
squadron of F-16C/Ds is as follows:
Aviation Fuel |
$4.3 |
Depot Maintenance |
$0.8 |
Consumable Supplies |
$1.7 |
Depot Level Reparables |
$6.5 |
Training Munitions |
$1.1 |
Rel and Safety Mod Kits |
$1.1 |
Rel and Safety Mod Install |
$0.2 |
Training |
$0.5 |
|
$16.2 |
Source: Department of the Air Force, 11th Wing, Freedom
of Information Manager.
Cost figures are in millions.
These figures exclude personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.
If we multiply the yearly operational costs by the 23
squadrons in the Egyptian Air Force we arrive at a yearly operational cost
of $372.6 million (excluding personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.).
A detailed breakdown of the yearly operational costs
for a squadron of Ah-64s is as follows:
Consumables |
$ 2.34 |
Reparables |
$11.02 |
POL |
$ 0.46 |
Indirect |
$ 0.36 |
|
$14.18 |
Source: Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations.
Cost figures are in millions.
These figures exclude personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.
Using the figure of $14.18 million for the average
yearly operating cost per squadron, we arrive at a total figure of $212.7
million for the yearly operational costs for Egypt’s 15 attack helicopter
squadrons. This brings the total cost for Egypt’s attack fighters and
helicopters to $585.3 million (excluding personnel and equipment costs
avg./yr). While the actual yearly operational cost may differ due to the
fact that not all the squadrons are F-16C/Ds and Ah-64s, this discrepancy
is adequately compensated by the fact that the analysis is excluding the
large number of aircraft including its transportation and training assets.
Navy
Egypt’s navy consists of 33 patrol boats, eight
frigates, nine minesweepers, eight submarines and one aging destroyer. Its
naval aviation assets include 10 Seasprites, nine Gazelles, and five Sea
Kings. The Egyptian Coast Guard is part of the navy and operates around 60
small patrol craft, nine Swift-ships, and 12 PCIs.
Data concerning the number of training and operational
hours that the ships in the Egyptian navy conduct each year is
unavailable. However, the hourly costs to operate naval aircraft and
vessels of a similar type found in the Egyptian navy are as follows:
Component |
|
Hourly Cost |
FFG-7 |
|
$3,039 |
Minesweeper |
|
$1,036 |
E-2C |
|
$2,761 |
SH-2 |
|
$ 830 |
Source: Department of the Navy, Freedom of Information
Office.
These figures exclude personnel and equipment costs avg./yr.
Given the high hourly cost involved in operating naval
vessels, and the size and magnitude of the Egyptian navy, a yearly
operational cost (excluding personnel and equipment replacement costs) of
$150 million is a conservative estimate.
Personnel Costs
Thus far, this discussion has not addressed the myriad
personnel expenses including salaries, clothing, food, housing, and
medical costs involved in maintaining and sustaining a large military.
Traditionally. these are the largest expenses that a military incurs.
Using the example of the US heavy division, at least $617 million or 63%
of its annual budget is devoted to personnel expenses. While recognizing
that Egyptian personnel expenses do not approach US levels, the
maintenance and sustainment of a large standing army does consume a
substantial portion of its officially stated budget.
Egypt has approximately 440,000 men in uniform. Of
these, approximately 275,000 are conscripts. However, just the basic costs
involved in maintaining such a large military consumes a significantly
higher amount than Egypt’s reported defense expenditures, especially,
following the institution of a number or reforms by the military during
the 1980s to improve the quality of life of military service, in hopes of
making it more appealing and attractive to more volunteers.
These reforms have included: periodic pay raises,
reduced prices when purchasing cars, access to better health care, visits
to special resort areas, and special commissaries that carried products
unavailable to the general civilian populace. However, by far the most
ambitious and expensive project was the construction of military cities.
Each city is designed to accommodate as many as 150,000 people and
includes (in addition to a comfortable apartment) schools, nurseries,
supermarkets, banks, water purification systems, and solar heating.58
The construction of these cities represents a considerable expenditure and
is arguably comparable, in both scope and cost, to the benefits offered
active-duty US service members. 59
While most of these reforms were directed towards career and volunteer
soldiers, the quality of life of the Egyptian conscript also improved
during this time.
