From Clandestine Army
to
Guardians of Terror:
The Palestinian Security Forces
and the Second Intifada
Gal Luft
Introduction
In the period between the
signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the outbreak of the second intifada
in September 2000, the Palestinian Authority (PA) proved that it had not
renounced the use of force as a viable instrument of policy. On the contrary,
throughout the eight years of diplomatic negotiations with Israel, it has
repeatedly and deliberately used violent means whenever diplomacy failed to
fulfill the Palestinians’ political aspirations. Palestinian Minister of
Information, Yasser Abd Rabou, confirmed this two-prong strategy: “The
Palestinian side,” he said,
will make clear that the negotiations will go on alongside
the Palestinian struggle against the occupation. It would be impossible to
continue the negotiations unless it is to a certain extent combined with a
certain [level] of struggle against the occupation.1
To be able to combine violence
and diplomacy, the PA needed to develop a military capability that would allow
it to offset Israel’s overwhelming military superiority. And indeed, under the
guise of an innocent police force, a sizable Palestinian military apparatus
emerged west of the Jordan River Valley. The army of the PA became a complex,
badly managed cluster of at least a dozen loosely connected armed groups, not
including the other Fatah-affiliated armed
groups: Tanzim and the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.
Operating under a “divide and conquer” strategy, PA
chairman, Yasser Arafat built his forces in such a way that only he could
arbitrate between them, giving none of them enough power to threaten his
regime. All of them, however, were given leeway to develop capabilities that
would eventually threaten Israel.
Several times prior to the
second intifada Palestinian military and para-military forces were
engaged in fighting against Israel. In addition to the 1982 Lebanon War in
which Israel defeated Palestinian brigades belonging to the Palestinian
National Liberation Army, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) met the Palestinian
armed forces in combat twice before the summer of 2000. The first incident
occurred in September 1996 following a controversial decision made by then
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to open to the public a Herodian
Tunnel in the Old City of Jerusalem. The decision sparked a three-day combat
in which 69 Palestinians and 14 IDF soldiers died, and over 1,200 people were
wounded. Most of the fire in this encounter was generated by uniformed
Palestinian policemen who had been trained to prevent exactly such occurrence.
For the IDF, the Tunnel riots were a seminal event that changed the attitude
toward the PA’s security services from a partner for peace to a potential foe.
As a result, the IDF revised its doctrine and began to seriously prepare for
the possibility of an armed clash with the Palestinian security services.2
May 2000 brought the outbreak
of a second wave of riots, referred to by the Palestinians as the “al Naqba
Riots”. The participation of the uniformed Palestinian security forces in
these riots was more limited than in 1996. Alternatively, the riots introduced
Tanzim, the armed faction of the Fatah movement, as an
independent armed militia and a key player in the Israeli-Palestinian security
arena. It became apparent that by arming and financing popular militias in the
PA controlled territories, Yasser Arafat has been preparing an alternative
military force to operate alongside his official, uniformed security
apparatus.
The two violent clashes exposed
the duality in the PA’s way of using force. The PA has managed to integrate
conventional military capabilities with popular elements operating at the
grass-roots level. The merit of this duality of means is that it allows the PA
to engage in a popular war and yet continue to build conventional military
capabilities that might be needed for a wider, high-intensity conflict.
Summer 2000 brought about two
major events: the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the failure of
the Camp David peace negotiations. Inspired by Hizbullah’s success in
driving Israel out of Lebanon, Arafat decided, as many times before, to
improve Palestinian political standing through the use of force. Asymmetrical
warfare has emerged in modern history as the weapon of the weak; he thought
that as such, if used persistently, it could yield substantial gains. The
success of dedicated, poorly equipped guerrilla forces in prevailing over
superior conventional armies in places like Algiers, Vietnam, Sudan,
Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Lebanon, has been a source of inspiration to many
Palestinians. They believed that a protracted campaign of terror and violence
would be sufficient to bring Israel to make further concessions to those made
in Camp David. Hence, the tenets of the PA’s strategy of fighting Israel in
the first year of the intifada were violent demonstrations designed to
give it an image of a popular struggle complemented by a campaign of terror by
Islamic fundamentalist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
These groups enjoyed freedom of operation and often the direct assistance of
the Palestinian security forces. In addition, the PA launched a massive
propaganda campaign and used diplomatic manipulations in an attempt to
internationalize the conflict. To make things
worse, Arafat allowed the Tanzim to develop as a parallel paramilitary
force with so many weapons and so much power that his security apparatuses
could not stand against it even if he decided to stop the violence. Tanzim
members – many of whom also serve in the ranks of the Palestinian security
forces – often act as though they are above the law and therefore did not
submit to the authority of the Palestinian police. The few attempts by
Palestinian police to arrest popular Tanzim activists or to confiscate
their weapons ended in civil disobedience and, at times, in violence.
In the second year of the
intifada, Tanzim, through its military wing the al Aqsa
Martyrs Brigades, adopted the use of suicide bombers and took the lead of the
terror campaign from the Islamists. In fact, Tanzim was responsible for
some of the bloodiest terror attacks inside Israel including the March 2002
Passover Massacre in which 29 Israelis were killed while attending a Seder in
Netanya.
Tanzim’s espousal of
terror as a key component in its war against Israel blurred the lines between
the Islamists and the PA allowing the Palestinian security forces to openly
engage in terrorism.3
Documented evidence gathered from Arafat’s offices in Ramallah reveal a
disturbing picture of Arafat’s personal involvement in financing and
facilitating terrorism. The documents also prove beyond doubt the deep
involvement in terrorism of top officials in the Palestinian security
establishment.4
This brought about a change in
the Israeli approach toward Arafat and his units. They were no longer
perceived as guardians of peace but rather as part of the Palestinian
terrorist infrastructure. Hence, over the three and a half years following
September 2000, the IDF has launched numerous attacks against Palestinian
military infrastructure using helicopters, jet fighters, tanks and missiles to
destroy most of the PA’s headquarters, training bases, vehicles and equipment.
The heaviest attack occurred in March 2002, after Palestinian terrorism rocked
Israel’s main cities no less than 12 times in one month, killing 70 and
wounding 548. Israel decided to take off the gloves and do exactly what Arafat
had promised to do but failed to deliver: eliminate the Palestinian centers of
terror. On March 28, hundreds of Israeli tanks and armored personnel carriers
rolled into six Palestinian-controlled cities. One by one, Ramallah, Kalkilya,
Tulkarem, Bethlehem, Nablus and Jenin were seized by the IDF as part of
Operation Defensive Shield. The operation was a heavy blow to the PA.
Thousands of weapons were confiscated and hundreds of militants were arrested
including many members of the security apparatuses. In the two years since
Operation Defensive Shield similar raids took place also in the Gaza Strip.
The view that the Palestinian
security forces are tainted with terror is also held today by the US
administration. In his historic June 24, 2002 speech, President George W. Bush
declared that Palestinian statehood would be conditioned on a complete reform
of the security forces and total rejection of terrorism. “Palestinian
authorities are encouraging, not opposing, terrorism. This is unacceptable,”
he said.
The United States
will not support the establishment of a Palestinian state until its leaders
engage in a sustained fight against the terrorists and dismantle their
infrastructure. This will require an externally supervised effort to rebuild
and reform the Palestinian security services. The security system must have
clear lines of authority and accountability and a unified chain of command.5
The demand for comprehensive
reforms in Arafat’s security services was also repeated in the
Quartet’s “roadmap” to Israeli-Palestinian peace,
developed in order to fulfill the vision laid out in Bush’s June 24 speech.
Disappointingly, as of this writing, the necessary reforms have not
been implemented and there is no sign that the Palestinians are prepared to
relinquish violence as a tool to achieve their political aspirations.
The chaotic nature of the
situation on the ground poses great challenge for military analysts trying to
assess current Palestinian military capabilities. Nevertheless, this study
attempts to describe the status of the various apparatuses, their weapons,
missions, doctrine, training, and their relations with fellow security bodies.
It also presents an assessment of the implications of the intifada on
the readiness of the forces and their ability to endure a long period of
fighting with Israel.
The second part of this work
will examine the different aspects in which Palestinian military forces could
pose a military challenge to the IDF and to Israel at large. These aspects
will be reviewed through three scenarios. The first is, in essence, a
prolongation of the existing situation in which Israel and the PA military
bodies fight each other using guerrilla and counter-guerrilla tactics. The
tactics used by the Palestinians under this scenario include ambushes,
bombings, drive-by shootings, coordinated attacks on Israeli military outposts
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and terror attacks against Israeli civilians.
The IDF’s action involves the use of high-tech weapons and specialized units
and is directed mainly toward Palestinian military installations,
infrastructure of terror organizations and individuals suspected in military
activity against Israel. At times, IDF units carry out incursions into
Palestinian controlled territories for punitive or preemptive purposes or to
remove threats from the vicinity of Israeli settlements. Nevertheless, despite
the intensity of the fighting, both sides refrain from using their entire
arsenal and military capabilities against each other. The Israeli military has
so far refrained from re-conquering the Gaza Strip, the center of Hamas
and Islamic Jihad, and the PA has held back some of its forefront units
from joining the fray.
