The following is the first
chapter of the book by
David Bukay, Total
Terrorism in the Name of Allah: The Emergence of the New Islamic
Fundamentalists, ACPR Publishers, 2001. |
Total Terrorism in
the Name of Allah:
The Emergence of
the New Islamic Fundamentalists
PART I
David Bukay
Foreword
Islam is extremely widely spread
throughout the world. There are 56 states that belong to the bloc of Islamic
states. In another 40 odd states, Muslims make up a prominent minority. In toto
there are more than one billion Muslims. The Arabs constitute about a quarter of
all Muslims, but they stand out in every field of activity, and in the issue of
Islamic Fundamentalism they are of critical importance.
The “Return to Islam” phenomenon
has many names, according to the observer: awakening, return, rebirth,
reassertion, resurgence, resurrection, militancy, fundamentalism, messianism,
march of Islam, political Islam, Islamism, radical Islam, zealots, Islamic
extremism, Islamic movement, Islamic fanatics.
The Muslims relate to the
phenomenon by a variety of expressions with a positive meaning: deep-rootedness
(usuliyah), men from-the-source (asliyun), Islamists (Islamiyun),
faithful (mu’minun), “[God] fearers” (mutadayinum). But there is
also a negative approach: muta`asibun, mutatarrifun,
mutashadidun, terms that refer to extremist believers and fanatics. We will
use the concept of fundamentalism1 both since
it is akin to “deep-rootedness” in Arabic (usuliyah), and since it is
better understood and more meaningful in the Western political dialogue.
The attitude in the West to the
fundamentalist Islamic threat began to gather momentum only at the end of the
1970s. Until then, the conception was that the problem was a local one of the
Arab regimes, and that all in all, they were succeeding reasonably in contending
with the problem. However, the victory of Khomeinism in Iran supplied tremendous
momentum to the upsurge of Islamic violence which became ever more extreme,
threatening regimes that were viewed as pro-Western, like Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
and Jordan, and even fueling an Islamist uprising in Syria. At the beginning of
the 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European regimes,
while the illusion flourished that the world was marching toward a new age, the
Islamic threat broke into international consciousness. Suddenly, expressions
began to be heard such as “a new Cold War”, “the new fanatic enemy”, and “the
green march”. Yet, the threat was still seen as far off, certainly not a direct
one against Western civilization and modernity.
Only on September 11, 2001, after
the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, was the Islamic
threat internalized. Only then did the comprehension penetrate to the Western
political consciousness that Islam is aggressive and violent, dynamic and
spreading, and that it arouses popular forces huge in their scope. Moreover, its
aspirations are worldwide. Only then, perhaps after a long delay, certainly at
an extremely high price, did the West begin to deploy to contend with it.
Dekmejian analyzed 175 Islamic
movements, and found that 74% were militant and radical, according to their
revolutionary ideology and their operational use of violence. It comes as no
surprise that the country with the largest number of Islamic movements is Egypt
(40), but it is surprising that Lebanon comes in second place with 29. Even
Jordan comes in third place (15). Iraq, which has a Shiite majority, is in
fourth place (13), whereas Syria and Algeria stand out with 12 Islamic movements
each.2 In practice, the number of Islamic
movements significant for research is much smaller.
The Return to Islam movement
began right after the first Muslim defeat at the hands of the unbelievers in the
West. In 1699, Islamic armies besieged the gates of Vienna, but in contrast to
the pattern customary until then, not only were they not victorious but they
were defeated. Not only did they not enforce their policy through a “peace
treaty”, but such treaties were forced upon them, the Treaty of Karlowitz in
1699, and subsequently the Treaty of Constantinople in 1700. This reality was
not temporary, and from then on the Ottoman Empire began its process of decline
compared with the European powers, with the “Eastern Question” becoming a
salient issue, and the focus of discussion being: What to do about the Ottoman
Empire and about its successor states. This too was a sign of a new reality that
the Muslims could not recognize, after all from then on, the discussions
centered on them and their fate.
Muslim weakness facing the West
was to leave deep feelings of frustration and a profound sense of inferiority
among the Muslims, whose conquering, righteous religion had been humbled by the
West, the lowly infidels. This reality was not only unrecognizable but it was
unreasonable. It contradicted all the laws of Islamic logic. The result was a
strengthening of the trend of Return to Islam, back to the sources of the
religion as a means of softening the shock, but also as a source of salvation
and return to “the correct and just condition”. The reactions to the political
and military weaknesses of Islam were always perceived and defined as religious.
The problems were formulated in religious terms, and so were the solutions that
were proposed. The conception was a return to the original Islamic foundations
and the goal was defined as a restoration in the present of past attainments,
and application of the principles of the past for successful activity in the
future.
Out of all the many political and
ideological movements that bloomed in the Middle East, only the Muslim movements
were original in their inspiration and won enthusiastic hearts among the masses.
This is one of the central reasons for the failure of the liberal, fascist,
communist, and socialist movements in the Middle East in the 20th
century. This was also the reason for the absence of democratization processes
in the Arab states and the lack of ability to make a transition to a civil
society.3 The greater the dissonance that was
created between the world outlook of the believer and the harsh reality, the
more he felt impelled to act drastically to change the reality. The profound
cultural conflict of values intensified the social frustration and the political
agitation, and served as a powerful catalyst for the Return to Islam, as to a
warm and beloved hearth. But it is important to know that violent Islamic
aggressivity does not derive only from frustration that leads – in social
science theory – to aggression. Islam has violent, aggressive elements and a
radical ideology – together with externalized protest – which originate in Arab
culture. The combination between “pleasant and peaceful ways”, as the Qur`an
preaches, and destructive, unrestrained fanaticism, is astonishing. The
phenomenon is not only in the division of relationships, internally in contrast
to policy directed outwards. It exists also on the inward dimension; this is
extreme duality (izdiwaj) which makes up a central part of the
Arab-Islamic personality.
The great hero of strict orthodox
Islam was Ibn Hanbal (780-855) whose works form the theoretical basis of Islamic
fundamentalism in our times. After him came the theologian Ahmad Taqi al-Din ibn
Taymiyyah (1263-1328), who expressed a profound commitment to renewal of the
ideal Islamic community through a return to the sources, and stringent and
binding application of the shari`ah. He consistently supported the use of
jihad against the enemies of Islam as such.4
His influence has been great as a theoretician and ideologue. It was expressed
in preaching and the activity of radical thinkers as a basis for the activity of
the new anarchistic Islamic terrorist groups.
The first fundamentalist
movements in Islam sprouted on the periphery of the Arab world, in the wake of
the decline of the Ottoman Empire: the Wahhabiyyah movement in the
Arabian Peninsula, which was established by Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhab
(1703-1792), as a Unitarian movement under Hanbali influence (and under that of
the puritan interpretations of Ibn Taymiyyah). It stood for total adherence to
the shari`ah, and flourished in the Arabian Peninsula as the ideological
basis of the Saudi state.5 The Sanusiyyah
movement was set up by Muhammad bin `Ali al-Senusi (1787-1859), as a missionary
effort among the Bedouin in Cyrenaica. In contrast to the revolutionary
Wahhabiyyah, the Sanusiyyah movement was mystical and reformist, and
conformed in its values to North African culture.6
The Mahdiyyah movement was set up by Muhammad Ahmad bin `Abdallah
al-Mahdi (1843-1885), who proclaimed himself to be the messiah. The Mahdiyyah,
extreme and puritanical like the Wahhabiyyah, flourished in the Sudan.
The main task of the mahdi was to advance pan-Islamism under his
leadership, but the movement was dissolved in 1898 by the British.7
The movement that led
fundamentalist Islam into the 20th century was the al-Salafiyyah,
the Islamic reform movement. It was an intellectual movement led by Jamal al-Din
al-Afghani (1838-1897) who preached pan-Islamic solidarity and active resistance
to Western penetration by a return to a renewed, reformist Islam.8
His disciple, Muhammad `Abduh (1849-1905), stressed the rationalism in Islam and
its modernistic vitality, and was active in Egypt.9
Nevertheless, as early as the age of `Abduh’s disciple, Muhammad Rashid Rida`
(1865-1935), who called for an Islamic revival in the mode of the Wahhabis,10
the conservative approach in the al-Salafiyyah movement took the lead. It
became active in violent Islamic activism in Egypt and Algeria.11
At the end of 20th
century, it became clear that the relatively modest approach of Rashid Rida` had
nothing to offer and after the acute political crises, the socio-economic
decline in most Arab countries, and the European imperialist conquest, it was
replaced by radical activism in the style of the Muslim Brotherhood led by Hasan
al-Bana (1906-1949). The movement won huge success and set up branches with
continuing influence throughout all the Arab countries.12
Not in vain did Egypt earn, in consequence of the large number of radical
Islamic movements that sprouted there, the dubious title of “cradle of Islamic
fundamentalism”. Meanwhile, the Wahhabi movement founded a state for
itself, Saudi Arabia, which became the stronghold of puritanical Islamic
conservatism. Yet the Muslim Brotherhood did not become institutionalized.