Consequently considering the direct costs of sustaining
a soldier, such as clothing, feeding, housing, health care, etc., coupled
with the indirect costs such as benefits paid to retirees, construction
and maintenance of the military cities, and dependent care, an average
cost of $25 per day per soldier is rather modest. However, using $25 as
the average cost per soldier and multiplying that amount by the number of
personnel in its active forces, we arrive at an annual expenditure rate of
$4.015 million (excluding direct pay).
The average pay for a conscript is about $10 a month.
However, volunteers, career enlisted soldiers, and officers enjoy
substantially higher wages that are competitive with the civilian sector.
Using the per-capita income of $689 (FY 94 figure) as the average annual
salary for career soldiers and $120 as the annual salary for a conscript,
we arrive at a total yearly expenditure for salaries of $113.685 million
for career and volunteer soldiers, and $33 million for conscripts, for a
total annual expenditure of $146.685 million on salaries. This raises the
total yearly personnel expenditure to $4,161.685 million.
It is important to stress that this is a conservative
estimate of personnel expenditures. Normally, personnel expenditures
constitute the lion’s share of a military’s budget. Indeed, approximately
65% of the yearly operational costs of fielding, maintaining, and
sustaining a US unit is devoted to personnel costs. Moreover, US figures
exclude all of the collateral costs included in this Egyptian estimate
such as civilian construction, retirement pay, etc.
Reserves
In addition to its large standing army, Egypt also
sustains a reserve force of over 600,000 soldiers. However, unlike most
Western armies, the Egyptian reserve system is thought to be totally
dysfunctional with only some 150,000 soldiers receiving any meaningful
training. 60 Taking
the 150,000 soldiers and estimating that they receive an average of 30
days training at an average cost of 60% of that of an active-duty soldier,
we arrive at a total reserve budget of $187.470 million. Furthermore,
assuming that an additional 150,000 receive a total of 15 days training,
at a cost of 40% of that of an active-duty soldier, we arrive at an
additional cost of $37.6 million for a total annual reserve cost of $225.5
million. This averages out to a yearly expenditure of $752 per soldier.
A conservative estimate of the Egyptian military budget
is far higher than its official figure of $2.7 billion. Indeed, as the
following table illustrates, Egypt actually spends a minimum of more than
four times its officially reported figures to maintain, sustain, and
operate a military as large and qualitative as it does:
Component |
|
Estimated Yearly Operating Costs |
Heavy Divisions |
|
$ 4,779.8 million |
Light/Airborne Divisions |
|
$ 678.8 million |
Air Defense Command |
|
$ 369.0 million |
Artillery |
|
$ 298.9 million |
Air Force |
|
$ 585.3 million |
Navy |
|
$ 150.0 million |
Personnel Costs |
|
$ 4,161.0 million |
Reserves |
|
$ 225.5 million |
Total |
|
$ 11,249.0 million |
Once again, it needs to be reiterated that these
figures are conservative estimates and that the actual figures could be
higher (as many smaller components, as well as equipment costs avg./yr.
for many units were not included in calculating the total annual
figures).61 In this
respect, it is worth noting that the US FY97 O&M budget request for its
510,000 troop army is $21.4 billion and that Egypt fields an army over 60%
(310,000 troops) the size of that of the United States.62
Consequently, a comparable level of spending would put Egyptian O&M
expenditures at around $12.84 billion for just its active duty components.
Moreover, the daily logistical costs of doing business, i.e. transporting
equipment, import overhead costs related to part and equipment purchases,
fuel, oil, etc. tend to be more expensive in third-world countries than
in the United States. Consequently, actual expenditures for any given
piece of equipment should be higher.
Additionally, three important considerations need to be
noted. First, unlike the Egyptian military, US forces logically should not
have to devote as much resources (per unit) on training as compared to
the Egyptians. This is due to the fact that US training doctrine has not
undergone the extensive evolution of changing its war-fighting doctrine to
the extent of the Egyptians. Notwithstanding the constant state of
transition of the US military, as it integrates particular nuances of its
doctrine into the system, it is hardly of the revolutionary nature that is
currently taking place within the Egyptian military establishment as it
transforms its military from a Soviet-based to a Western-based military.