The second scenario
will describe an all-out Israeli-Palestinian military confrontation in which
the PA uses all the weapons, units and tactics that have not been used until
now. Naturally, such escalation will force Israel to expand its own arsenal of
lethal weapons, including the extensive use of air power, artillery and heavy
armored formations. According to various reports, Israel is not ruling out the
possibility of launching an all-out attack against the PA in the Gaza Strip in
response to escalated violence. Such radical measures would entail the IDF to
move into the city of Gaza in order to destroy the military and political
infrastructure of the PA and the terror organizations it hosts. This, in turn,
would put the PA in a battle for its survival. The Palestinians’ lack of a
comprehensive defense system and the disparity in power between the PA forces
and the IDF would bring about a complete destruction of the remainder of the
PA’s military infrastructure as well as its political institutions. Arafat
himself is likely to be killed or expelled from the region under such
scenario. But before complete destruction of the PA takes place, the IDF will
have to meet Arafat’s soldiers in the narrow streets of cities like Gaza,
Rafah, Khan Yunis and the adjacent refugee camps as well as in West Bank
cities which the IDF invaded many times before. Urban war, as the IDF
experienced in the battle of Jenin refugee Camp during Operation Defensive
Shield, could be complex and costly in term of casualties. Success in such a
war depends mostly on the ability of the attacker to crush the fighting will
of the defender before international intervention takes place. The degree of
persistence and willpower of the Palestinian security forces and the
Palestinian population from which these forces draw their support is likely to
be one of the most important considerations that would determine whether
Israel should embark on such an operation. The PA, seeking new means of
deterrence to deter Israel from launching such an attack, may resort to
examining unorthodox options in the sphere mega-terror attacks and use of
non-conventional weapons.
The third scenario will focus
on the role of the Palestinian military forces in the event of a regional war
involving one or few Arab players such as Syria, Iran, and Hizbullah.
The danger of intervention of more Arab states such as Saudi Arabia as well as
the abrogation of existing peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt should not be
discounted. The plausibility of such a scenario have been, somewhat, reduced
in the wake of the terror attacks on New York and Washington on September 11,
2001, the subsequent US declaration of war on terrorist organizations and
their host nations and the US liberation of Iraq. But the unpredictable nature
of the region, the conflicting agendas of the different players and the
traditional fragility of military coalitions still give this scenario a degree
of plausibility.
Such a war could be triggered,
for example, by a Hizbullah missile attack on Israel’s north. Such an
attack is likely to elicit massive Israeli retaliation against Syrian-occupied
Lebanon and Syria itself and might involve other countries. Palestinian action
could also trigger regional turmoil. A successful mega-terror attack
causing hundreds of Israeli casualties would most likely provoke a
large-scale, uninhibited punitive offensive that could, in turn, create a
humanitarian crisis, Palestinian flight to Jordan and severe destabilization
in the region including a real danger to the Hashemite Kingdom.
Fighting in the framework of a coalition of Arab states, the PA military units
could have an important supporting role with considerable operational
implications on the IDF’s ability to mobilize its essential reserve component.
Palestinian military and para-military forces could also attempt to attack
important military and civilian installations inside Israel itself, creating
havoc and significant psychological damage.
I. The PA Security Services: Structure and
Organization6
The formation of the
Palestinian security apparatuses were explicitly defined by the Cairo
Agreement signed in May 1994 and the subsequent Oslo II Agreement signed in
September 1995. The Cairo Agreement determined that the Palestinian Authority
could establish a strong police force that would be referred to as “the
Palestinian Police”. The duties, functions, structure, deployment and
composition of the Palestinian Police, together with provisions regarding its
equipment and operation, were prescribed in the agreement. The PA police
undertook to perform normal police functions, including maintaining internal
security and public order, protecting the public and its property and acting
to provide a feeling of security and safety, adopting all measures necessary
for preventing crime and protecting public installations and places of special
importance.
The Oslo II Agreement signed in
September 1995 added an important duty to the Palestinian Police: combating
terrorism and violence and preventing incitement to violence.
The agreements also provided
the means to do the job. Israel allowed the PA to absorb up to 7,000 veterans
of the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) living throughout the Arab world and
to recruit them into the ranks of the Palestinian Police. The rest of the men
were to be recruited from the local population of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip.
The Palestinian Police was to
be composed of seven integral branches: Civil Police, Public Security,
Preventive Security, Intelligence, Presidential Guard, Coastal Guard and
Emergency Services and Rescue. The agreement specified that except for the
Palestinian Police referred to in the agreement, no other armed forces shall
be established or operate in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank. In reality, the
PA employs today at least 12 different security apparatuses, this without
taking into account the Tanzim, Fatah’s armed militia, the most
dominant force in the second intifada and other armed groups such as
the Popular Resistance Committees and the al Aqsa Martyr Brigades which
will be described later.
National-Security Force (Kuwaat Al-Amn Watani)
(NSF)
As the largest security
service, numbering about 14,000 men, the NSF was responsible prior to the
intifada for most of the missions along the borders of “Area A”, the area
which used to be under exclusive Palestinian control, and inside the cities.
Soldiers of the NSF guarded most of the checkpoints on the outskirts of main
cities taking part in other general security-related missions. Until the
outbreak of the intifada, the force also operated a company
specializing in the Israeli-Palestinian Joint Patrols.
The forces in Gaza are
organized in three brigades, a northern brigade, responsible for the northern
part of the Gaza Strip including Gaza City, a southern brigade responsible for
the southern region of Rafah and Khan-Yunis, and a border brigade of
approximately 1,000 troops which patrols along the eastern border of the Gaza
Strip. In the West Bank, the NSF consists of eight battalions of 400-450
troops deployed in the large Palestinian cities of Ramallah, Jenin, Tulkarem,
Jericho, Kalkilyah, Nablus, Hebron, and Bethlehem.
The NSF recruited most of its
men from the PLA and gradually added increasing numbers of local recruits.
Commanding the NSF in Gaza is General Abdel al Razzak Majaideh. The commander
in the West Bank is General Haj Ismail, both officers are PLA veterans. NSF
units were equipped with 30 armored vehicles BRDM2, most of them were
destroyed in Israeli raids. The troops carry AK-47s and pistols but also keep
heavier weapons in their arsenal.
Civil Police (Shurta Madaniyya)
The civil police, known as the
Blue Police, is the PA’s main law enforcement apparatus. It handles ordinary
police functions such as directing traffic, arresting common criminals,
fighting drug trafficking and keeping public order. The organization employs
over 7,500 policemen in Gaza and approximately 4,700 in the West Bank.
According to the interim agreement, the Civil Police would also deploy in 25
selected villages and towns throughout the West Bank’s Area B, the area of PA
civilian jurisdiction and Israeli military control. The policemen in these
villages were allowed to carry firearms within the village territory, and to
maintain public order but this arrangement has been cancelled since the
outbreak of the hostilities.
The police forces are equipped
with light weapons and drive blue vehicles. Just like other apparatuses, the
infrastructure of the Palestinian Police was considerably damaged by Israel.
Members of the Civil Police,
including its commander, General Ghazi Jubali, have been involved in terror
attacks against Israeli targets. In July 1997, the IDF caught three policemen
who were on their way to attack a Jewish settlement near Nablus. Jubali turned
out to be the person who masterminded the attack and since then he is wanted
by the Israeli authorities. As a result, he was excluded from all the security
negotiations between Israel and the PA. Jubali is prohibited from leaving the
Gaza Strip and cannot have direct command over the police forces in the West
Bank. Police operations in the West Bank are, therefore, directed by the local
police chief, Muhammad Jabari, whose headquarters are in Ramallah.
In December 2000, the death of
Jubali’s deputy Abdel Muati al-Sabawi while trying to dismantle a bomb,
revealed the connection of members of the Civil Police to an illicit weapons
industry in Gaza. According to Israeli sources, Jubali and some of his
deputies were personally involved in coordinating the production of mortar
shells and hand grenades.7
Rapid Deployment Special Police Unit
This is the spearhead of the
Civil Police. This force of a few thousand highly trained men specializes in
handling complex crises such as severe riots, and counter-terrorism
operations. The unit is specifically trained in urban warfare and is the most
capable in restoring order in the PA’s crowded refugee camps. Many of the
commanders of the unit have undergone training in the Soviet Union and one of
their important roles is to train instructors for the other Palestinian
security services.8
In October 2002, a group of Hamas gunmen kidnapped and killed the
unit’s commander, Col. Rajeh Abu Lihyeh. Hamas refused to hand over the
principal suspect and resisted attempts by the PA to storm the refugee camp
where he lives. The incident triggered clashes between Fatah and
Hamas leading to five deaths.9
Presidential Security – Force 17 (Amn Al-
Ri`asah)10
Force 17 is the unit that is
responsible for the protection of Yasser Arafat as well as other VIPs and
important installations in the PA. This high quality security apparatus,
commanded by Faisal Abu-Sharah since 1994, is based on the historical Force 17
which provided PLO leaders intelligence and protection against internal rivals
during the 1970s and 1980s.
The force is estimated at 2,000
men in the Gaza Strip, deployed in three geographical battalions: a northern
battalion, a southern battalion and a battalion, which controls Gaza City. In
the West Bank, the force consists of approximately 1,500 men, most of whom are
deployed in Ramallah and commanded by Mahmoud Damara, also known as “Abu-Awad”.
In addition to providing
security guards, Force 17 deals with counter- terrorism and the arrests of
opposition activists and suspects of collaboration with Israel. It also
assists the NSF in routine security missions along the border with Israel and
patrols the main cities.
Force 17 has two subsidiary
bodies, subjected to the Presidential Security command. The first is Force 17
Intelligence Unit whose main mission is gathering information about the
activities of the opposition movements and other domestic threats. The other
is the Presidential Guard, Arafat’s most loyal and trusted inner circle. This
small unit of several dozen elite fighters provides the tight security around
him, preventing any assassination attempts. The unit commander is Yusuf Ali
Ahmed Abdallah, also known as “Dr. Yusuf”.
Unlike the other security
services, Force 17 consists mainly of officers who came from Tunisia in 1994.
These officers are hardly known in the public and lack local ties and
popularity that many of the other military leaders enjoy.