Rather it continued to promote intense political and social activism in the name
of radical Islam.
The Arab political system began
to act against Western imperialism in order to achieve national independence,
while in the background Islamic movements stood out as foci of
anti-establishment agitation. These movements had not accepted the Arab
political order which had been imposed for the most part by Western imperialism.
The political system in the Arab
states was ripe for an outbreak of Muslim reaction by the fundamentalist
movements.
CHAPTER I
Arab-Islamic Political
Culture
A culture is a system of beliefs
and behaviors that include symbols, values and norms which characterize a
certain society, and are understood to its members alone. A culture is unique,
as an evolutionary, accumulative outcome of societal behavior and activity
through acculturation and socialization. From Geertz’ standpoint, culture is:
A historically
transmitted pattern of meanings, embodied in symbols, a system of inherited
conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate,
perpetuate and develop their knowledge...13
Understanding and studying the
culture are critical variables for understanding the political behavior of
Arab-Islamic society, and therefore, its terroristic fundamentalism as well. The
central typical claim is that a deep gap exists between the culture of Arab
society and the culture of Western society, which underlies the flawed thinking,
the distortions of perception, and the failing policy which in turn leads to
strategic surprises, to mental blindness, and to lack of preparedness. An
outstanding expression of this is “the mirror image” that makes us think that
our adversary resembles us conceptually and operationally; you view his
strategy, tactics, and goals as images of your own, and you perceive him as
having your values, in the parameters of your approaches. However, in fact, this
is your own reflection in the mirror, while the adversary is different from you
qualitatively in his values and actions.
Islamic Civilization and
its Sources
Islam forms a universal
Weltanschauung, an all-embracing civilization that determines for the
believer commandments of what to do and what not to do. It is the only religion
the name of which appears in its own holy writings (eight times in the Qur`an),
and the name means: absolute and exclusive devotion and submissiveness to the
will of Allah. There is no separation in Islam between the domain of Allah and
the domain of the ruler; between religion and state; and its supreme goal is
building a political community (ummah) that matches the values of the
Islamic ideal.14 This system of faith is formal
and institutionalized, and the Qur`an is the supreme source of authority.
The Muslims believe that the Qur`an represents the actual words of God,
as they were transmitted to the Prophet Muhammad over a period of 23 years, and
were preserved accurately and in the correct order.15
Additional sources of authority are the sunnah and the hadith,
which document the words and deeds of the Prophet. These explain the Qur`anic
text, and together they constitute a basis for a written and oral law (shari`ah)
and they absolutely guide the life of the believers.16
Islam is an inclusive system of religion (din) and state (dawlah),
and everything is in the hands of Allah and derives from Him.17
In contrast to Judaism, which is
a religion closed to the outside and makes conversion difficult, and conducts
missionary preaching to those within (“All Israel [all Jews] are responsible for
one another”), Islam maintains great tolerance in matters of faith within the
religion, while it is forcefully militant towards the outside world. On the
inside it is very easy to become a Muslim. A man need only say the shahadah
(“There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah”) three times
with conviction, in front of witnesses or before a religious judge (qadi),
and he has become a Muslim. After that, no one investigates his deeds or
conduct. This is the reason for the astonishing success of Islam in countries of
the Third World in the 20th century. On the outside, Islam
distinguishes between Dar al-Islam (the domain of Islam, “Islamic soil”)
and Dar al-harb (the domain of war, “the soil of the infidel”). It sees
the world in dynamic terms of constant expansion, and obliges political
occupation and religious coercion in the setting of holy war (jihad), and
someone who falls in a jihad is called shahid. Between Dar
al-Islam and Dar al-harb there is Dar al-Sulh, the domain with
which Islam is in a state of truce, but it is only temporary, until the Muslims
become stronger militarily.
Religion has served as a
political tool. No religious sect has been excommunicated from Islam, unless it
excommunicated itself. Most of the splits in Islam have originated from
political issues, and the religious framework has only served as an expedient
reference. Nevertheless, since it was shameful to assert political goals, the
method applied was political negation in religious terms. (That is, the ruler
was not going in the path of Allah and His Prophet, and was betraying religious
values; hence he deserved being removed from power.) The pattern that emphasized
these trends for the first time was the break away of the Khawarij sect
and the rift with the shi`at `Ali (faction of Ali) which brought about
the rise of the Shi`a as an alternative religious movement to the
Sunnah. That is, the important struggle was political, but its expressions
were in the name of religious arguments.
Islam is very conservative in its
political conceptions. The paramount goal is attaining an Islamic order and
political stability, while preserving the community’s unity in the Dar
al-Islam. The main role of the ummah is “enforcing the good and
rejecting what is subject to contradiction” (al-amr bil-ma`ruf wal-nahi `an
al-munkar). Any government is preferable to lack of government. There is a
cynical evaluation of the reality of imperfect political life, and therefore
there is a capacity to accept any ruler, whether because he is preferable to
anarchy, or whether because he forces himself on the population, which is not
considered a factor whose opinion and positions have to be considered. Islam
makes up a closed political system and a traditional social system, which blurs
the difference between “what is” and “what must be”, causing political cynicism
and lack of desire for innovation, while reinforcing submission and passivity.
We must recall that “the gates of innovation” (ijtihad) were closed in
the eleventh century. This explains the traditional cloistered state of society
and the thoughtless imitation (taqlid). The Islamic consensus has applied
flexible judgment and expressed various interpretations – but only towards the
way of life desirable for the believer, and the place of Islam in society, and
not, definitely not towards the outside.
On the other hand, political expression was
also “encouragement” for unbelief, for rebelliousness, and for political
violence. How can we explain the paradoxical phenomenon that Islam is
conservative and conformist and any opposition is a challenge to Allah, yet in
reality there have been so many revolts, coups d’état, and political
murders? The answer is fascinating: there is no need for legitimization by the
people, since sovereignty belongs to Allah. And from the moment that state power
is replaced, the new rulers become acceptable and agreed. Everything on earth is
by the will of Allah, and thus too are rebellious aspirations and violence
towards the authorities. The true test is always the result. If the deed
succeeds, Allah wanted it so. And if the deed fails, this too was the will of
Allah. The ruler has full responsibility, since he expresses the will of Allah.
But if there exists any problem, the ruler is guilty and must be removed. Hence,
the religious sages (the `ulema) determined that there is an obligation
to oppose any ruler who lacks fear of Heaven, a position supported in the
traditions ascribed to the Prophet. This is the religious “ideological”
foundation for violence and revolutionism in Islam.18
The Islamic state is theocratic –
Allah is the only source of faith, and religious worship is the symbol of
collective identity. All criticism is interpreted as denial of the faith.
Therefore, any challenge to the existing political order – in order for it to
become legitimate – is translated into religious preaching aimed at proving
deviation on the part of the existing authorities. Unbelief is linked to belief,
and that is the only basis for conducting political life among the rival
factions in Islam. Any opposition to the existing political order is considered
infidelity to Allah: the Khawarij that was supported by the Bedouin, in
their protest against the very fact of the state and its coercion; Shi`at
`Ali (Shi`ites) which began as supporters of Ali’s claims to rule and
became a religious faction which was supported by the mawali, the
non-Arab Muslims who accepted the Islamic religion and turned to the Shi`ah
for social reasons. These phenomena were the foundation for Arab-Islamic
behavior in history.
This trend links up to the
problem of regime legitimacy. Islam has not succeeded in laying the basis for a
conception of legitimacy and authoritative governance on a sovereign foundation
since the view that the state is the creation of a “social contract” is alien to
Islam. The state, like other phenomena, reflects and embodies the will of Allah.
Sovereignty (hakmiyah) derives from Allah alone, and does not at all have
to do with the will of the ruled. The Western doctrine holds that there is a
right to resist an evil government, and that there is even a duty to replace it.
This does not exist in Islam. Any attempt to change the structure of legitimacy
and sovereignty is bid`ah, which is interpreted as innovation, but it
literally means any thing or custom that was not approved in the time of the
Prophet. To prove this argument, a hadith attributed to the Prophet is
quoted: “The worst of things are the modern things. All innovation is a mistake,
and any mistake leads to hellfire.”