Second, the Egyptian military, as it adopts and
integrates Western war-fighting doctrine, has to reorganize and retrain
much of its military. Since sustainment operations are relatively less
costly than training costs, it stands to reason that the Egyptian’s
operation and maintenance (O&M) expenditures (per unit of measure) to
train its forces, should not substantially deviate from what it costs the
US military to sustain their forces.
A typical US Armored Division trains about 12 to 15
weeks annually. This training includes “train-up” time spent to prepare
for, and participate in, one or two major deployments such as to The
National Training Center. Egypt also conducts two or three major
deployments annually, such as Bright Star and Badr exercises.
Consequently, given the relatively small amount of time US forces actually
spend training, it is hard to imagine the Egyptians training substantially
less.
Finally, US military planners vehemently contend that
the current levels of spending are the minimum required to sustain their
forces. The Department of Defense has been arguing since the beginning of
its drawdown in the late 1980s that any significant reductions would make
US forces “hollow” and incapable of fulfilling US national strategic
objectives. Consequently, either the Egyptians are spending a similar
amount on O&M or they are fielding a very hollow army. Whatever the case,
the task of the strategic planner is to assume the worst.
Moreover, this estimate does not even begin to take
into consideration the score of civilian administrative and support tasks
that are needed to sustain a divisional unit such as: non-divisional
training support services, civilian support services and O&M costs for
non-divisional support facilities, as well as administrative and staffing
costs for the maintenance of Egypt’s military schools and institutions.63
Most important, this analysis has excluded three
critical and extremely expensive components of the Egyptian military
industrial complex. These components are Egypt’s defense industry, its
non-conventional weapons research and development programs, and its
military intelligence network. Traditionally, these components are among
the most expensive outlays of military expenditures. While it is not
possible to obtain open source data on the cost of these components, a
conservative estimate, given the size and magnitude of these programs, is
$4 to $6 billion. This would put actual annual Egyptian military
expenditures at between $15 and $17 billion.
In 1994, Egypt surpassed the United States to become
the second largest arms importer, behind Saudi Arabia, in the world.
Moreover, Egypt, in a region that leads the world in the import of
weapons, is the only Middle East country to have increased its arms
purchases yearly since 1990. Whatever the actual figures of annual
Egyptian military expenditures, it is clear that it is far higher than its
reported $2.7 billion.
Indeed, this analysis is probably significantly
underestimating actual Egyptian military expenditures. The Egyptian
military industrial complex pervades all aspects of Egyptian society
thereby blurring the distinction between civil and military expenditures.
While most published sources put annual Egyptian
military expenditures at 7 to 10% of gross national product, this figure
is grossly underestimated. Given the size of its active conventional
forces, its large non-conventional research and development programs, and
its conventional military defense industry, actual annual Egyptian
military expenditures is closer to 20 to 30% of its gross national product
(GNP). Historically, only countries engaged in a full-scale war have
devoted such a large percentage of their GNP to defense.
Egypt is bordered by Libya, Sudan, and Israel. While
Sudan’s Islamic regime is potentially ideologically threatening, its 300
main battle tanks (250 of which are T-54/55s) and some 50 combat aircraft
pose a negligible threat to Egypt. On paper, Libya’s military is far more
formidable than Sudan’s. However, its forces hardly present a threat to
Egypt. Approximately 1,600 of Libya’s 2,200 tanks are old Soviet T-54/5s.
Moreover, a lack of manpower has forced Libya to place over half of
its armor, as well as many of its 400 aircraft, in storage, thereby making
Libya little more than a massive arms depot.64
It is significant to note that Libya’s 80,000 man
military is less than 20% the size of Egypt’s. Finally, despite the
triangle of tension that periodically erupts between Egypt and its Islamic
neighbors, the three countries have demonstrated a willingness to rally
over perceived pan-Islamic issues. For example, notwithstanding the belief
that Sudan was behind the June 1995 assassination attempt on Mubarak’s
life, Egypt opposed attempts by the United States to impose a military
embargo on Sudan. Egypt also opposed the US when it threatened to take
military action against a suspected Libyan chemical plant. Consequently,
Israeli strategic planners should be asking themselves towards whom is the
current, Egyptian military buildup directed.