According to the IDF, Force 17
members, especially in the West Bank branch, were involved in numerous terror
attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians such as shooting attacks,
roadside bombs and mortar attacks. In February 2000, a cell of Force 17
members in coordination with Hizbullah, was associated with launching
mortars on a Gaza Strip settlement. The group’s leader, Mas`oud Ayad, was
assassinated by the IDF shortly afterwards. On March 30, 2001, Israeli forces
bombarded from the air two of the headquarters of this force in Ramallah and
Gaza. Soon after, in early April, Israeli forces arrested several members of
this force inside Area A. Force 17 bases and offices were severely damaged by
Israel’s attacks, especially during the attack on Arafat’s headquarters in
Ramallah during Operation Defensive Shield.
Preventive Security Forces (Amn Al-Wiqa`i)
(PSF)
This plainclothes security
force operates in the West Bank and Gaza with an estimated power of close to
5,000 agents and is known to be the largest of the PA’s intelligence forces.
Until the outbreak of the intifada, this body was involved in
preventive actions against terrorist and opposition groups as well as
information gathering in Israel. It had its own prison and interrogation
installations. Some of the PSF activities were associated with violence,
abduction of civilians, interrogations, tortures, and other illegal actions.
The PSF achieved, therefore, a reputation for human rights violations
including the death of tortured detainees.11
PSF leaders prior to the
hostilities, Jibril Rajub in the West Bank and Muhammad Dahlan in Gaza, were
amongst the most powerful individuals in the security establishment. They were
politically influential due to their power among the grass roots as well as
their political connections with the political leadership of the PA. Both of
them were part of the Fatah leadership at the beginning of the first
intifada and both were imprisoned in Israel. During the heydays of the
peace process, they worked in close cooperation with the Israeli security
forces especially in the fields of counter-terrorism and crime prevention.
They were also involved in the economic life of the PA and had control over
the PA’s imports and exports of goods and services. They were known to be
involved in corrupt practices such as collection of protection fees, issuing
of business licenses, extortion and theft.
With the outbreak of the second
intifada, both leaders were faced with increasing criticism
regarding their previous collaboration with Israel. To enhance their
credibility and patriotism in the eyes of the Palestinian public, they had to
re-invent themselves and adopt hard-line positions. As a result, the PSF,
especially its Gaza branch, has gradually become an active participant in the
fighting. The PSF headquarters in Gaza converted
itself into the main center for the manufacturing of weapons and a safe haven
for terrorists planning to carry out attacks in the Gaza Strip. Within the
headquarters, and with full knowledge and consent from senior members of the
PSF, a huge amount of weapons was manufactured and stockpiled. These weapons
were handed out freely to terrorist cells belonging to Hamas, the
Islamic Jihad, and Fatah, which used them to carry out daily
bomb and shooting attacks in the Gaza Strip.
Dahlan and his deputy, Rashid
Abu-Shabak, were reportedly involved in directing and sponsoring terror
attacks against Israeli targets in the Gaza Strip. Abu Shabak has been
personally involved in the November 2000 attack on a school bus in Kfar Darom,
and is the driving force behind Palestinian production of mortars and rockets.
He and his deputy Samir Mashrahawi maintain
close working relations with Hamas and PIJ. PSF members in the West
Bank have also been involved in planning, executing and backing terror attacks
including an attempt to blow up a car bomb in an Israeli population center.12
The PSF involvement in
terrorism triggered a change in Israel’s approach toward the organization.
Rajub, Dahlan and Abu-Shabak were treated no more as part of the solution but
as a major part of the problem. Their headquarters were destroyed and key
members of their organizations were arrested or assassinated. Due to personal
tension with Arafat and the leadership of Tanzim, both security chiefs
were forced to step down as part of the changes that took place in the
security forces in July 2002. Dahlan’s position was taken by Abu-Shabak. Rajub
was replaced by Brigadier-General Zuheir Manasra, former governor of Jenin.
But PSF members refuse to obey his orders. Instead, they submit to Rajub’s
deputy Colonel Bashir Nafe. With the establishment of the Palestinian cabinet
in May 2003 headed by Mahmoud Abbas, Dahalan was appointed defense minister.
He formed a joint apparatus combining the West Bank and Gaza Strip branches of
the PSF relieving Manasra from his job. Being a Gaza resident, Dahalan faced
difficulties asserting his authority on the PSF in the West Bank and failed to
unite the two branches under one command. After failing to reform the security
forces Dahlan resigned from his position.
General Intelligence (Mukhabbarat Al-Amma)
The General Intelligence is the
PA’s official intelligence body specializing mainly in counter-insurgency and
the hunt of collaborators with Israel. It is also involved in intelligence
gathering outside the territories, counter-espionage operations and developing
relations with other foreign intelligence bodies.
The organization’s size is
estimated to be 1,000 men, many of whom are highly experienced intelligence
agents who worked at the PLO headquarters in Tunis prior to the establishment
of the PA. In addition, there are up to 2,000 informers and unofficial
employees who render various services to the General Intelligence.
The General Intelligence is
headed by Maj. Gen. Amin al-Hindi, who was involved in the 1972 massacre of
the Israeli athletes in the Munich Olympics. He disappeared after the attack
and emerged 22 years later as the commander of the General Intelligence. But
the more visible man in the organization is the West Bank director Tawfik
Tirawi, who since the beginning of the intifada, is known to
have been involved in organizing civil disobedience as well as numerous terror
attacks.
On September 1, 2001, the
General Intelligence organization suffered a severe blow with the death of
al-Hindi’s deputy, Colonel Taisir Khatab. He was reportedly assassinated by an
unknown Palestinian organization calling itself the Martyr Bilal al-Ghoul
Group.13
In June 2002 Tirawi was forced to resign due to personal dispute with Arafat.
Military Intelligence (Astkhabbarat Al-Ashkarim)
A smaller intelligence body of
500-600 men, is headed by Mussa Arafat, Yasser Arafat’s nephew. The Military
Intelligence is a preventive apparatus, which deals mainly with arrests and
interrogations of opposition activists who might endanger the stability of the
regime. This body also investigates some of the illegal actions carried out by
other intelligence and security bodies. The Military Intelligence is also
involved in intelligence gathering in and on Israel. In addition, it
arbitrates in the occasional feuds between the different security forces.
Unlike former Gaza Preventive
Security Service chief Mohammed Dahlan, who used to be a Fatah leader,
or Palestinian Intelligence chief Amin al-Hindi, who earned his reputation as
a PLO fighter, Mussa Arafat has very little popular support. His power is
mainly derived from his special relationship with Yasser Arafat. On several
occasions his unit was involved in fighting, ending up with casualties, with
other Palestinian armed bodies. In 1998, Mussa Arafat’s men raided the
Tanzim office in Ramallah, accidentally killing one Tanzim
activist. In other incidents, they fired at the Chairman of the Tanzim
in the West Bank, Marwan Barghouti, and few of his associates, thus causing
great tension with the local population. In July 2001, the Military
Intelligence was involved in armed clashes with members of Hamas and
the Palestinian Popular Resistance Committees following the arrests of some of
the Committees’ men.
Military Police
This is a subordinate body to
the Military Intelligence which specializes in riot control, arrests,
protection of VIPs and important installations, maintenance of prisons and
enforcement of order and discipline among the security bodies. The military
police is the PA’s ceremonial force and Arafat’s guard of honor upon his
arrival and departure form Gaza.
Special Security Force (Amn Al-Khatz) (SSF)
The Special Security Force was
established in January 1995 and works under Arafat’s direct supervision. Its
official objective is to gather information about the activities of opposition
groups in foreign countries, especially Arab ones, but its actual function is
to spy on the PA’s other security services. The SSF supplies Arafat with
information about cases of corruption and illegal actions of PA officials. It
is the smallest of the organizations, numbering several dozen, and headed by
Muhammad Natur who is very close to Arafat.
Coast Guard (Shurta Bahariyya)
The official objective of the
Coast Guard is the protection of the PA’s territorial water mainly against
arms and drug smugglers from Egypt. It owned 13 motorboats equipped with
machine guns, all of them were destroyed by the IDF. Most of the members are
foreign recruits who used to belong to the Fatah naval unit abroad.
They are trained in diving and underwater sabotage. The unit is deployed
mainly in Gaza and consists of about 600 men in Gaza and 400 in the West Bank.
What is the use of hundreds of seamen in the West Bank which has no access to
the sea? Upon their arrival to the PA areas, the soldiers of the Coast Guard,
who had received special commando training in Egypt, made the unit highly
valuable and able to deal with dangerous challenges. As an elite unit, the
Coast Guard in the West Bank is responsible for the protection of prisons and
other important installations. But the capture of the Karine-A revealed
another role to the Coastal Guard: facilitating arms smuggling operations via
sea into the PA. The captain of the Karine-A, a colonel in the Coastal Guard,
demitted in his interrogation that the organization took part is several
smuggling schemes under orders from Arafat’s associates.
The Israeli response to these
findings was decisive. The Coastal Guard was prohibited from conducting
operations in PA water, its maritime equipment was destroyed and its members
are currently restricted to operations on the ground. The Coastal Guard is
presently headed by Gamaa Ghali and the West Bank component is commanded by
Abu-Zaki.
Aerial Police (Shurta Al-Joya)
The aerial police is a
rudimentary aerial unit based on “Force 14”, Fatah’s aviation unit,
responsible for operating and maintaining what used to be a small fleet of
five helicopters, used mainly for Arafat’s and other VIP’s transportation. The
unit numbers several dozen and is commanded by Shukri Tabet. In addition,
there are some 200 Palestinians who have reportedly undergone training in Arab
militaries as fighter and helicopter pilots. However, only a small fraction of
them, are young and fit enough to serve as pilots in a Palestinian air force.
The only airfield in the PA is at Dahaniya in the Gaza Strip but this field
was destroyed by Israel and is no longer operational. So were the helicopters
and the rest of the equipment. As of this writing, the PA has no aerial
capabilities.