This phenomenon is connected to
contemporary politics and it has influence on understanding the Islamic
fundamentalist phenomenon. The Arab regimes in the Middle East are authoritarian
and fall into two kinds: military regimes in which the army is in power, and
monarchic regimes where the army serves as a support for the existence of the
regime and its survival. The authoritarian tradition is not new, and it is
inherent in Islam and Arab culture. The Arab leaders are patrimonial, and this
pattern too is typical of Arab-Islamic culture.19
Political culture is subordinate
at the center and parochial at the periphery. There is no political tradition of
a sovereign people, and of course the phenomenon of citizenship is hardly
widespread. Most of the population does not belong to the ruling elite, to the
political leadership, and is not viewed as a participant in political
bargaining. There is no political participation, except on the level of support
alone, and not of demands, and the political mobility is low, and dependent on
the will of the regime. The same is true for pressure groups and interest
groups.
The Arabic word for state is
dawlah, which was interpreted as dynasty, and its original meaning was to
overthrow or to replace20 (Sura
3:134-140; Sura 79:7). The Islamic state is a theocracy where Allah is
the only source of power and law, and the ruler is his representative. The basic
conception was of the ummah in which everyone was equal, without a class
hierarchy. In practice, the state which arose was very far from the ideal. It
had a broad class structure, a division between the center and the periphery,
between nomads and village dwellers and city dwellers, and secondary divisions
and many cross-categories within each group. There were ethnic, religious, and
class controversies, and a class of Arab aristocracy took shape. This class was
oppressive socially, economically, and religiously. The central phenomenon is
that most of the population was totally alienated from the government, and was
not viewed as a factor that had to be considered in conducting policy.
Further, scientific thought in
Islam, like legitimacy and sovereignty, is different from the Western
conception, and this has significant implications for political principles. The
conception is atomistic and not integrative. There is no principle of causality,
since everything derives from the will of Allah. Hence, there is no need to ask
questions, or to clarify details involving any world issues. The phenomenon is
expressed by the term fitnah which basically means a test of faith or
proof of ability to withstand the evil impulse. However, the term serves as a
description of a movement that might disrupt the existing political order. The
prototype came with the murder of the reigning khalifah (caliph),
`Uthman, in 656 CE, and the civil war that subsequently broke out. Nowadays,
fitnah means rebellious separation or opposition by force to governmental
authority. This notion leads to conservatism and collectivism in thought and
ways of action. The result, a synthetic culture was formed with the supreme
aspiration to preserve stability, and with the fear of undermining the
socio-political order, lest breakup, anarchy, and disorientation take place.
* * *
Islamic values have been deeply
influenced by the Arab values of the pre-Islamic jahiliyyah age, as well
as by Jewish values. In practice, there is very little from the Islamic age in
the values important to Arab conceptions and behavior. Rather, they reflect the
Arab tribal values from the Arabian Peninsula until the rise of Islam. In the
jahiliyyah period, “The Arabs did not know Allah and his messenger and the
laws of the religion.” Therefore, it has been defined wrongly as “the period of
ignorance”. Nevertheless, it was more an age of savagery, violence, and idol
worship.
The name Allah is jahili
in origin, and represents a full Islamic adoption. Allah was considered a
supreme god, and He had three daughter goddesses: al-Lat, al-Manat, and
al-`Uzza. These were transferred as a whole to Islam. Even the worship of
stones was one of the most important in jahili Arab society, and the
“black stone” in the Ka`abah in Mecca stood out. This was the sublime
expression of a fetishistic religion. Yet as a consequence of its centrality and
importance, Muhammad was forced to absorb it as a prominent component of Islam.
He transformed it into a proof of the covenant between Allah and Abraham (called
in Arabic al-Khalil, the friend). The most outstanding example of
absorption of a jahili world outlook in an absolute and perfect manner is
the custom of pilgrimage (hajj): the ritual included circumambulation
around the Ka`abah seven times, kissing the black stone, and running
between Safa and Marwah seven times. They held mass ceremonies that took place
at fixed times: running to Muzdalifah and to Mina where they threw seven stones
at Satan who exists in the form of three mounds of stones. This set of
ceremonies too expresses jahili fetishism. However, the Prophet Muhammad
understood that they were deeply rooted in the Arab consciousness, and he gave
them an Islamic configuration.
Additional jahili customs
that Muhammad continued were the month of fasting and charity. In jahili
Arab society, violent and anarchistic, it was customary to stop warfare for four
months during the year. A holy month for fasting and three months in which it
was customary to do business rather than make war. That is, the fast was
connected to business. This custom too was transferred to Islam and fixed in the
month of Ramadan. On the 27th of this month, the Qur`an began
to be revealed on laylat al-qadar. During the month of fasting, the
believer must avoid any food or marital life, from sunrise until sundown, and at
its end, the holiday of ending the fast (`id al-fitr) is celebrated.
Giving sadaqah (charity)
was one of the features of the perfect Bedouin, a commandment that was stressed
in the age of jahiliyyah. Islam absorbed it without determining exact
rules as to the manner of distributing it. At the beginning of Islam, sadaqah
served a political purpose, to draw those wavering into joining. Over time, the
dhakat became a regular, defined tax (a tithe from all field produce; and
the fortieth part of the beasts, silver, gold, and merchandise), and sadaqah
refers to any other act of generosity of the believer.
If we skip over the practices
that were copied from jahili customs, we see that only two of the Five
Pillars of Islam (arkan al-Islam) – prayer (salat) and testimony (shahadah)
– are Muslim in origin. Even in regard to the roots of Islamic law (usul
al-shari`ah), we find two out of five that were jahili: general
agreement or consensus (ijma`) and the custom of the place (`adah
or `urf). The other three: the written law (Qur`an), the oral law
(sunnah), and analogy on the basis of the texts (qias) are Islamic
in origin. Islamic tolerance within the religion is expressed by recognition of
four schools of legal interpretation (madhahib): hanafi (named
after Abu Hanifah 702-772); maliki (named after Malik, 716-795);
shafi`i (after al-Shafa`i, 768-820); and hanbali (after Ibn Hanbal,
780-855). Indeed, only groups that arrived at real exaggeration in their
religious attachment and took upon themselves various beliefs that were
perceived as ascribing partners to Allah (shirk) were excommunicated from
Islam, since they were accused of exaggeration (ghulat).
* * *
The influences of Jewish
tradition on the Prophet Muhammad were essential. In the period when he was
born, into the Hashim family of the Quraish tribe, in 570 CE, the importance of
Mecca as a commercial city was rising as a consequence of the disintegration of
the Persian Empire in the east and the Byzantine in the northwest, as well as
the decline of the kingdoms of south Arabia.21
Since Muhammad’s father had died before he was born, and his mother died when he
was six, he was raised by his grandfather Hashim and afterwards by his uncle,
Abu Talib, who was a well-known merchant. The major part of his business was
with Jewish merchants. Muhammad accompanied him, and absorbed stories from the
Torah (the Patriarchs, Joseph, Pharaoh, the Children of Israel in the desert).
He began to prophesy at age 40 (in accord with the tradition that a man reaches
his intellectual perfection at that age), going into solitude on Mount Hira,
near Mecca. Muhammad attests to the influence of Judaism (Sura 26:197;
Sura 10:43) on his prophecy, and his opponents accused him with: “Those are
stories of the Israelites.” The people of Mecca banished him and persecuted him,
while the Jews saw him as a false prophet and avoided him.
When persecutions by the economic
and social elite of Mecca became intolerable, Muhammad left Mecca22
and came to Yathrib (which he called al-Madina) in 622. This time, July
16, 622, was the beginning of the Muslim counting of time. The hijra
(migration to Yathrib) transformed Muhammad, the prophet of a persecuted sect of
believers, into the leader of a religious community. He began to organize the
believers as a group of believers: the unification of the migrants from Mecca
(the muhajirun) with the supporters in Madina (al-ansar) in the
framework of “rules of the community” (`ahd al-ummah). Islam changed from
being a religious message to a political institution, to a framework of
offensive political action with enthusiastic supporters.23
Muhammad sought to co-opt the
Jews to his community of believers, as a basis of support for his ideas. But the
Jews, since they were “a people that dwells alone”, rejected and kept away from
him as a false prophet, and became his enemies:
-
Prayer and the direction of
prayer. Muhammad told the believers to pray, like the Jews, three times a
day. And when he was rejected, he announced that Islam was better than they,
and therefore believers should pray fives times a day (there is also an
opinion that this had to do with applying an originally Persian belief). Each
prayer is preceded by a partial purification, and on Friday and holidays – a
full purification. When there is no water, one may use sand. At a time of
danger, one may cut the prayer short, and one may pray while walking or
riding. The main part of the prayer is kneeling and touching one’s forehead to
the ground (rak’ah). The purpose of these acts is to express absolute
submission to Allah, while saying the surat al-fatihah. There are no
prayer arrangements: one begins with proclaiming Allahu-akbar;
afterwards one says the shahadah: There is no God but Allah and
Muhammad is the messenger of Allah. At the end come the blessings of the
Prophets. There are personal prayers and elective prayers. The time of prayer
is set according to the course of the sun.