However, this does not suggest that war is imminent or
a high probability in the short-term. Currently, the Egyptians, despite
their major modernization efforts, are still incapable of launching a
successful and credible military offensive that would pose an existential
threat to Israel. Egypt still suffers from a number of qualitative
weaknesses that would make an Egyptian attack in the short-term a
strategic mistake.65
However, Egypt currently possesses a formidable defense capability. This
capability affords Egypt greater flexibility as it pursues its strategic
goal of achieving regional hegemony.
The quantitative and qualitative size of the Egyptian
military would serve as a powerful deterrent in any deterioration of
relations between Egypt and Israel, thereby affording Egypt the capability
of heightening tensions to the level of those that existed in June 1967.
Consequently, given Egypt’s strategic interests, an Egyptian
remilitarization of the Sinai, in the mid-term, cannot be ruled out.
Unlike 1967, Israel would have to absorb such a psychological blow as the
balance of forces would preclude Israel from achieving strategic surprise.
CONCLUSIONS
Notwithstanding the enormous military buildup of
forces in the region, the IDF still maintains a discernable qualitative
advantage over the neighboring Arab forces in weaponry, manpower, and
integration of war-fighting technologies. However, the decade-long massive
influx of Western weaponry to the Arab countries has seriously eroded
Israel’s qualitative superiority while simultaneously widening the
quantitative gap in favor of the Arabs.
The influx of Western armaments poses at least two
significant adverse ramifications for Israel. First, the influx of Western
technology will insure that the technological gap between Israel and its
neighbors will remain significantly reduced as compared to other periods.
The influx of Western technology and the deployment by the Arabs of “smart
weapons” has dramatically increased the ability of the common Arab combat
soldier. The underlying premise dictating the production of many US
weapons is the KISS principle (keep it simple, stupid). Under this
principle, weapons are designed to be utilized by soldiers with negligible
understanding of how these weapons may work. Today, weapons of extreme
lethality can now effectively be employed by soldiers who traditionally
lacked the capability to effectively employ sophisticated equipment.
Consequently, Israel’s much heralded human qualitative
edge is somewhat neutralized, as many of these weapons have made target
acquisition, and therefore target destruction, much simpler. Moreover, the
Arabs have closed the human qualitative gap due to a tremendous increase
in the number of engineer and natural science graduates from Arab
universities in the last two decades. 66
How this would relate on any future battlefield is open to speculation.
However, it probably would significantly increase Israeli losses in any
future conflict.
Second, the relative cost for Israel to maintain any
qualitative gap is now much greater. Israel has generally maintained a
high degree of technological advanced armaments. Consequently, each
incremental gain in Israel’s qualitative advantage will cost that country
substantially more in research and development costs. This will make the
relative cost of each new system more expensive and will limit any attempt
by Israel to hold, or decrease, the Arab’s quantitative advantage.
Technology returns tend towards an S shape: increasing
performance for cost in its early growth phase and diminishing returns
during its later phase. As Israel precedes its neighbors along the S
curve, Israel’s costs will increase faster if it desires to maintain a
constant level of technological superiority. 67
Consequently, Israel can maintain qualitative superiority only by devoting
more resources from force structures to technology. Since Israel, as
virtually every country, operates within well-defined budget constraints,
it can maintain its qualitative advantage only at the expense of allowing
the quantitative gap to increase.