Civil Defense (Al-Dafah Al-Madani)
Consisting of the fire
department and rescue services, the Civil Defense coordinates these and other
civilian services during emergencies. In normal times, the body administers a
massive program of first aid and rescue training for the civilian population.
This unit, numbering approximately 2,000 men, has its own ambulances and
rescue vehicles and is commanded by Brig. Gen. Omar Ashur.
County Guard (Amn Al-Makhapta)
The county guard is a small
force which supplies security services to the county governors and their
offices. It engages in summoning people for questioning, resolving local
quarrels and enforcing decisions of the Palestinian courts of arbitration.
II. Command and Control
The most prominent feature of
the Palestinian security forces is the proliferation and amorphousness of the
aforementioned units, which makes a precise definition of their different
responsibilities nearly impossible. There are, for example, seven different
bodies dealing in various capacities with intelligence and counter-insurgency
operations. The abundance of intelligence units has dual reasoning. First, it
represents Arafat’s emphasis on the survival of his regime through
counter-insurgency operations in an attempt to weaken the militant opposition
as much as possible. The opposition movements, Hamas and Islamic
Jihad, must be under permanent surveillance in order to diminish the
political threat which they pose. Second, the intelligence bodies are mostly
plainclothed apparatuses employing agents who look and dress like regular
civilians. This allowed the PA to inflate the number of security personnel to
a large extent without violating the quotas prescribed in the Oslo and Cairo
agreements.
With so many security
bodies no wonder that their jurisdictions overlap each other often causing
street clashes, confusion and inefficient work. In more extreme cases
confusion may lead to harsh results when one security branch ends up battling
with a competing one over blurred jurisdictions or access to money and
weapons. Coordinating the services to prevent such unfortunate events is
complicated because Arafat has built his forces in such a manner that only he
could arbitrate between them.
Another factor creating command
and control problems is the separation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
The geographical barriers prevent Palestinian commanders from moving freely
between Gaza and the West Bank and exercising their command over their troops
in both areas. As a result, each one of the apparatuses has two branches
independent of each other: one in the West Bank and the other in the Gaza
Strip. The regional commanders work directly under Arafat without any
intermediate level of command. This results in friction between West Bank
commanders and their Gaza colleagues over funding, prestige and political
influence.
Unlike most militaries, the PA
security forces do not work under the supervision of a general-staff-like
body. There are two umbrella organizations to coordinate the work of the
different services but their authorities are limited. First is the General
Directorate of Palestinian Security Services, established in May 1994, which
is responsible for the logistic coordination and maintenance of the
Palestinian security bodies and services. The supreme commander of all the
security and intelligence apparatuses is the Chairman of the PA, Yasser
Arafat. Under him served General Nasr Yusef, a former PLA general, as the
chief-of-staff. His responsibility was to coordinate nine administrative
departments responsible for training, logistics, communication, finance and
political guidance. Nevertheless, the Directorate has no operational
jurisdiction and no authority to interfere with the activities of the
different services. In 2003, Yusef’s relations with Arafat deteriorated and he
lost much of his power and influence.
Another body that has become
increasingly influential since the outbreak of the intifada is the
Palestinian High Security Council chaired by Arafat and comprising all the PA
security organs. The council is the PA’s highest body of national security
decision-making but it serves mainly to demonstrate national solidarity and to
convey a false image of cooperation between the various services. By the
beginning of the third year of the intifada the Palestinians have no
effective mechanism of coordination of their military operations and the
fighting is conducted in decentralized manner.
III. Weapons
One of the key principles of
the Israeli-Palestinian agreement was the Palestinian right to bear arms in
order to ensure its security as well as the security of Israelis. To do so,
the Israeli agreement allowed the PA forces to hold 15,000 rifles and pistols
and another 240 machine guns of 0.3” or 0.5” caliber. This number was later
doubled. The agreement did not prescribe the number of weapons each one of the
apparatuses would be allowed to have but determined that only authorized
members of the Palestinian Police would be allowed to carry them.
Except for the arms, ammunition
and equipment of the Palestinian Police described in the agreement, no
organization or individual in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank area is allowed
to manufacture, sell, acquire, possess, import or otherwise introduce into the
Palestinian controlled territories any firearms, ammunition, weapons,
explosives, gunpowder or any related equipment.
The PA has been violating the
above provisions almost since its establishment. It is hard to determine
precisely the number of weapons in the PA, but it is estimated to be more than
four times the allowed number. Tens of thousands of illegal weapons are in the
hands of members of the security forces as well as in the hands of
unauthorized civilian members of the Tanzim, Hamas, Islamic
Jihad and other political groups and criminal groups. Severe discrepancies
also exist between the types of light weapons allowed by the agreement and the
weapons that the PA is actually stocking. The Palestinians have obtained
anti-armor missiles such as LAW and AT-3 Sagger, M203 grenade launchers,
rocket propelled grenades, mortars of various calibers, 107mm. and 120mm.
katyusha rockets, land mines, hand grenades, shoulder launched anti-aircraft
missiles and truck mounted anti-aircraft guns.14
The general assessment is that
the PA is involved in a massive effort to amass stocks of illegal weapons and
ammunition to enable it to have an extended fighting capability. The
accumulation of weapons is carried out by smuggling them into the PA through
the Dead Sea and into the West Bank, or through the Mediterranean Sea into the
Gaza Strip. On January 29, 2001 the Israeli security forces found on the beach
near Ashkelon sealed barrels containing dozens of rocket propelled grenade
launchers and hundreds of grenades and mortar shells. The barrels were part of
a larger cargo, directed to Gaza, that was discharged by a smugglers’ ship
from Lebanon. On May 7, 2001, the Israeli Navy managed to capture a fishing
boat off the coast of Haifa with a large quantity of arms and ammunition bound
for the forces in the Gaza Strip. The cargo included rocket-propelled
grenades, mortars, 50 katyusha rockets, mines, grenades and shoulder launched
anti-aircraft missiles. This arsenal was sent to the PA by Ahmed Jibril’s
Lebanese based Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).
It has been established that several similar shipments made it through to the
PA and the weapons are in the hands of various armed groups, including the
official security services.15
But the biggest attempt to smuggle weapons into the
PA took place in January 2002 when a ship – the Karine-A – transporting fifty
or more tons of arms, was captured by the Israeli Navy. The shipment included
both 122 mm. and 107 mm. Katyusha rockets, which have ranges of 20 and 8
kilometers respectively. It also contained 80 mm. and 120 mm. mortar shells,
various types of anti-tank missiles, anti-tank mines, sniper rifles,
Kalashnikov rifles and ammunition. The types and the quantities of the weapons
captured aboard the Karine-A, as well as the timing of the ship’s voyage,
indicated that Palestinian armament efforts are designed not exclusively for
defensive purposes, but rather for changing the military balance between the
PA and Israel. From Gaza, the 122 mm. Katyushas could have threatened Ashkelon
and other coastal cities; while from the West Bank, Ben-Gurion International
Airport and several major Israeli cities would have been within their range.
The shipment also included rubber boats and diving equipment, which would have
facilitated sea borne attacks from Gaza against coastal cities.16
Another
channel of smuggling is from Egypt by means of secret underground tunnels,
which connect Egypt to Rafah in the Gaza Strip. Despite the IDF’s extensive
efforts to locate and destroy these tunnels, all of them dug underneath the
Israeli controlled borderline, the underground channels are still very active.17
The border with Jordan is also
a place for weapons transfers. Israel thwarted several Palestinian efforts to
smuggle weapons and ammunition through the Dead Sea and the Jordan River. It
is hard to assess, though, the extent of weapons that successfully filtered
through the porous border. In addition, there are continuous efforts to break
into Israeli military installations and steal valuable weapons. Some of these
efforts were very fruitful, and dozens of anti-tank missiles as well as
machine guns, rifles and ammunition were transferred into Palestinian hands.
In February 1997, for example, a former IDF scout was arrested for stealing a
military patrol vehicle loaded with weapons and ammunition. In the
investigation he admitted that the weapons were ordered by the PA through a
Palestinian who served as a connection with the suspect. Israeli arms dealers
and other criminals have an important role in assisting the Palestinian
procurement efforts. Some of the weapons are smuggled into the PA through
regular commercial import channels. Weapons hidden in trucks and containers
escape the eyes of Israeli customs inspectors and are then transferred
directly to the PA.18
Indigenous Arms Production
The PA is prohibited from
manufacturing weapons and ammunition both domestically and outside its
borders. Furthermore, it should prevent weapon production by terror
organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In the first four
years of its operation, there was no evidence that the PA was involved in arms
production. There were, however, several attempts by Hamas members to
build workshops and laboratories to produce bombs and grenades. But due to
fruitful Palestinian-Israeli security cooperation, these attempts were
thwarted. In one case, the PA raided a grenade factory that produced more than
6,000 grenades, but the ammunition was kept by the PA and never handed to
Israel as agreed.
In 1997, there was a change in
the PA’s policy regarding indigenous weapons production. In May 1998, the
Palestinian Legislative Council completed the legislation of the Firearms and
Ammunition Law, a law that enables the production of weapons and ammunition in
the Palestinian controlled territories, thus laying the foundation for an
indigenous defense industry capable of producing light arms and ammunition.
And indeed, such factories have been established, working under the scientific
committee of the Fatah movement and adding to the PA’s arsenal large
quantity of light ammunition.
On January 30, 2001, the
Palestinians fired, for the first time, mortar shells on an Israeli target.