-
Fasting. At the
beginning, Muhammad ordered the believers to fast on the Ashurah, the
tenth day, the Day of Atonement. However, after the conflict with the Jews, he
went back to jahili sources for a month of fasting, the month of
Ramadan.
-
Jerusalem. The
connection is definitely Jewish, whereas Jerusalem is not mentioned at all in
the Qur`an.24 Muhammad’s dream is of
isra umi`raj (the Night Journey), together with the horse, al-Buraq (in
Aramaic: susa barkiya, the white horse). The origin of this story is in
the Prophet Elijah’s ascent on the horse-drawn flaming chariot to Heaven. The
concept of al-Aqsa mentioned in the dream means extremely far-off, not
Jerusalem but apparently the end of the earth, the zone of Islam’s
aspirations. Jerusalem was only conquered in 638 CE, and since then its
importance has grown, in consequence of the Muslim practice of fixing the
ruler’s status over the ruled by building mosques in places holy to Jews and
Christians (consider the Temple Mount and the Cave of Machpelah).
Arab-Islamic Society
The tradition and tribal
clannishness have the dominant influence over Arab society and reflect the
jahili tribal ideals.25 The tribe was the
only social-cultural unit, and it was in constant confrontation with other
tribes over sources of subsistence: the scarcity of resources against the many
demands to obtain them. (A society based on “Thou shalt live by thy sword.”) At
the head of the tribe was the sayyid, who was chosen by the tribal
elders, and was the first among equals. The social structure included the
hamulah (clan) and the extended family. Between the tribal territories there
was a haram, a kind of no-man’s-land. Its neutral holiness was accepted
as a place of clarifications and inter-tribal treaties. Hence, the tremendous
experience and the proven ability that Arabs accumulated in conducting
negotiations. There is no doubt that this was one of their strongest skills,
which they brought to the level of an art, and this is expressed in their
negotiating policy today. Structures for mediation and compromise developed that
were not institutionalized and were called “middle mechanisms” (wasat or
wusta). Their role was to prevent development of situations destructive
to society, as a result of the widespread violence and the blood vengeance.
The tribe was composed of family
groups linked to each other by a common father, and the cultivation of a sense
of solidarity. The social basis was the group of origin through male relatives
alone from the father’s family, which maintained control over a territory.
Tribal society was anarchic, and had a decentralized system of security, founded
on self-help and mutual responsibility for the welfare and security of the
people in the tribe. Everyone was responsible for the acts of the individual and
worked for the sake of the group. Juridically speaking, every adult tribesman
was equal to every other. This required him to be responsible in his activities
and tolerant in his attitude toward his close and known environment.
In contrast to modern societies
that promote individual interests and the ethos is what the individual takes and
receives from the collective, in Islamic society the ethos was the opposite.
There was a communal consensus as opposed to an individual’s opinion. Islam does
not encourage individualism, rather, it favors organized, orderly authority. The
individual does not exist by his own right, and he is not important except
through his belonging to a collective framework, as a result of the concept that
“the opinion of the many cannot be wrong.” There is nothing more contemptible
than individualism, which is conceived as divisive and as harming the
achievement of goals. All these traditions and values originate from the Arabs,
from the socio-economic reality in the Arabian Peninsula when the individual
could not exist without the group, and any accepted legal opposition was lacking
there.
The cultural phenomenon of
favoring collectivism has had a great influence on today’s reality. A collective
culture emphasizes responsibility and mutual dependence. A man has no importance
in his own right, but only in relation to the group. This is a vertical culture
with a high communications context. People are viewed differently according to
their status and their capability. They have a low self-esteem as regards
aspirations for freedom and their status in regard to the authorities; and more
than anything, they are expected to conform to the group and to its needs, the
indirect and cloudy messages of communications, and the wide-ranging conformism
with the stress on the population’s dependence on the authorities. This is in
contrast with the individualistic culture, which is accepted in the West, which
is horizontal and has a low context of communications. People are equal in
status and ability, they have a high esteem for aspirations for freedom and
independence, and they expect that the group will conform to their needs.
Communications messages are direct, while emphasizing innovation and
competitiveness, and there exists high mobility in the setting of the legitimate
struggle for power and influence.
The family structure in Arab
society is authoritarian and patriarchal. A group typified by mutual
responsibility, which stresses the centrality of the tribe, the clan, and the
extended family in the social structure. It stresses the absolute superiority of
these ascriptive groups over the individual’s life. It casts out those who
deviate from its way or who act against its interests. Social ostracism is
tashmis which originally meant exposure to the sun, and in the past was
called khali`: outcast, expellee. Tashmis was a defensive action
and was aimed at maintaining social coherence and mutual responsibility.
The determining group membership
is within, inside the family or the clan. Ties of friendship with those
belonging to groups of other origins, however strong they may be, will not last
if a conflict breaks out between the two groups. The friend becomes an adversary
and an enemy. An example of this is the saying which is found in several
variants: “My brothers and I against my cousins; my cousins and I against the
neighbor; the neighbor and I against the outsider.” And the outsider is usually
a member of the same tribe. Of course hostility and suspicion towards members of
other tribes is deep and intense. From this we may understand the hatred of
outsiders who are not Muslims or Arabs, certainly of those of whom it was said
that they are infidels. In this way, we reach the social foundation of
Arab-Muslim hatred, which is mixed with envy and feelings of inferiority towards
the West.
The duty to support the
clan/family setting of belonging against others exists without any link to the
issue of right or wrong. The attitude towards the outsider is characterized by a
fascinating contrast: Politeness and the sympathy of a warm welcome but at the
very same time, alienated suspicion. The outsider may even be the neighbor (jar).
This is true even in modern times. Even if the status of the clan (hamulah)
has weakened, it has certainly not disintegrated. Its importance is great as a
foundation for social organizing.
Muhammad succeeded in laying the
political and intellectual basis for the Islamic social system. He even tried to
build a new society made up of the Islamic community instead of the existing
tribe and clan structure. However, reality was different. The tribes joined
Islam on the basis of the existing customary solidarity. And they swore
allegiance (mubay`ah) to him personally, since he was perceived as a
victor. This is a striking phenomenon among the Arabs, which originated in the
spread of Islam, and has paramount implications for the issue of “the Return to
Islam”. The victor is just, and the just always is victorious. Like the test of
success, so too the test of justice. Justice and success are in the hands of
Allah alone. Hence it is understood that Islam wins and succeeds because it is
just. Yet, when Muhammad realized that he would not succeed and that the
jahili values were deeply rooted, he took them into Islam and gave them an
Islamic configuration with the meaning of, “For the Sake of Allah (fi sabil
Allah)”.
In tribal society, the secular
ideas took a central place and were expressed in the concept of “manliness” (muruwwah).
This refers to a whole complex of characteristics of the perfect Bedouin man.
The most important trait was safeguarding the rules of tribal solidarity (`asabiyyah).
The tribe was the principal social unit, the basis for personal and collective
existence. Hence, the centrality of the collectivistic conception as against the
individualistic one in Islamic society. The most outstanding, most central
phenomenon in society is honor. This is the highest, most important value. It is
even more important than life itself. A man without honor was considered dead.
The place of a man within the tribe, like the place of the tribe within
federations of tribes, was in conformity with the measure of his honor. All
social values are aimed at attaining, preserving, and increasing honor: giving
shelter to a stranger, preserving family and tribal honor through the tradition
of blood vengeance; hospitality; and actions to reinforce honor like advertising
and renovating one’s genealogy. This particular subject, the family tree, was
developed and brought by the Arabs to the level of real science.