Compounding this problem are numerous reports of
declining motivation and military preparedness within the IDF. 68
The roots of this decline can be traced to the political debate during the
1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the misuse of IDF forces during the
Intifada. However, it was the broadening of the ideological schism
between supporters and opponents of the peace process, coupled with the
unrealistic expectations concerning the peace process by the previous
government, that has exacerbated the morale problem. Should this trend of
declining IDF motivation continue, coupled with increasing qualitative
capabilities of its Arab neighbors, then the probability of Israel
maintaining an overall qualitative edge is in jeopardy.69
If Israel loses its discernable qualitative edge, then the prospects for a
tactical military defeat in a future war would shift from a negligible to
a distinct possibility. It needs to be emphasized that the Arab states do
not need to achieve qualitative parity with Israel. They only need to
erode the Israeli qualitative advantage enough to allow their quantitative
superiority to overwhelm the much smaller IDF.
Consequently, while the IDF still may hold a
qualitative advantage over its neighbors, this advantage has been severely
eroded when comparing the current correlation of forces to other periods
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This advantage continues to dissipate as
weapons flood the region from both the West and East as the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the 1991 Gulf War has removed the last restraints
regarding such sales.
Unless current trends are reversed, the prospects of a
future Arab-Israeli war will increase exponentially as more and more
weapons find their way to the Middle East. This will occur regardless of
the outcome of the current peace process. It is the consensus opinion of
many regional and military experts that deterrence of a future
Arab-Israeli war is a direct function of Israel maintaining a perceived
superiority in the balance of forces. 70
Should this perception change, the probability of a future war will be
high. Consequently unless progress in the peace process is accompanied by
recognition from the Islamic states that Israel must maintain strategic
parity with the collective might of all potential enemies, then the peace
process will not succeed. Thus far, the Islamic countries are not willing
to concede this issue and current trends do not bode well for the future.
Estimates are that the Middle East will continue to
lead the world in arms purchases through the rest of the decade. 71
Saudi Arabia, currently the world’s largest arms importer, will continue
to lead the world in arms imports and will import an additional $32.4
billion in weaponry during the remainder of the decade.72
In any future Arab-Israeli war, these weapons will undoubtedly find their
way to the battlefield. Given this environment, Israeli military strategic
planners would be well advised to pay closer attention to its neighbor in
the south■
Endnotes
1
A case in point was the 1973 Yom Kippur War when Israeli strategic
planners appeared to rely heavily on the fact that the Arab states
lacked the military capability to defeat Israel when determining the
probability of attack.
2 For example, independent analysis of China’s defense expenditures have
concluded that China spends up to four times more than its officially
published estimate.
3 US Arms Control Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 95/13, November 1,
1995.
4 Ibid.
5 Egypt’s 1994 imports were approximately 70% higher than its 1990
imports. Ibid.
6 US aid to Egypt has averaged $2.2 billion annually ($1.3 billion of that
aid in military assistance), since 1979. See Clyde R. Mark, Egypt-United States Relations, Federation of American Scientists CRS Issue
Brief, 93087, October 31, 1996.
7 The Jerusalem Post, March 11, 1994.
8 Janes' Defence Weekly, February 28, 1996, p. 23.
9 Egypt initially ordered 46 F-16s in 1991.
SIPRI 1996 Yearbook.
Data for upgrades was taken from Defense Link, April 16,
1996, Memorandum 067-M.
10
Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm, Boulder: Westview Press,
1993, pp. 338-9.
11 Defense Link, September 16, 1996, Memorandum 210-M.
12 Arms
Transfer News, No. 94/8, May 20, 1994.
13
Defense Link, September 5 and 16, 1996, Memorandums 212-M and
193-M.
14
Cordesman, After the Storm, op. cit., p. 338.
15 Janes'
Defence Weekly, February 28,1996, p.23.
16 Anthony
Cordesman, Perilous Prospects: The Peace Process and the Arab-Israeli
Military Balance, Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.
17 News
Release from the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Contract
Announcement, No. 012-96, January 16, 1996.
18 SIPRI
1996 Yearbook.
19 Janes'
Defence Weekly, May 1, 1996, p. 8.
20
Cordesman, After the Storm, op. cit., p. 339.
21 Ibid.,
p.340.
22 Ibid.,
p. 341.
23 Ibid.
24
Defense Link, April 16, 1996, Memorandums 061-M and 071-M.