Since then, more than 1000 mortars and rockets have been fired at Israeli
settlements. Whereas in the beginning it was thought that the PA is using
smuggled mortar shells, by mid-May 2001, the Israeli General Security Services
uncovered a network of Palestinian operatives who were involved in the
manufacturing of mortar rounds in Gaza. Senior ranking officers of the
Palestinian Police were involved in the production of thousands of shells in
various calibers. A similar operation was initiated by the PSF, headed by
Muhammad Dahlan. PSF agents were asked to produce 120mm. aluminum mortar
shells that could provide Palestinian artillery with extended range.19
They also produced grenades, bombs and over 1,000
stabilizers for anti-tank missiles. Other information that surfaced from
interrogation of PSF detainees revealed how the PSF actively sponsored and
encouraged the setting up of many workshops in Gaza City used to manufacture
weapons. These weapons were used by many different terrorist organizations to
carry out attacks against IDF units and Israeli civilians.20
Documents seized by the IDF in one of the raids in Gaza showed that PSF
members were also involved in setting up a chemical plant to produce nitric
acid used to produce high-quality explosives. The man behind this initiative
was Rashid Abu Shabak.
As of this writing, it appears
that most of the activities of weapons production have been severely limited,
especially in the West Bank. The IDF destroyed many weapons factories and
confiscated materials that could be used for weapons production. Production is
likely to continue to take place in places like Gaza City and Khan Yunis where
IDF activities are limited. It is almost certain that the attempts to
establish a clandestine arms industry would continue. The PA sees indigenous
arms production as a necessity since this is the only way to ensure the supply
of weapons and ammunitions to its forces.
IV. Training
According to the Oslo
Agreements, Palestinians joining the security forces were supposed to be
trained as policemen, not as combat soldiers. To do that, the PA received
assistance from several countries including Britain, Austria, the Netherlands,
Egypt and the Scandinavian nations. The CIA also had an important part in the
training of the various services hoping that such training would facilitate
the PA’s war against terrorism. Palestinian intelligence agents received
training by CIA instructors both in the Palestinian controlled territories as
well as in the United States. The CIA training focused on advanced
surveillance and photography methods, sniper training and advanced VIP
protection techniques. The CIA also provided the PA with listening devices and
computer programs capable of scanning large numbers of radio frequencies. With
such radio scanners, the Palestinian forces can listen in on IDF radio
communication.21
The funding of the donor countries enabled the PA to establish training bases
in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Until the outbreak of the intifada,
training courses for new recruits were conducted regularly and according to an
annual training program. But since each one of the security services recruits
and trains its own men, there has been little coordination or information
exchange between the services on how to improve the quality of training. The
Palestinian security forces still lack the resources for extensive training
program. As a result, basic training is usually insufficient and runs from 10
days to one month of intensive courses. For more elite units like Force 17,
the training is three months.22
The daily contact with the IDF, when cooperation still existed, also had a
positive influence on the quality of the Palestinian forces. Although Israel
was never directly involved in the training and instruction of Palestinian
forces, it was only natural that the Palestinian Police, by simply operating
alongside a well-equipped standing army like the IDF, emulated and adopted
many of the drills and techniques performed by the Israelis.
Since 1998, there has been a
change in the training routines of the PA. The services began to adopt
training programs with gradually stronger military orientation rather than
focusing exclusively on police work. Palestinian company and battalion
commanders were sent to undergo training in Egypt, Yemen, Algeria and Pakistan
as commanders of combat units. Many of those who were previously qualified to
function exclusively as law enforcers began to think, plan and function as
professional soldiers. In addition, the size of the formations trained by the
PA also grew. In 1998, the training of Palestinian security forces was limited
to small-sized units such as platoons and companies, but in the beginning of
2000, when it became apparent that crisis was imminent, the PA started
training battalion-sized formations. In 2000 alone, until the outbreak of the
intifada, the NSF conducted six battalion exercises. The training
focused on various combat scenarios including urban warfare, gaining control
of an area of land, mock attacks on IDF posts and Jewish settlements, and use
of mechanized forces.23
V. Impact of the Second
Intifada
In the three and a half years
of the second intifada, more than 2,000 Palestinians have been killed
and more than 20,000 have been wounded. On the Israeli side, more than 900
people have been killed and more than 5,500 people have been wounded. Both
sides have suffered a serious setback to their economy and national morale.
In the first few weeks of the
fighting, the performance of the Palestinian security forces was rather poor.
The violent demonstrations were part of the PA’s strategy to present the
crisis with Israel as a genuine act of disillusionment and rage by the
Palestinian people. Arafat, therefore, refrained from ordering his security
forces to act against his people’s display of anger. Not only did the PA
forces not attempt to restore order, they became increasingly involved in the
fighting, though only on an individual basis. Palestinian policemen exchanged
fire with IDF troops in numerous occasions but overall displayed a low level
of military competence. They generated a great deal of sporadic, inaccurate
fire with very little results. Contrary to the riots in September 1996, when
the PA forces succeeded in killing 14 Israeli soldiers in two days, in the
first two weeks of the second intifada, not one Israeli soldier was
killed in combat with the Palestinian police. In first year of the second
intifada, fewer than 50 Israeli soldiers have been killed and only 20 of
them in direct combat. The rest were victims of bombing and lynching. By any
military standards, this toll is minimal considering the intensity and
duration of the fighting. It reflects more than anything the superb military
readiness of the IDF units but no less a poor military competence of the
Palestinian side. The Palestinian security forces have also surprised the IDF
by using none of the special weapons – such as anti-tank and anti-aircraft
weapons – in their possession, and by failing to execute any military
operation against Israel beyond the level of a squad.24
The weakening of the central
regime and the failure of its security forces to defend the Palestinian
population led to a severe loss of prestige and a desire of the Palestinian
street to have alternative armed forces. This sentiment allowed local militias
to accumulate power and, hence, erode the status of the security services as
the PA’s primary instrument of force. The dire economic situation has brought
many members of the security forces to leave their ranks and join smaller
organizations which provided them with additional income and social benefits.
The largest of these militias, Tanzim, has become the leading
organization in the popular struggle against Israel. Other groups are the
al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, a militia affiliated with Fatah and the
various popular resistance committees as well as other cells belonging to the
Islamists groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
Tanzim
Tanzim is not a newcomer
in the Palestinian arena. During the seven years of the first intifada,
most armed operations against Israel were carried out by the Fatah
Hawks, which used to be the military wing of the Fatah movement. With
the signing of the Oslo agreements and renunciation of the violent struggle,
the Fatah Hawks organization was abolished. But despite the
proliferation of uniformed security bodies since 1994, Arafat insisted on
maintaining a militia that would not be part of the formal administration of
the PA. He therefore approved and funded a successor body known as Tanzim.
It was comprised of small cadres of armed activists operating throughout the
West Bank and to a lesser extent in the Gaza Strip during the years of the
peace process. Their primary occupation was to control the opposition to
Arafat in the PA and to be his independent arm to lead popular action against
Israel, in case the need for such action arose.
In the May 2000 Naqba
Riots, Tanzim activists were in the forefront of the demonstrations and
were those who generated most of the fire against the IDF. Despite the
increasing armament of Tanzim, Israel has never acted decisively
against Arafat’s violation of the agreements which prohibited the formation of
any armed body outside the official security forces. With the outbreak of the
second intifada, Tanzim, under the leadership of Marwan
Barghouti, – now imprisoned in Israel – immediately assumed the leadership
over the Palestinian masses.
The precise size of Tanzim
is not known. Estimates range between 10,000 and 40,000 members. These members
are mostly Fatah supporters who were either not recruited to the PA
security services or students and unemployed Palestinians. Many of the
activists are graduates of the first intifada and some have been
imprisoned in Israel. Most members have undergone training in PA sponsored
training camps in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Tanzim’s influence is
not uniform across the PA territory. The organization is specifically
influential in Ramallah and Nablus, less so in cities like Bethlehem and Jenin.
The Gaza Strip branch of Tanzim is characterized by a higher percentage
of employees of the security services who work during the day as intelligence
agents or police officers and when off duty, as Tanzim activists. As a
result, many of the Tanzim weapons used in attacks against Israel are,
in fact, those weapons that Israel had supplied the PA as part of the Oslo
agreement.
Al Aqsa Martyrs
Brigades
With the escalation of the
fighting, pressure grew on the security forces to take a more active role in
the fighting. Arafat needed a mechanism that would allow members of the
security forces to serve the Palestinian cause without giving up the seemingly
popular nature of the intifada. He also realized that such a mechanism
is needed to alleviate the frustration and resentment among his soldiers. Such
a mechanism was established in October 2000 in the shape of a new organ called
the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. This organization is, in essence, a
cluster of unaffiliated armed gangs, several hundreds in force, which operate
mainly in the refugee camps of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It allows
members of the security forces to take part in the execution of terror attacks
without incriminating their uniformed forces. And indeed, hundreds of NSF, PSF,
General Intelligence, the Civil Police and Force 17 are active participants in
the brigades. In fact, the commander of Force 17 in the West Bank, Mahmoud
Damara, is known to be one of the senior commanders of the al Aqsa
Martyrs Brigades. As the intifada proceeds, the organization’s power in
the West Bank is increasing and it aspires to become the official armed branch
of the Fatah movement. Its ideology is uncompromising; it opposes the
peace process and it is committed to an unlimited armed struggle with Israel.