The phenomenon of honor has
paramount importance in Arab culture, and its implications for every issue in
society is worthy of additional elaboration. As we have said, honor is more
important even than death. Hence, the Arab saying: “It is better to die with
honor than to live with humiliation.” There are several kinds of honor:
sharaf is manly honor. It is a flexible kind of honor that can go up or
down. One may add to it or take away from it through the man’s activity and
through the perception of his environment. On the other hand, `ird is the
honor of a woman (and also means a woman’s pelvis). This sort of honor operates
in connection with her modesty. It is a hard kind of absolute honor. The woman
is born and grows up with honor. It is her duty to preserve it from any
defamation. The moment that it is lost, it cannot be restored.26
Muslim tradition attaches supreme importance to manly honor, and to womanly
modesty, which expresses the man’s honor. This is the basis for the conduct of
Islamic society in respect of women and their status. And it is one of the
difficult problems involved in the lack of equality.27
A family’s honor depends on the
virginity of its daughters. The harshest blow against honor derives from a
daughter or a sister’s improper sexual behavior, or that of a female cousin on
the father’s side. An adulterous woman must be killed. That is, the family’s
honor is preserved by the action of her male relatives. The act of killing
against the background of family honor not only cancels the shame, but it also
renews the family’s status and raises its prestige and esteem. A wife’s modest
manner of dress, speech, and conduct are the bases for the husband’s honor. In
contrast to conventional thinking, family honor murders are more common in the
cities than in the countryside.28
The polar opposite to honor is
shame. Researchers are not sure whether the concept of honor is more important
than the feeling of shame that will be caused if honor is wounded. In the Middle
East, not honor but shame is the decisive preoccupation. Shame does not refer to
the acts of dishonor, such as illicit sexual relations, but to their revelation,
to their becoming public knowledge. Revelation of shameful acts to the public is
what most wounds a man’s honor and humiliates him in the eyes of society. The
Arab moves along a continuum of constant effort to actively avoid anything that
causes shame, as well as energetic actions to promote his honor.29
One of the most important
phenomena of the issue of honor, which has huge influence on the behavior today
of the fundamentalist Islamic movements, is the aggressive, externalized
approach. After all, beyond the shame, that derives from wounded honor, lies
revenge. This is the hostility towards the outsider, that honor will be attained
and advanced only if vengeance is taken in a way that will be seen by everyone.30
The Jewish approach offers a cheek to slap. This arises from the concept, “We
have sinned, we have transgressed, we have committed a crime,” and “Because of
our sins, we were exiled from our Land.” The Christian approach offers the other
cheek while taking responsibility. Meanwhile, the main component of the
Arab-Muslim approach is offensive: “Do I have a problem? You are guilty.” – This
is open, blatant hostility towards whatever is perceived as a wrong, as an
injustice, as inability to attain one’s goals. There is no attempt to
compromise. Further, there is certainly no tolerance for or consent to the
rights and the justice of the other. Nor is there any understanding that
relative concepts are involved. The phenomenon has taken on perfect dimensions
in the Arab approach to the Palestine Question. The conception is total and
absolute. Justice and truth are totally with the Palestinians, definitely and
without challenge. Benny Morris, one of the leaders of Post-Zionism, understands
this, and became somewhat wiser: “They do not understand that there is justice
on the other side... Did you ever hear a Palestinian say that there is justice
to the Jewish claims to Eretz Israel? I never heard it.”31
The reason for emphasizing the
importance of honor derives from the centrality of the patriarchal authoritarian
family in tribal society.32 It is easier to
violate any treaty other than one based on a man’s word of honor, which obliges
him at any price. After all, what does a man have besides his honor? Therefore,
the most forceful curse that can be said about a man is that he lacks honor (kalil
al-adab). When one wants to stop a man from speaking or when he is speaking
silly things, one does not tell him to stop, whether harshly or softly, directly
or indirectly, after all, this might wound his honor. Therefore, one uses a
parable or an epigram with a clear meaning, or one tells him, “Pray to the
Prophet” (salli `ala al-Nabi). The speaker cannot proceed with his words,
which are everyday chatter, and he stops speaking immediately. Or when a man
says things that are not agreed to, he is not told this openly or crudely.
Rather he is offered a parable or an epigram, such as: “There is no tax on
words” (al-kalam mafish `alaiha gumruc).
Language is a cultural phenomenon
possessing supreme importance. It embodies a system of symbols that enable
members of the same culture to communicate. It enables people to understand
their social environment, and determines their world outlook. The tradition, the
history, and the cultural values are imprinted within it. In Arab society, the
use is prominent of expressions, parables, metaphors, linguistic allegories, and
there are exaggeration (mubalaghah) and boasting (mufakharah) of
one’s command of the language. Hence, there is also exaggeration in speech,
verbal pathos, and the wide use of rhetorical phrases. This approach is
absolutely opposed to the understatement of Western culture. And here is one of
the cultural problems in full force: What happens in the encounter between the
overstatement of Arab culture and the understatement of Western culture? In a
society that stresses understatement, like world public opinion, there is great
attention paid to the apocalyptic hyperbole of overstatement. This is one of the
most important reasons for Israel’s difficult situation in world public opinion,
which believes that the Arab cultural trait of exaggerated speech describes an
existing reality. Arab culture represents a collective ethos and it esteems
tradition and honor. It is indirect, with a tendency to avoid insult and causing
shame. Therefore, it is better to lie in order to prevent confrontations and
insults. The Arabic language is a heritage of rhetoric.33
The power of the rich and
beautiful Arabic language’s influence on the Arab’s conduct is astonishing. No
people has feelings of such ardent admiration for, or makes such intense and
conscious use of their language as do the Arabs. No people is moved so quickly
or so swept away by the written or spoken word. The Arabic language is a mirror
through which the Arabs examine the world. Even the language of the uneducated
is very rich and leads to hyperbole and overemphasis. The Arabs are very proud
of their language and they are convinced that it is the most excellent, most
beautiful in the world. Patai refers to this as rhetoricism, because of the high
value that the Arabs attach to their language and its profound influence on
their lives.34 Lewis quotes the philologist
al-Tha`alibi who insisted:
Whoever loves the
Prophet loves the Arabs. And whoever loves the Arabs loves the Arabic
language...because Muhammad is the best of prophets... The Arabs are the best
of all the peoples...and the Arabic language is the most excellent of
languages.35
The Arab personality excels in
antitheses and opposites. This is a deeply rooted duality. The anthropologist
Blackman describes the peasants, the fellahin, of Upper Egypt:
They are happy, joyful people in part, lovers of jokes and
stories, modest and lovers of hard work, and they offer enthusiastic welcomes
to strangers. Yet at the same time, they are extremely emotional; easily and
quickly lose their tempers, rising to very high levels of hostility and
animosity without self-control. And under the influence of pathos and
fanaticism, they are capable of committing any violent, cruel action with
terrifying intensity. And the change is dramatic and extreme.36
This is the way of tribalism and
clannishness: fatalism and passivity under wondrous self-control, yet,
impulsivity astounding in its intensity and out of all proportion in its
uncontrolled violence.37
The tribal phenomenon and the
anarchic structure bring to expression a number of important characteristics:
the centrality of blood ties among the extended family or the tribe, rather than
ties to institutions or organizations, determines one’s loyalty and one’s
personal and group identification. As a result, there has existed a lack of
basic trust, suspicion, and hostility toward “the Other”, even if he is from the
neighboring clan or a member of the same tribe. This is a central process in
social life, certainly in village areas.38
Hence, it goes without saying that toward non-Muslim strangers the phenomenon is
much more extreme. Therefore, all the mechanisms of welcoming and the intensive
activity of blessings and hospitality are aimed at creating a protective buffer,
at softening the threatening interpersonal encounter.
The picture is obtained of social
anarchy, of a war of all against all. However, at the very same time the duty to
submit and obey leaders has been very prominent. The masses are strangers to and
alienated from political processes; they do not see themselves, and are
certainly not seen, as a factor with a position and an opinion that need to be
taken into account. There is seemingly a duty of consultation (shura)
that Muslim researchers and theologians have turned into an element that
expresses Islamic democracy. Yet even in the jahili tribal society it was
limited to a council of elders and notables alone. The broad consensus that was
achieved among the notables was based on the talents and fluent speech of the
leader. Thus, the phenomenon of general consensus (ijma`) too, which
supposedly served as an expression of consensus and democratic values in Islam,
was in fact among the ruling elite and the notables. This reality increased
political cynicism, strengthened the trend that politics is “a necessary evil” (sharr),
and therefore one ought to avoid involvement in it. On the other hand, it
justified the right to rebelliousness and revolutionism. These explain why the
Islamic ideal was so far from realization, and change of regime could be carried
out only in an uninstitutionalized manner, usually violently.
Indeed, Arab society resembles
any other tribal society in its characteristics. But the difference is
essential, since in no other society have the values and means of government
operated through an all-embracing religion which rules over all political life,
and gives incentives to take power and coerce one’s will. Islam implanted in the
Arabs values and attitudes that have barely changed over the generations.
Another phenomenon that made it possible for Islam to exist as a political
system was to accept the many anarchic conflicts as legitimate and to
institutionalize them. That is, Arab society adopted a flexible political system
with a high capacity for adaptation. However, this was only on the inside. In
everything having to do with non-Muslims, there was a lack of tolerance, and
total, uncompromising hostility.
This trend was expressed also in
a realistic, sober-minded conception of the possible as against the desirable.