25
Defense Link, September 5, 1996, Memorandum 196-M.
26
Cordesman, After the Storm, op. cit., p. 341.
27 Janes'
Defence Weekly, February 28, 1996, p. 22.
28 Janes'
Defence Weekly, March 6, 1996, p. 23.
29
Cordesman, Perilous Prospects, op. cit., p. 205.
30
Defense Link, May 10,1996, Memorandum 092-M.
31 Janes' Defence Weekly, February 28, .1996, p. 23.
32 Arms
Transfer News, No. 94/8, May 20, 1994.
33
Military and Arms Transfer News, November 1, 1995.
34
Defense Link, July 29 and April 16, 1996, Memorandums 170-M and
066-M.
35
Military and Arms Transfer News, November 1, 1995.
36 SIPRI
1996 Yearbook database and Janes' Defence Weekly, February 28,
1996, p. 23.
37 Janes'
Defence Weekly, April 9, 1997.
38
Cordesman, After the Storm, op. cit., p. 335.
39 Ibid.,
p. 336.
40 Ibid.
41 The
Jerusalem Post, March 13, 1989.
42 Ibid.
43 The
Jerusalem Post, April 12, 1995.
44 The
Jerusalem Post, March 11, 1994.
45 Federation of American Scientist (FAS) report on Egypt’s missile
proliferation, September 12, 1996.
46 Ibid.
47
Cordesman, After the Storm, op. cit., p. 346.
48 The
Jerusalem Post, March 11, 1994.
49 The
Associated Press, June 21, 1996.
50 FAS, op.
cit.
51 FAS, op.
cit.
52 ACDA has
reported Egyptian defense expenditures as high as $7.17 billion in 1987
to $2.71 billion in 1995. Other estimates have noted a far less dramatic
drop.
53 O&M
costs represents the operating costs of fielding the force. It includes
costs for purchasing and distributing spare parts and supplies to
support the military members and equipment.
54 A
Department of Defense information paper dated March 4,1997, used a
higher figure putting the peacetime cost to operate a heavy division at
$1,014 billion.
55
Department of The Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Plans, letter dated July 18, 1997. The Department of
Defense information paper dated March 4, 1997 used slightly higher
figures of $617 million on personnel, $184 million on operations and
$175 million on equipment avg./yr.
56 A
portion of the replacement equipment costs are offset by the $1.3
billion of annual Foreign Military Assistance from the US.
57 The
costs of maintaining an independent brigade is usually about 30% higher
than the costs associated with a brigade in a division. This is because
an independent brigade has its own combat support units such as:
intelligence detachment, combat engineers, air defense artillery, etc.
58 US
Department of the Army, Army Area Handbook – Egypt, March 15,
1994.
59 There is
no denying that the daily standard of living enjoyed by the American
soldier is far superior to that of his Egyptian counterpart. However,
considering the relative costs of providing the types of services now
offered by the Egyptian military in construction of “military cities”,
the investment, as a percentage of costs related to per-capita income,
is comparable.
60
Cordesman, After the Storm, op. cit., p. 332.
61 While
Foreign Military Assistance programs account for a substantial portion
of replacement costs, it does not begin to cover the total cost.
62 Army
News Service release, March 4, 1997.
63 Egypt
maintains no less than five service academies as well as a general and
staff college. US Department of the Army, Army Area Handbook – Egypt,
op. cit., March 15, 1994.
64 Data for
the Libyan and Sudanese militaries was taken from the IISS Military
Balance for 1995.
65 For
example, Egypt’s military infrastructure and logistics capabilities are
antiquated and scarcely capable of supporting a major rapid excursion
into the Sinai. See Cordesman, Perilous Prospects, op. cit., pp.
209-210.
66 Zeev
Bonen, “The Impact of Technology Developments on the Strategic Balance
in the Middle East”, in Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, The
Middle East Military Balance, Boulder: CO, 1995, p. 160.
67 “The
Impact of Technology”, The Impact of New Military Technology,
The Adelphi Library 4, London, 1981, pp. 37-40.