The al Aqsa Martyrs have been responsible for hundreds of terror
attacks since October 2000, including ambushes, drive-by shootings, mortar
firing, and bombings.25
In keeping with the official Fatah line, the cells initially confined
their attacks to the West Bank and Gaza, targeting Israeli soldiers and Jewish
settlers. But Israel’s assassination of Raed Karmi, a popular militia
commander in the West Bank city of Tulkarm, in January 2002 changed that.
al Aqsa fighters launched a sustained series of suicide attacks inside
Israel, including the first suicide bombings by women, quickly outpacing the
radical Islamic groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
The fighters of the al Aqsa
Martyrs Brigades also serve as a link between the PA security forces and the
opposition movements Hamas and Islamic Jihad, allowing the PA
deniability when accused of supporting those terrorist groups. With the
establishment of the Martyr Brigades, the Palestinian military establishment
has become even more complex than it used to be. Even Palestinians closely
associated with Arafat’s close circle cannot understand the chain of command
and system of affiliations and allegiances that exists inside the PA’s
security establishment. Many of the Palestinians involved in the intifada
have double or even triple affiliations. Member of Force 17, for example,
could also become associated with Tanzim and at the same time carry out
operations on behalf of the al Aqsa Martyrs. As the popularity of the
popular militias is growing, many members of the uniformed bodies cross the
lines and join the militias bringing with them their weapons and expertise.
Today, thousands of the employees of the Palestinian security forces,
especially in the Gaza Strip, are also militiamen. The main reason they still
keep their allegiance to their uniformed jobs is financial. The security
forces are among the few sectors in the Palestinian government establishment
that are still being paid regularly, though the salaries are meager. As long
as Arafat can deliver paychecks to his troops, the loyalty of the uniformed
bodies is guaranteed. But economic collapse of the PA and inability to pay
salaries to the public sector may lead to a subsequent collapse of the
security forces and mass desertion into the embracing hands of the opposition
movements.
Effect on Training and Combat Readiness
The intifada had mixed
impact on the training and quality of the Palestinian forces. On the one hand,
it had a detrimental effect on the ability to conduct regular training,
recruit new members and maintain high level of readiness. Most of the PA’s
training infrastructure has been destroyed by IDF missiles including the
newest training facility of the PSF near Ramallah and the Civil Police in
Gaza. In fact, the Palestinian security forces do not train anymore.
IDF operations have also taken
a heavy toll on maintenance and logistics. Consequently, the PA logistic
support of its units has significantly deteriorated since the outbreak of the
intifada. Many of the vehicles used by the PA forces have been
destroyed in IDF attacks and those that survived suffer from shortage of spare
parts, technicians and fuel to keep them in operational shape. Palestinian
weapons, radio equipment and machinery are also badly maintained with great
implications on the effectiveness of the forces.
The Palestinians are also
facing an ammunition shortage. While during the first weeks of the intifada
there had been a massive use of firearms, including automatic fire at
demonstrations and funerals, Palestinian guerrillas have become increasingly
aware of the fact that ammunition is a finite resource. The leadership of the
intifada has called several times for a more economic use of ammunition
and the need to preserve resources for a prolonged struggle. As mentioned
before, there are great efforts to replenish the ammunition stocks by
smuggling ammunition from outside sources. The most important way of ensuring
weapons inflow is by maintaining the underground tunnels passing underneath
the road along the border-fence in the southern area of the Gaza Strip, in the
area which separates Palestinian Rafah and Egyptian Rafah. The tunnels are
operated by the Samadana clan in Rafah. Members of the clan wage an ongoing
battle along the borderline in order to secure the inflow of weapons and
prevent IDF patrols from thwarting their smuggling operations. To protect
their lifeline, the Samadanas generate heavy fire on IDF armored vehicles
patrolling near the city of Rafah. As a result, on average, 50% of the total
daily number of shooting attacks and roadside bombs in the territories occur
in this area.26
Despite the erosion in
Palestinian military power, in some areas the intifada had a positive
effect on the PA’s military readiness. It enabled many Palestinian servicemen
to improve their combat skills by participating in gunfire battles against the
IDF. Palestinian troops had an opportunity to use their weapons on live
targets including against heavy equipment such as IDF tanks and armored
personnel carriers. The fighting enabled them to test some of their
capabilities and to draw important tactical lessons. The experience that has
been accumulated is useful for the training of future Palestinian recruits.
But it is important to note that only a small part of the Palestinian soldiers
gained such combat experience. The majority of the troops, especially those
affiliated with the NSF, have been deprived of training for more than three
years and their combat readiness is likely to have been degraded.
Attempts to Reform the Security Forces
The growing disappointment of
the Bush administration of Arafat’s conduct brought about in May 2002 a demand
from the White House that the PA reform its security establishment as a
precondition to further progress toward peace. This demand was reiterated in
President Bush’s June 24, 2002 address. The American call for reforms
corresponded with a general feeling on the Palestinian street that the
security forces and their chiefs, recipients of almost half of the PA’s
budget, have been riddled with corruption and have failed the people.27
The level of popular support for reforms in May stood at 91%. Specifically,
85% supported the calls for the unification of the security services under one
command and for purging them of corruption.28
Arafat’s reform plan, however,
was at best cosmetic. It called for halving the number of Palestinian security
services. After such a restructuring, a police force, border guards, internal
and external security branches, military intelligence and a personal guard
unit for Arafat would remain in existence. To oversee the coordination and
direction of all the security forces, Arafat appointed loyalist Gen. Abdel
Razak al-Yahya as the new interior minister. Upon taking office, Yahya pledged
transparency and accountability, and, most importantly, to embark on a serious
effort against Palestinian terrorists. Simultaneously, Arafat removed some of
the key people in the Palestinian security establishment, especially those who
had power bases and popular support capable of challenging his rule. Among
those deposed were the head of civil defense Mahmud abu Marzuk, the head of
general intelligence in the West Bank Tawfik Tirawi, and, most importantly,
the heads of preventive security in Gaza and the West Bank, Dahlan and Rajub.
Instead, Arafat appointed a number of uncharismatic loyalists who are unlikely
to defy his leadership. Most disturbing was the fact that many of the new
appointees like Rashid Abu-Shabak and Mahmoud Damara who were known to be
closely linked to terrorist organizations in the territories as well as in the
Arab world. Finally, in October 2002, Arafat replaced al-Yahya, regarded as a
US favorite for his apparent reformist zeal, by Hani al-Hassan, a Fatah
member considered loyal to Arafat. Arafat’s steps indicate a strategic choice
diametrically opposed to US and Israeli objectives. Instead of using the
reforms to move beyond the destructive impact of terrorism, he has tightened
his control over his terror machine and installed people connected to some of
the world’s most dangerous terrorist organizations in order to improve
cooperation with them. Under the guise of reforms, he has strengthened his
regime by removing from power any viable opposition. Understandably, the
administration responded to these problems by slowing down its engagement in
the reform process. The establishment of the Abbas government has brought a
new wave of reforms but at the same time intensified the struggle for control
over the security bodies. While Abbas, Dahlan and finance minister Salam Fayad
demanded full governmental control over all the apparatuses, Arafat insisted
on maintaining his operational control over most of the units. Furthermore, a
conflict evolved over the control of the funds distributed to the forces.
Against the will of the security chiefs Fayad insisted on a centralized
payment system in which government workers’ salaries are paid through the
banks, not through direct payments. This organizational change has reduced
some of the power in the hands of the security chiefs. But the collapse of
Abbas’ government put an end to this effort as well. Arafat brought Jibril
Rajoub back as a national security advisor with limited responsibilities. In
sum, very little has been achieved in the effort to reform the forces and as
long as Arafat, the main opponent of such reforms, is in power is unlikely
that the structure and conduct of the forces would be significantly changed.
Future Scenarios
1. Prolonged Low Intensity Conflict
According to this scenario
Israel and the PA continue to engage in a low intensity fighting for an
unlimited period of time or until the two sides rescind violence and return to
peaceful negotiations. Palestinian strategy according to this scenario would
be to generate a high level of Jewish casualties over a long period of time,
and to create a sense of insecurity among Israeli civilians. Israel’s security
fence currently under construction is likely to make infiltrations of suicide
bombers a more difficult task. In response, the Palestinians would focus their
attacks on Jewish civilians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip hoping to
make life there intolerable and economically unfavorable. This might lead to
voluntary departure of disillusioned settlers and, hence, weaken the Israeli
will to continue the presence there.
Furthermore, the Palestinians
derive a sense of achievement by the fact that Israel agreed to withdraw
unilaterally from the Gaza Strip as well as from the negative impact of the
intifada on the Israeli economy. They believe that only if the Israeli
society pays a heavy price in the conflict the Palestinians would be able to
reap future benefits from their struggle and finally liberate the West Bank
and beyond. Therefore, there are no signs that the Palestinians will end the
violence or alternatively adopt the use of non-violent methods.
Israel, on its side, is likely
to continue its operations against individuals and groups involved in
terrorism through the policy of targeted killing of Palestinian military
activists suspected of planning and executing terror attacks. Israel’s
military strategy would be to contain the violence, prevent terror attacks in
Israel itself, increase the economic pressure on the PA and degrade the
capabilities of the various organizations. This means that Israel would
continue to target Palestinian weapons factories, training bases, headquarters
and offices of the various bodies and Palestinian posts from which fire was
originated. In addition, Israel would continue to fight arms smuggling into
the West Bank and Gaza Strip both via land and sea and expedite the
construction of the separation fence in the West Bank.
Continuation of the existing
situation has several implications on the Palestinian security services. The
erosion in the military effectiveness of the PA formal security bodies due to
Israel’s attacks on training bases, headquarters, individuals and other
installations is likely to continue. With no operative training bases, and
logistic support the military bodies, especially the NSF, are deprived of
proper training and their new recruits cannot reach the minimal standards of
military professionalism.
Furthermore, prolonged
intifada would continue to take its economic toll on the PA. Under
economic adversity the PA compensation to its security operatives is likely to
decline, a fact that would increase the willingness of many members of the
security forces to offer their services to terrorist groups and rough
militias.
In sum, a prolonged intifada
could have disastrous effects on the structure, organization, discipline,
and readiness of the Palestinian security forces. The police and paramilitary
units are not likely to maintain the level of military effectiveness they had
before the intifada and the Palestinian military establishment’s
equipment and expertise will gradually shift into the hands of a group of
warlords, gangs and local militias.