Living in the desert, in hostile surroundings, with resources rare and hard to
obtain, in a state of parochialism and social and political alienation, they
created a society that came to terms with the harsh reality. Political
conformism was necessary as was acceptance of the rules of conduct which defined
social goals in religious terms. In contrast to Jewish society, which is
implanted with a messianic heritage of exile – revolutionism, pleading with
rulers, placating, and the culture of the enclave, Arab society speaks with
pathos and feeling, but stands stable in the desert sand, while actually
racially rejecting the Other.
An important cultural phenomenon
is the attitude toward time. Time was always an exciting and mysterious subject.
In ancient cultures, they even invented gods of time. The Greeks had Kronos.
From his name are derived the terms chronological, synchronization, anachronism.
There are three kinds of time, objective, physical time – represented by the
clock and the calendar; biological time which expresses processes through
creatures and plants, and is unique in accord with the seasons of the year; and
psychological time which expresses a man’s subjective experience. Time is much
influenced by culture. Thus among the Bedouin, “Time is a cigarette”; among the
American Indians: “Time is a red apple.” In Arab society time is not
characterized in terms of shortage, and the conception is that “There is time”
always, and “There is no need to achieve everything in our times.” The
phenomenon of “Now” is not known and not understood. One may put off attaining
goals if one encounters a difficulty or resistance, and one needs patience to
realize them. There is a fatalistic coming to terms with life and death.
These are definite symptoms of
behavioral polarization, between unity and schism, between honor and shame,
between violent aggressivity and passive submission to the state, between the
ideal and reality, between fantasy reaching up to the skies and the earthiness
of the burning desert, between hatred of the imperialist West and admiration of
its attributes and activity. The dominant phenomenon is the aspiration for
freedom, a result of the stormy, emotional personality type, contrasted with the
anarchy of desert life which requires patience and endurance. Arab society in
the Middle East is tribal in origin, and became institutionalized over the
centuries into a village society with a minority in the cities. Urban society
sprouted up in the 20th century. Nevertheless, patterns of thought
and activity have remained village and tribal for the most part.
The Arab-Islamic Political
System
The two central phenomena that
explain the Arab-Islamic political system are authoritarian regimes and
patrimonial leadership.
The authoritarian phenomenon
covers various and varied instances of political regimes. The pioneering
research in the field was done by Linz, who considered Spain in the time of
Franco.39 He discerned four dimensions that
characterize authoritarianism as personal leadership, which exercises power
within very broad boundaries – which are yet undefined formally – at the head of
a military junta; lack of a detailed guiding ideology; very limited political
pluralism; lack of mobility, and absence of sovereign legitimacy.
From Linz’ research, two
approaches to research emerged with different foci. One, that of Perlmutter40
concerning the Middle East, emphasized the institutional-structural dimensions
of authoritarian regimes, as a successful way of understanding their political
dynamics and practical behavior. The second approach, that of O’Donnell,
concerns the political system in South America.41
He stressed the processes of modernization as a principal focus for
understanding the phenomenon. He found three kinds of authoritarianism:
traditional, populistic, and bureaucratic, which he analyzed in accord with the
dimensions of institutionalization and integration of modernization.
The typifying components
according to which one can discern the phenomenon of authoritarian regimes are
personal leadership and the centrality of the army in politics.
-
The Personality of the
Leader and His Centrality as an Alternative to Regime Legitimacy. The
leadership in Arab politics was always an activity limited to the level of the
ruling elite, and distinguished as a personal system, without fixed political
structures. Most inhabitants were not involved in political activity, and
viewed it as a malignant evil that one must not be involved in. The state
oppressed them and demanded two things: enlistment in the army and payment of
taxes. Participation in politics was always on a low level, and was expressed
by support for the government, and not in demands on it. The leadership was
always the most important factor in Arab political history, which was a kind
of existence (wajib). Any government was preferable to lack of
government, which meant anarchy. Hence, “even an Ethiopian slave whose head is
like a watermelon” in the words of Khawarij, and “better 40 years of tyranny
than lack of government,” according to the Hadith. Nevertheless,
politics was limited to the level of the ruling elite, without fixed
structures or mechanisms of institutionalization. The caliphs (khulafa)
were defined as replacements for the Prophet, and earned oaths of allegiance (mubaya`ah).
Muslim history gave prominence
to the dominance of the patrimonial leadership. The leader was located in the
center of the political system, and within the inner circle around him loyal
advisors ran to and fro competing for power and influence. Islam cultivated
patrimonial patterns through stressing the religious ideals of submission and
sublimation. Competition was institutionalized in the political system alone,
while the patrimonial leader encouraged these processes by the method of
divide and rule.
As opposed to other
societies, Islam institutionalized conflict, as a political feature, as a way
of life, and thereby systemic stability was strengthened. Halpern analyzed the
Islamic system in terms of its capacity to transform tensions into balances,
and to link all the components of society together through conflict no less
than through coordination and integration.42
In the Arab-Islamic tradition we find a stress on the traits and personality
of the ruler and prominence of non-institutionalization of politics.43
This setting, which was created in the historical and religious tradition,
emphasized the anarchic links of sublimation combined with horizontal links of
competition and conflict.
Arab-Muslim political
culture is subordinated at the center and parochial at the periphery, and
possesses an alienated character. Political power has led to economic wealth
(the opposite happened in the West). The political elite included –
traditionally – three bodies of functionaries: religious scholars, military
officers, and members of the bureaucracy. Four kinds of leadership are known:
consensus, a jahili custom (appointment of tribal elders and one chosen
first among equals); legitimacy of choice, an Islamic tradition based on blood
ties to the tribe of Qureish and to the Sah`abah; Muslim dynastic
theocracy; and the techno-bureaucratic leadership of army officers.
Islamic has succeeded in
channeling anarchistic energies into a dynamic, expanding system, an
aggressive foreign policy, and into conquests for the sake of Allah. Islam
satisfied economic and social needs for conquest, and established an empire
with two phenomena: Islamization of the conquered territories, and their
Arabization. Therefore, the factors in the success of Islamic expansion44
were a combination of three aspects: first, religious motives for spreading
the Muslim religion as a religious duty that was rewarded with paradise;
second, economic-social aspects – harsh years of drought had brought about
pressure to apply an aggressive external policy. Fertile lands were conquered
while religion served as a cover. The climactic approach stands out: the
climactic conditions were so harsh that they brought about offensive wandering
northwards, to departure from the Arabian Peninsula. The third, diplomatic
aspects: the Byzantine and Persian Empires had been weakened while chaos
prevailed in them. They were worn out and not held in affection. In contrast,
the new conquerors enjoyed high morale and the offensive spirit of combat
methods, and with endurance to withstand the difficult conditions of shortage.
And there was a reward for their labor: They received loot and regular
payments, and those who fell in battle were promised all the delights of
Paradise, for those who fell for the sake of Allah (shuhadah).
The leadership is the
central factor in importance in every political system. However, its influence
and power in an authoritarian regime is great and significant. The
authoritarian leadership is not protected like the totalitarian leadership,
and emerges mainly from the army or rests on the army’s support. Hence,
Wriggins claimed45 that in developing states
there is no greater importance than the functioning of the leadership, and he
proposes examining the political system in terms of strategies in aggregation
of power, while emphasizing the leader’s personality.
Due to the lack of
institutional legitimacy, legitimacy is bestowed on the leadership. The
competition to achieve and preserve power is not institutionalized, and
everything flows from the will and the whims of the leader, who serves as a
central index for the importance of the state.46
All national issues revolve around the leader’s personality and prestige. The
structure is one of primordial groups possessing loyalties and belonging.
Effective political non-institutionalization and the lack of formal procedures
are expressed in the weakness of organizational ties, and they encourage
disorder and political decadence.47 Political
struggle takes place through interpersonal rivalries and not between parties
representing functional interests. The leaders shape policy in all areas of
life with a hierarchical, centralized policy, while the conception of politics
is bureaucratic.
In a place where the
frameworks of traditional power are not in effect, and the political systems
from the colonial period are not well regarded, the leader’s personality is
the principal embodiment of past tradition and of aspirations for the future.
His personality is a vital index in the eyes of the population, for the place
and importance of the state in the world.48
The “simple” political
system and processes of decision-making are placed in the hands of the leader,
without any involvement of interest groups, and without institutionalized
activity through procedures and practices. Authoritarianism is not
ideological, and lack of competition and parties is a striking trait. The
bureaucracy becomes the essence of everything, in the manner of a hierarchical
military command structure.49
The ruling elite comes
from among the religious sages, army officers, and members of the bureaucracy.