68
Declining military preparedness on the part of the IDF was most recently
noted by Israeli MK Ephraim Sneh, chairman of a subcommittee of the
Knesset Foreign and Defense committee that deals with control and
management within the defense establishment. MK Sneh emphasized that
this deterioration has been occurring for a number of years. Ha’aretz,
July 30, 1997.
69 This
concern was raised most recently by OC Air Force Maj.-Gen. Eitan Ben-Eliahu,
The Jerusalem Post, July 4, 1997.
70 This was
the consensus opinion of a group of Israeli scholars in response to a
questionnaire put to them by the author.
71
“World-Wide Conventional Arms Trade (1994-2000): A Forecast and
Analysis”, Center for Defense Information Report, December
1994.
72
Estimates were taken for the years 1994-2000, Ibid.
* * *
APPENDIX:
The Changing Arab-Israeli Balance of Power
TABLE ONE:
ARAB-ISRAELI QUANTITATIVE BALANCE OF POWER
Main Battle Tanks
|
1967 |
1973 |
1985/6 |
1989/90 |
1992/3 |
1996/6 |
Total Arab: |
1,450 |
4,841 |
12,870 |
14,156 |
12,521 |
14,436 |
Israel: |
950 |
2,000 |
3,600 |
3,794 |
3,890 |
4,095 |
Ratio: |
1.53 |
2.42 |
3.57 |
3.73 |
3.22 |
3.53 |
Combat Aircraft
|
1967 |
1973 |
1985/6 |
1989/90 |
1992/3 |
1996/6 |
Total Arab: |
580 |
1,038 |
1,988 |
1,940 |
2,109 |
2,190 |
Israel: |
288 |
360 |
640 (555) |
676 (574) |
764 (662) |
699 (597) |
Ratio: |
2.01 |
2.88 |
3.10 (3.38) |
3.00 (3.38) |
2.76 (3.18) |
3.13 (3.67) |
Total Arab numbers include the countries of Egypt,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. Discrepancies in data can be
attributed to attrition caused by the Iran-Iraq and Persian Gulf
conflicts. Israeli figures include aircraft in storage. Numbers in
parentheses represent figures and ratio of aircraft in storage that are not
included.
Source: IISS Military Balance and JCSS Middle
East Military Balance for the appropriate year.
Data for 1967 and 1973 was taken from Anthony Cordesman’s
After the
Storm:
Changing Military Balance in the Middle East, Boulder: Westview
Press, 1993.
TABLE TWO:
EGYPT'S WESTERN SHIFT
|
1985/6
Total West % |
1989/0
Total West % |
1992/3
Total West % |
1995/6
Total West % |
Main Battle Tanks |
1750 350 20 |
2425 785 32 |
3167 1527 48 |
3500 1900 57 |
Combat Aircraft |
504 259 51 |
517 395 76 |
492 432 79 |
564 476 84 |
Source: IISS Military Balance and JCSS Middle
East Military Balance for the appropriate years.
TABLE THREE:
THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI BALANCE OF POWER
Main Battle Tanks
|
1985/6
Total / HQ |
1989/0
Total /HQ |
1992/3
Total / HQ |
1995/6
Total / HQ |
Egypt |
1,750 / 350 |
2,425 / 785 |
3,167 / 785 |
3,500/1,300 |
Israel |
3,600 / 850 |
3,794 / 1,200 |
3,890 / 1,450 |
4,095/1,430 |
Ratio |
2.06/2.43 |
1.56/1.53 |
1.26/1.85 |
1.17/1.10 |
Combat Aircraft
|
1985/6
Total / HQ |
1989/0
Total /HQ |
1992/3
Total / HQ |
1995/6
Total / HQ |
Egypt |
504 / 50 |
517 / 83 |
492 / 89 |
564 / 159 |
Israel |
640 / 265 |
676 / 293 |
764 / 442 |
699 / 458 |
Ratio |
1.20 / 5.3 |
1.30 / 3.53 |
1.55 / 4.97 |
1.24 / 2.88 |
lsraeli figures include aircraft in storage.
Source: IISS Military Balance and JCSS Middle East Military
Balance for the appropriate year.
|