2. High-Intensity Confrontation
Continuous escalation of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict due to an increase in the terrorist activity
within Israel, particularly in the event of a successful mega-terror attack,
might lead to an Israeli decision to use overwhelming force against the PA
with the intention of destroying the remainder of its military infrastructure.
In such a scenario, it is likely that the IDF would use air and artillery
forces followed by entry into the Gaza Strip and West Bank cities with armored
and infantry units. It is also likely that any Israeli operation would be
extensive in scope and would aim to reach a rapid military decision before the
international community intervenes. But unlike cities in the West Bank which
have been repeatedly invaded by the IDF with minimal resistance, Gaza Strip
cities and camps could be an entirely different challenge. Essentially a huge
refugee camp, Gaza’s density and crowdedness are forbidding. Gaza is one of
the most densely populated territories in the world which means increased
friction with the civilian population and, hence, a potentially great number
of civilian casualties.
Palestinian forces in Gaza are
better organized and better equipped than their brothers in the West Bank. The
Palestinian access to heavier weapons and more powerful explosives is better
than in the West Bank. Palestinian militants operating in Gaza have already
proven their capability to destroy Israeli Merkava tanks by planting powerful
bombs along Israeli routes of transportation. Clearly under this scenario, the
PA would put to action every military capability at its disposal. This
includes the use of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, mortars and rockets.
NSF units in the Gaza Strip could be dispatched to confront the advancing IDF.
These units are armed well enough to be able to launch attacks against Jewish
settlements and military installations in the Gaza Strip.
The crucial component of the
PA’s preparation for a major showdown with Israel is the ability to inflict
psychological and material damage to the Israeli home front. The most
effective way to do so would be by means of deployment of many long-range
weapons such as mortars and rockets. The proximity to Israel’s population
centers would enable the Palestinians with primitive artillery pieces to cover
major Israeli cities such as Jerusalem, Netanya, Hadera, Kfar Sava, Modi’in,
Rosh Ha’ayin, Sderot and Ashkelon. In addition, Palestinian artillery could
reach strategic targets, such as critical road junctions, oil and gas farms,
communication installations, power stations, industrial complexes, IDF bases
and headquarters, government buildings, cultural centers and most importantly,
Israel’s seaports and airports. Palestinian known artillery capabilities
include low caliber weapons such as 60mm., 90mm. and 120mm. mortars up to a
range of six miles, 107mm. rockets up to a range of five miles and 122mm.
rockets up to a range of 13 miles.
3. Regional War
With the collapse of the Iraqi
military in spring 2003 the Arab-Israeli military balance has shifted in favor
of Israel. This means that in the short run the likelihood of a regional
conflict has been reduced. But despite the improvement in Israel’s strategic
posture, it is premature to assume that the threat has been permanently
removed. There are several unknowns including the nature of the new Iraqi
regime, and the changes that may take place in Jordan and Syria as well as in
the behavior of Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. Each of these could
have profound implications on Israel’s strategic posture.29
Hence, the outbreak of a regional war in the Middle East is still a feasible
scenario which could occur either as a result of a Palestinian or a
Syrian-Iranian-Lebanese catalyst. Continuous provocations by Hizbullah
along Israel’s northern border could lead to harsh IDF retaliation against
Syrian targets. This could, in turn, invite further escalation by dragging
additional regional actors into the cycle of violence. Israel, as a result,
could find itself fighting a war in two or three fronts against an
unpredictable combination of Arab militaries.
In addition to the automatic
participation of Syria, Lebanon and Hizbullah, it is likely that other
Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Libya and Algeria could also join
the fray, though in limited capacity. The response of Jordan and Egypt is
unpredictable since they are bound by peace agreements with Israel as well as
other international commitments. But a bloody conflict over and within Gaza
could present problems for Egypt, and might eventually be serious enough to
affect its peace agreement with Israel. Similarly, a major struggle between
Israel and Palestinians on the West Bank leading many Palestinians to seek
refuge in Jordan might impact Jordan’s internal stability and threaten the
peace between Jordan and Israel.
Whereas this scenario is
clearly most unfavorable for Israel, many Palestinians believe that regional
war is the only way to break the political-military deadlock in which they are
caught. They believe that a regional crisis involving several Arab countries
would be the only way to balance Israel’s military superiority and to exert
international pressure on it by using the oil weapon.
What would be the role of the
Palestinians in such a war? The IDF’s response to an Arab attack would be
quick mobilization of its reserve units and deployment of armored reserve
formations along the eastern border in order to establish a strong line of
defense in the Jordan River Valley and the mountain ranges overlooking it.
These units would have to force their way through Judea and Samaria’s narrow
corridors and move through areas heavily populated by Palestinians.
The Palestinians’ main
contribution to the coalition effort would be to disrupt the IDF’s
mobilization and deployment by creating chaos and confusion in Israel and
slowing down movement of IDF units. Since the backbone of the IDF is its
reserve units, the speed of their call up, their travel to their bases and
from there to their fighting positions carries strategic importance,
especially in the event scenario of a surprise attack. Israel’s miniscule
size, its congested traffic and the IDF’s heavy reliance on a limited number
of transportation routes, many of them running in mountainous terrain, could
be an Achilles heel easily exploited by the Palestinians. The Palestinians’
greatest impact on the Israeli deployment could be felt in routes connecting
Israel’s major population centers along the coastal plain with the security
strip along the Jordan River Valley. A war between Israel and its neighbors
could also inspire some Arab-Israelis to assist their brethren. The
involvement of the Arab-Israelis —constituting almost 20% of Israel’s
population– in the Palestinian uprising, resulting in the death of 13 Arab
demonstrators in October 2000, has shown that their allegiance to Israel in
the event of a regional war is not guaranteed. According to Ha’aretz
military journalist Ze’ev Schiff, there has been an alarming increase – from
56 in 2001 to 74 in 2002 – in the number of Arab-Israelis prepared to
participate in terror activities against Jewish Israelis. In 2000, there were
eight terrorist cells discovered among Arab-Israelis. In 2001, there were 25
groups uncovered, while in 2002, 32 were discovered.30
Many towns and villages inhabited by Arab-Israelis are located along strategic
routes of transportation connecting Israel’s coastal plain with the Galilee,
the Golan and the Jordan River Valley. The participation of Arab-Israelis in
the Palestinian efforts to disrupt IDF units from moving to the front is a
disturbing thought that deserves to be treated with great care.
The disruption and attrition of
IDF units en route to the front could reduce the IDF’s capability to confront
its enemies from the other side of the river. The IDF is likely to apply
enough air cover to allow reinforcements to eventually reach the frontline
early enough to confront enemy forces crossing the Jordan River, but these
reinforcements would most likely arrive at the front after experiencing
considerable delays and fighting.
4. Use of Non-Conventional Weapons
Due to their tactical
inferiority, the Palestinians realize that they are likely to fare poorly in
an all out one-on-one confrontation with Israel. In order to defend themselves
against Israeli aggression, the Palestinians are likely to adopt a defensive
doctrine the main pillar of which would be the emphasis on deterrence
capability vis-à-vis Israel. In their search for means of deterrence
against Israel, the PA could resort to the acquisition and introduction of
non-conventional capabilities.
The thought of the use of
non-conventional weapons by the PA or other Palestinian elements is unsettling
but should not be dismissed. There are several technological, political and
psychological explanations as to why the PA might want to opt for acquiring
weapons of mass destruction, among them are the cheap cost of such weapons and
the sense of prestige and security they grant to the owner.31
And indeed, in the tenth month of the intifada, Palestinian media began
to call for serious consideration of the deployment and perhaps use of
chemical and biological weapons.
The general atmosphere in the
PA is that if attacked by Israel, the Palestinian people would be called to
fight for their survival using all available means. It is clear that without
international intervention, the PA would not be able to deter Israel from
launching a massive attack with the aim of destroying the PA. If such attack
occurs, the only meaningful deterrent the PA could have is the ability to
threaten the vulnerable Israeli home front in a similar way that Saddam
Hussein exploited this vulnerability during the 1991 Gulf War.
Many Palestinians believe that
biological and chemical weapons are a legitimate and desirable means in the
struggle against Israel, especially since Israel itself is known to have
non-conventional weapons in its arsenal. Furthermore, in order to tarnish
Israel’s image, Palestinian spokesmen and media have published false claims of
Israel’s alleged use of non-conventional weapons against the defenseless
Palestinian population. They have blamed Israel for using shells containing
depleted uranium, dispensing poisonous chocolate sweets in the Gaza Strip,
employing “Black Gas” that causes nausea, and shelling the Palestinians with
cans of paint containing poison. Israel has been blamed for spreading foot and
mouth disease in PA territory, and Arafat’s wife, Suha, claimed during a visit
by Hillary Clinton, that Israel poisons Palestinian wells. Ludicrous as they
are, these allegations are widely believed, and they help create legitimacy in
the eyes of the Palestinian public for the introduction and perhaps the use of
non-conventional weapons. A December 2001 poll by the Palestinian Center for
Policy & Survey Research from showed that only 26% of the Palestinians viewed
the use of such weapons against Israel as an act of terrorism.32
To achieve non-conventional
capability, the Palestinians could use chemical or biological agents delivered
by suicide bombers. Artillery shells and 122mm. rockets armed with chemical
warheads have already been developed and are being produced by Arab countries
like Syria, Iran and Iraq. This ammunition is easily transferred and could be
smuggled into the PA via sea or air, but the PA does not have the necessary
artillery to deliver it. The long-range weapons that are already known to be
in the hands of the PA, namely light mortars and rocket launchers could
potentially be used to fire artillery shells carrying chemical and agents but
their payload is so small that the damage they could inflict would be
negligent.