Most of the population were not at all involved in political activity, and saw
it as “a malignant evil” which it was necessary to live with and accept, but
it was absolutely desirable and very advisable not to be involved in. Three
kinds of leadership developed: “traditional”, which passes down as an
inheritance according to tradition and custom; “feudal”, growing out of landed
property and tribal status; and “revolutionary”, which derives from the
seizure of power by force. The three kinds of leadership differ in their forms
of government, in patterns of control, and in sources of legitimacy. Yet they
all have something in common; the leaders are patrimonial.
In order to understand the
phenomenon of patrimonial leadership, we will discuss several considerations
of the matter. Weber examined three kinds of leadership: traditional personal,
charismatic personal, and legal-rational non-personal. Patrimonialism is a
sub-type of traditional leadership and exceeds in importance, patriarchal and
gerontocratic leadership.50 Coming after
Weber, Roth pointed out that patrimonialism is separate from traditional
legitimacy, and is based on personal loyalty of men to a leader through
material incentives.51 Patrimonial leadership
is most suitable in Third World countries, some of which, “perhaps are not
states but rather private governments of those who possess governmental
power”.52
Following Roth and on the
basis of Weber’s terminology, two sub-tendencies developed. One by Linz who
dealt with patrimonial personal leadership, and developed four kinds of
non-democratic regimes which are founded on personal loyalty to the leader:
modern sultanism; oligarchic democracy; caudillismo (rule by army
commanders); and caciquismo (rule by bosses of organized crime). Among
the four, modern sultanism is the most personal. In it, the army and police
play a decisive role.53 The second
sub-tendency is Eisenstadt’s. He considered neo-patrimonialism, and created a
distinction between traditional patrimonialism and modern neo-patrimonialism,
principally in Africa.54
Jackson and Rosberg found
that the absence of effective political institutions flows from the dominance
of personal leaders in military or party regimes. Personal leadership
necessarily also means an authoritarian regime which is founded on personal
ties in patron-client relationships, through divide and rule: religious
leadership that stresses an all-embracing ideology and requires loyalty and
absolute submission; princely leadership based on kinship ties of manipulative
coalitions; authoritarian-personal leadership that rules without competitors
and without coalitions; and tyrannical leadership that is a parallel to Linz’s
sultanism, and exercises coercive power without limitations.55
We may characterize
patrimonial leadership in the Arab political, military, and kingship systems
by four central aspects:
-
Personalism. Personal ties are
the most important, and not study or understanding of the formal structures
and organizations. This means that the leader is responsible for all areas
of society, and his importance is greater than all the mechanisms and
balances, and his leadership style is more important than the functioning of
the political institutions.56 Legitimacy is
not institutional but solely personal, and the leader represents the
aspirations of the past and the hopes for the future. Patrimonial leadership
lacks tolerance for institutionalized political processes, for the existence
of an opposition, and does not recognize the legitimacy of social conflicts.
It opposes the “politics of politics” that is expressed in compromises and
negotiations. The political struggle is not between parties, but through
interpersonal rivalry. Opposition parties, if they exist, are inclined to
act as revolutionary movements, which negate the existing political order.
In consequence of high politicization, the phenomenon of praetorianism
developed as a central political process.57
-
Strategic Personal Ties. The
leadership attaches great importance to physical proximity. Indeed, it
exists in all the political systems, but it has a great importance in a
place where processes of decision-making are centralized, personalist, and
informal. Those who are close to the leaders – family members, friends and
personal loyalists – take the senior government
positions.
This is the central reason for governmental nepotism. Furthermore,
what is involved is clientelist politics in which the leader brings
personalities and advisors near to him and pushes them away in a strategy of
divide and rule, in order to prevent formation of alternate foci of power
which might threaten him and his regime, as well as his aspiration to create
competition among them.
-
Informal Politics. Processes of
decision-making are not structured in institutionalized settings. Political
institutions are weak, without capacity to influence. Therefore, they serve
as a means for rationalization of power. They make it possible for leaders
to emphasize capabilities for maneuvering, while taking minimal
responsibility. Hence, politics is non-corporative, performed through
informal bodies without political structures bearing influence, and
political participation is on the level of demands alone.58
-
Military Power. This power is
at the disposal of the leader and of his needs. The army has an important,
significant role in the political system, and constitutes the basis for the
leader’s status and courage. Military parades, ceremonies, and displays of
military power are among the major foundations for attaining and preserving
power, and in projecting political power. Therefore, patrimonialism emerges
chiefly in military regimes or in regimes wherein the army is a support for
the regime and a basis of its existence.
-
High Involvement by the Army
in Shaping and Administering Politics. The army is critical in its
importance for the functioning of the authoritarian state. Since the beginning
of the 1930s and until the end of the 1980s, the army has intervened and ruled
in more than seventy states. Finer argued that it was possible to explain
military involvement in politics through objective and subjective factors. In
relating to the motive and the opportunity, Finer speaks of four combinations
of possible military involvement: there is no military involvement, since
there is neither motive nor opportunity for it; there is military involvement
– there are both a motive and an opportunity; “In sum”, there is no military
involvement, since there is no motive despite there being an opportunity; and
military involvement is unsuccessful, since there is a motive but no
opportunity. The motives for intervention are: national interests, destiny of
the army in politics, sectoral-class interests, and corporative interests. He
analyzed the role of the army in politics, through a typology identifying five
characteristics of a military regime.59
Huntington’s classic,
influential study is the most famous analysis of the roles performed by
military regimes. He examined three phenomena, while referring to
praetorianism and to the level of political participation. The oligarchic type
is connected with a low level of political participation, the radical type of
the middle class is connected with an average level of political
participation, and the mass type is linked to a high level of political
participation.60 It is important to signify
that the term praetorian is taken from the Praetorian Guards in the Roman army
which succeeded in placing their candidates on the throne of imperial power.
Nowadays, the concept serves to explain situations of chronic interference by
the army in politics, and when the army constitutes an independent influential
political force. Huntington argues that a praetorian society means
politicization of the army and of all social forces. All societies that go
through processes of modernization are inclined to be praetorian, since the
political institutions cannot contend with the constantly growing demands for
political participation.61
In every type of
praetorian society, the army performs a different role. The Oligarchic Type
touches the personalist political leadership, and has stood out since the
nineteenth century in regimes in South America. In the Radical Type of the
Middle Class, the army fulfills an autonomous role through a reformist
overthrow and is prominent among the regimes of the Middle East and Africa,
whereas in the Mass Type, the army plays the role of guardian of the regime,
and carries out a “veto overthrow” in order to protect the dominance of the
middle class against all the new groups that have joined politics, mainly from
the lower classes.62
Perlmutter described two
types of the revolutionary praetorian army: the Arbitrator Type which accepts
the existing social order, and is ready to go back to the barracks after the
issues have been settled; and the Ruling Type that challenges the existing
institutional legitimacy, does not trust civilian politicians, and is inclined
to maximize the role of the army in politics. Perlmutter adds a third type to
these two: “the army-party regime”.63
Nordlinger created a
similar typology in which there are three types of military regime: the Ruling
Type that expresses a broad control; the Guardian Type expresses limited goals
and direct control; the Mediator Type expresses limited goals and indirect
control. These types are discerned through two variables: the scope of
political-economic goals of the regime, and the scope of military influence on
the government. The army’s power reaches its peak in the “Ruling Type” of
military regime. Nordlinger based his analysis on the reasons for army
intervention, referring to the Why and the When does the army intervenes. He
intensely stressed the corporative interests of the army.64
Taking power is the simpler act compared with administering power. A practical
guide for taking power is that of Luttwak,65
and in the context of South America that of Firko.66
Among them Nordlinger briefly analyzed the techniques for action.67
The authoritarian regimes
in the Arab world are of two kinds: first, military regimes, in which the army
has seized power by force, without parliamentary arrangements, and it holds
control of all institutions of power, making decisions without restraints.68
Secondly, royalist regimes are where power is passed down as a family
inheritance, but the army serves as a major support for the regime’s
existence.69 In both types of regime, the
leadership is patrimonial.
What is implied by
features of Arab politics, is that the authoritarian regime and the
patrimonial leadership violently suppress all opposition. They do not
recognize the legitimacy of political bargaining, of pluralism, or of the
basic rights of the individual; and they demand political support and
submission, while not honoring political demands. Hence, any opposition is
conspiratorial, and the more that the regime suppresses it, the more the
opposition becomes violent. Here is the link to the action of the
fundamentalist Islamic movements, to their successful suppression which
brought about their exit from the scene, out of the Arab states, to
Afghanistan, and to creating the new anarchistic Islamic terrorist groups.
continued...
Chapter II in the next issue of NATIV ONLINE
Endnotes
1 |
Webster’s defines it as “a
movement in 20th century Protestantism emphasizing the
literally interpreted Bible as fundamental to Christian life and
Teaching”. The Encyclopedia Britannica defines it as a
conservative movement in American Protestantism arising out of the
millenarian movement
of the 19th
century and emphasizing as fundamental to Christianity the literal
interpretation and absolute inerrancy of the Scriptures, the imminent
and physical second coming of Jesus Christ, the Virgin Birth,
Resurrection and Atonement. |
2 |
R.H. Dekmejian, Islam in
Revolution, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995, pp. 57-59,
66, 220-245. |
3 |
We will consider specifically
these two issues in the course of the present study. |
4 |
V.E. Makari, Ibn-Taymiyyah’s
Ethics, Chico: Scholars Press, 1983. |
5 |
C.M. Helms, The Cohesion of
Saudi Arabia: The Evolution of Political Identity, Baltimore: John’s
Hopkins University Press, 1980. |
6 |
N.A. Ziadeh, Sanusiya: A Study
of a Revivalist Movement in Islam, Leiden: Brill, 1958. |
7 |
P.M. Holt, The Mahdist State in
the Sudan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958; H. Shaked, The
Life of the Sudanese Mahdi, New Brunswick: Transaction, 1978. |
8 |
N.R. Keddie, An Islamic
Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writing of Jamal al-Din
al-Afghani, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. |
9 |
M.H. Kerr, Islamic Reform: The
Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966; A. Hourani, Arabic
Thought in the Liberal Age, London: Oxford University Press, 1970,
pp 130-160. |
10 |
Ibid., Hourani., pp. 222-244. |
11 |
Ibid., pp. 231-232. |
12 |
The best study on the Muslim
Brotherhood and its influence is still that of Mitchell. R.P. Mitchell,
The Society of Muslim Brothers, London: Oxford University Press,
1969. |
13 |
C. Geertz, Interpretation of
Cultures, New York: Basic Books, 1973, p. 89. |
14 |
P.K. Hitti, Islam: A Way of
Life, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970. |
15 |
M. Ruthven, Islam in the World,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 26-79. |
16 |
Ibid., pp. 80-121; M.W. Watt,
Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1961. |
17 |
M. Zia Ullah, Islamic Concept
of God, London: Kegan-Paul, 1983. |
18 |
A fascinating analysis of these
movements in terms of “the meaning of unbelief”,
“revolutions in Islam”, and “Islamic conceptions of revolutions” can be
found in B. Lewis, Islam in History: Ideas, Men and Events in the
Middle East, London: Alcove Press, 1973. |
19 |
We will consider these two
important phenomena below in this chapter. |
20 |
M. Hoffman, Islam the
Alternative, Reading: Garnet Publishing, 1993, pp. 89-98. |
21 |
P. Crone, Trade and the Rise of
Islam, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. |
22 |
M.W. Watt, Muhammad at Mecca,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960. |
23 |
M.W. Watt, Muhammad at Medina,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962. |
24 |
The issue of Jerusalem is heavy,
subject to deeply emotional controversies, and apologetics in the
conceptions of the sides. Indeed, Jerusalem has no real link to or touch
on Islam, except as a defiant political demand, but it is not our task
to discuss in the context of this study. |
25 |
F.M. Denny, An Introduction to
Islam, New York: Macmillan, 1985, pp. 46-64. |
26 |
R.T. Antoun, “On the Modesty of
Women in Arab Muslim Villages: A Study in the Accommodation of
Tradition”, American Anthropology, Vol. 70/4, August 1968, pp.
671-697. |
27 |
F. Mernissi, Beyond the Veil:
Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Moslem Society, Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1987; L. Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam:
Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, Cairo: American University in
Cairo Press, 1993. |
28 |
J.G. Peristiany (ed.), Honor
and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1966; B. Altorki, Women in Saudi Arabia, New
York: Columbia University Press, 1986. |
29 |
S. Hamady, The Temperament and
Character of the Arabs, New York: Twaine, 1960, pp. 34-39, 50-54. |
30 |
D.P. Ausubel, “Relationship
Between Shame and Guilt in the Socializing Process”, Psychological
Review, Vol. 62/5, September 1955. |
31 |
B. Morris, “The Arabs Are the Same
Arabs”, Yediot Aharonot, November 23, 2001 (Hebrew). |
32 |
H.H. Williams and J.R. Williams,
“The Extended Family as a Vehicle of Culture Change”, Human
Organization, Vol. 24/1, Spring 1965. |
33 |
E. Shouby, “The Influence of the
Arabic Language on the Psychology of the Arabs” in A.M. Lutfiyya and
C.W. Churchill (eds.), Readings in Arab Middle Eastern Societies and
Cultures, The Hague: Mouton, 1970. |
34 |
R Patai, The Arab Mind, New
York: Charles Schriber, 1983, pp. 48-49. |
35 |
B. Lewis, The Middle East and
the West, New York: Harper and Row, 1965, p. 86. |
36 |
W.S. Blackman, The Fellahin of
Upper Egypt, London: Harrap, 1927, pp. 23-24. |
37 |
H.H. Ayrout, The Egyptian
Peasant, Boston: Beacon Press, 1963, pp. 141-145; S. Hamady, The
Temperament and Character of the Arabs, New York: Twaine, 1960, pp.
54-55. |
38 |
H. Ammar, Growing up in an
Egyptian Village, London: Routledge and Kegan Pall, 1954. |
39 |
J.J. Linz, “An Authoritarian
Regime: Spain”, in: E. Allardt and S. Rokkan (eds.), Mass Politics,
New York: Free Press, 1964, pp. 255-259, 269-270; J.J. Linz,
“Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes”, in: F.I. Greenstein and N.W.
Polsby (eds.), Macropolitical Theory: Handbook of Political Science,
Vol. 3, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975. |
40 |
A. Perlmutter, Modern
Authoritarianism: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1981. |
41 |
G. O’Donnell, Modernization and
Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1973. |
42 |
M. Halpern, The Politics of
Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 10, 18. |
43 |
H.C. Moore, “On the Theory and
Practice Among the Arabs”, World Politics, Vol. 23/1, October
1971. |
44 |
F.M. Donner, The Early Islamic
Conquests, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981. |
45 |
W.H. Wriggins, The Ruler’s
Imperative, New York: Columbia University Press,
1969. |
46 |
M. Hudson, Arab Politics,
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. |
47 |
S.P. Huntington, Political
Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. |
48 |
Y. Emerson, From Empire to
Nation, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. |
49 |
J. Heaphey, “The Organization of
Egypt: Inadequacies of a Non-Political Model for Nation-Building”,
World Politics, Vol. 2/2, January 1966. |
50 |
M. Weber, The Theory of Social
and Economic Organization, New York: Free Press, 1964, pp. 328,
358-360. |
51 |
G. Roth, “Personal Rulership,
Patrimonialism, and Empire Building in the New States”, World
Politics, Vol. 20/2, January 1968, pp. 195-196. |
52 |
Ibid., pp. 196, 198. |
53 |
Op. cit., J.J. Linz, 1975, pp.
253, 259-264. |
54 |
S.N. Eisenstadt, Traditional
Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism, Beverley Hills: Sage,
1973. |
55 |
R.H. Jackson and C.G. Rosberg,
Personal Rule in Black Africa, Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1982, pp. 9-10, 12-19, 37-81. |
56 |
Op. cit., G. Roth, 1968. |
57 |
A. Perlmutter, Egypt: The
Praetorian State, New Brunswick: Transaction, 1974. |
58 |
H.C. Moore, “Authoritarian
Politics in Unincorporated Society: The Case of Nasser’s Egypt”,
Comparative Politics, Vol. 6/2, January 1974. |
59 |
S.E. Finer, The Man on the
Horseback, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. |
60 |
S.P. Huntington, Political
Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968,
p. 80. Despite this, Huntington himself admits that his theory is taken
mainly from the South American experience, and that in other regions of
the world, reality might be different. Ibid., pp. 199-200. |
61 |
Ibid., pp. 79-80, 194-196. |
62 |
Ibid., pp. 199-205, 209, 214,
216-218, 222-223. |
63 |
A. Perlmutter, The Military and
Politics in Modern Times, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977,
pp. 104-105, 145-147. |
64 |
E.A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in
Politics: Military Coups and Government, Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1977. |
65 |
E. Luttwak, Coup d’Etat: A
Practical Handbook, London: Allen Lane, 1968. |
66 |
B.W. Faracau, The Coup: Tactics
in the Seizure of Power, Westport: Praeger, 1994. |
67 |
Op. cit., E.A. Nordlinger, 1977,
pp. 102-106. |
68 |
Ibid.; R. O’Kane, The
Likelihood of Coups, Aldershot: Avebury, 1987. |
69 |
M. Herb, All in the Family:
Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the |
|