A more promising delivery
device would be the use of suicide bombers armed with non-conventional
material. “A few bombs or death-carrying devices will be enough, once they are
deployed in secluded areas and directed at the Israeli water resources or the
Israeli beaches, let alone the markets and the residential centers,” suggested
a Palestinian newspaper.
[This will be
carried out] without explosions, noise, blood, or pictures that are used to
serve the Israeli propaganda. Anyone who is capable, with complete
self-control, of turning his body into shrapnel and scattered organs, is
also capable of carrying a small device that cannot be traced and throw it
in the targeted location.33
This proposition should not be
treated lightly. Though the experience of terrorism by means of weapons of
mass destruction has been very limited, the taboo of using such weapons was
broken by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo in 1990 when its members
planned to spray botulinum toxin in the streets of Tokyo. Three years later, a
failed plan to use anthrax in residential areas was discovered. The cult
intended to kill thousands of people by using chemical weapons in Tokyo’s
subway system and in at least one case, in 1995, succeeded in causing panic
and casualties. Since the September 11 terror attacks on the Pentagon and the
World Trade Center, several plots by terror organizations to conduct mass
killing by means of chemical and biological weapons have been uncovered.
During Operation Defensive Shield, for example, the IDF discovered in Arafat’s
compound four bottles of bromide, 12 liters in total. Bromide is a toxic
chemical. When inhaled it can cause serious breathing problems. It can be
weaponized and used by suicide bombers in order to inflict more damage and
panic.
Israel’s small size, its
dependency on few fresh water sources, its dense population, its porous
borders and the increasing number of Palestinians willing to sacrifice their
lives in suicide missions, are factors which make it more vulnerable to
attacks of the nature discussed above than other countries. It is hard to
determine precisely how real and immediate the threat of Palestinian use of
non-conventional weapons is. Clearly the motivation for such an option, at
least among fringe groups, exists, and the means to do that are at their
disposal.
Conclusion
Military analysts, who measure
countries’ military potential mainly by counting hardware, such as platforms,
weapons and formations, find the PA armed forces to be a challenge to assess.
On its face, it is a poorly equipped, complex web of apparatuses which have
been severely degraded since the outset of the intifada. But the
exacerbating war against terrorist groups in places like Chechnya and
Afghanistan has demonstrated that rag-tag opponents could often offset
conventional military superiority by resorting to tactics of terror, guerrilla
and attrition. Judged by its role in the asymmetric war of the kind Israel is
facing, the Palestinian security forces, inferior as they may be, should not
be treated as a negligible addition to the Arab-Israeli military balance.
The existence of hostile,
militarized Palestinian groups west of the Jordan River Valley could pose
significant strategic threat to Israel. “The characteristics of that threat
are invisible, like cancer,” said Israel’s Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon.
When you are
attacked externally, you see the attack, you are wounded. Cancer, on the
other hand, is something internal. Therefore, I find it more disturbing,
because here the diagnosis is critical. If the diagnosis is wrong and people
say it’s not cancer but a headache, then the response is irrelevant. But I
maintain that it is cancer. My professional diagnosis is that there is a
phenomenon here that constitutes an existential threat.34
And indeed, the geographical
location of the West Bank and Gaza Strip could allow Palestinian units to help
building a land bridge between Israel and other Arab countries. Furthermore,
through the deployment of long-range artillery and anti-aircraft weapons,
Palestinian units could impose a threat to Israel’s population centers, air
traffic and other strategic targets. The fact that Palestinian forces are
deployed no further than five miles from Ben Gurion Airport, eleven miles from
the IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv and two miles from the Knesset in Jerusalem
only emphasizes the need to treat it with utmost care. The Palestinian
proximity to Israel’s population centers, and main arteries of transportation
enable it to hinder the IDF’s reserve mobilization process, on which Israel
relies in an emergency situation. Though the size and capabilities of the
Palestinian armed forces are not likely to allow it to deny IDF units access
to the front, it could significantly erode the IDF’s strength by forcing it to
fight its way there.
Therefore, either in the case
of prolonged war with the PA or in the case of a conflict between Israel and
an Arab coalition, the role of the armed forces of Palestine would be far more
significant than their intrinsic military value. Israeli governments have
understood the potential dangers posed by allowing Palestinian militarization
and have taken action to stop this trend. But after three and a half years of
fighting between Israel and the PA, with Israeli towns and settlements, not to
mention the city of Jerusalem, attacked by artillery fire, it became clear
that the Palestinian military capabilities are far beyond what had been the
intention of the architects of Oslo and that the Palestine security services
and militia groups should receive no less attention than any other military in
the region.
Gal Luft
is Executive Director of the Institute
for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS). The opinions
expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be
construed as representing those of the Institute for the Analysis of
Global Security, its Board of Directors or its Board of Advisors.
Copyright © Gal Luft,
April 2004
Not for citation or quotation without author’s consent. |
Endnotes
1 |
Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, July 29,
2001, Quoted in Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Special
Dispatch - PA, July 30, 2001, No. 247. |
2 |
Gal Luft, The Palestinian Security
Forces: Between Police and Army (Washington, DC: The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, 1998), pp. 25-28. |
3 |
Gal Luft, “The Palestinian H-Bomb:
Terror Winning Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, July-August 2002. |
4 |
Ronen Bergman, Authority Given,
Yediot Ahronot, 2002. |
5 |
For the full text of President Bush’s
Rose Garden address see:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html |
6 |
Information on PA units was adapted
from discussions with US and regional military and intelligence experts as
well as various open sources such as: Shlomo Brom and Yiftah Shapir eds.
The Middle East Military Balance 1999-2000 (Cambridge and London: The
MIT Press, 2000); International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS),
The Military Balance 2000/2001 (London: Oxford University Press, 2001);
Gal Luft, The Palestinian Security Forces: Between Police and Army
(Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998); Avner
Avrahami, “Structure of the Palestinian Security Apparatus”, Ha’aretz,
July 30, 2001. Figures of members and weapons are estimates and may not
correlate with figures published by the media. |
7 |
Haaretz, May 24, 2001;
Jerusalem Post, May 24, 2001. |
8 |
The only unclassified information
about this unit was published by the Russian TV in May 1998 after the PSS
had sent to Russia a request for assistance in supplying special purpose
equipment for the unit. “Palestinian Special Purpose Police Want Russian
Equipment”, Moscow NTV, May 28, 1998, in FBIS-NES, June 2, 1998, p.
150. |
9 |
Gal Luft and Jonathan Schanzer, “Fatah-Hamas
Relations: Rapprochement or Ready to Rumble?” Policywatch #693, The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 19, 2002.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/policywatch2002/
693.htm |
10 |
For more information on Force 17 see:
Reuven Paz, “Force 17: The Renewal of Old Competition Motivates Violence”,
Peacewatch #316, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April
5, 2001; IDF Spokesperson, “Force 17 Background Material”,
http://www.idf.il/english/
news/info_force17.stm |
11 |
See B’Tselem report, “Neither Law nor
Justice”, Report on the Palestinian Preventive Security Service, Jerusalem,
August 1995. Also Amnesty International Report 1997: Palestinian Authority
(internet edition), specifying that 1,200 people were arrested by the PSS on
security grounds and 10 died in Palestinian prisons. |
12 |
Ma’ariv, December 29, 2002.
|
13 |
Jerusalem Post, September 2,
2001. |
14 |
Ha’aretz, June 23, 2000. |
15 |
Jerusalem Post, May 7, 2001;
Ha’aretz, May 7, 2001. |
16 |
Gal Luft, “The seizure of Gaza-Bound
Arms: Military Implications,” Peacewatch #359, The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, January 8, 2002.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Peacewatch/peacewatch2002/359.htm |
17 |
Steve Rodan and Arieh O’Sullivan, “PA
Smuggles Arms Via Sinai Tunnels”, Jerusalem Post, International
Edition, June 6, 1998, p. 32. |
18 |
See: Alex Fishman and Ron Leshem, “We
Gave Them Guns”, Yediot Ahronot, Weekend Supplement, February 16,
2001; Lior El-Hai, “Palestinian Intelligence Sent an Israeli to Steal
Shoulder-Fired Missiles”, Yediot Ahronot, March 25, 1998. |
19 |
Ha’aretz, May 24, 2001;
Jerusalem Post, May 24, 2001. |
20 |
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0mse0
|
21 |
On CIA training of the PA security
forces see: Arnon Regoler, “The Intelligence Pros”, Kol Hair,
November 24, 2000; Yediot Ahronot, February 16, 2001. |
22 |
Interview with commander of
Palestinian Police Gen. Nasser Yussef in Niel MacFarquhar, “How Palestinian
Policemen Were Drawn Into the Conflict”, New York Times, September
29, 1996, p. 1. |
23 |
Ha’aretz, July 6, 2000, July
12, 2000; News Channel 2 TV, July 11, 2000; Yediot Ahronot,
February 16, 2001. |
24 |
Gal Luft, “The Palestinian Military
Performance and the 2000 Intifada”, Middle East Review of
International Affairs (MERIA), vol. 4, no. 4, December 2000. |
25 |
Roni Shaked, “Arafat’s New Army”,
Yediot Ahronot, Weekend Supplement, July 27, 2001. |
26 |
Amos Harel, “Egyptian Border Police
Smuggling Weaponry to PA”, Ha’aretz, August 17, 2001. |
27 |
Gal Luft, “Reforming the Palestinian
Security Services,” Peacewatch #382, The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, May 15, 2002.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Peacewatch/peacewatch2002/382.htm |
28 |
Opinion poll # 4, conducted by the
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) between 15-18 May
2002.
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls
/2002/p4a.html |
29 |
Gal Luft, All Quiet in the Eastern
Front? Israel’s National Security Doctrine After the Fall of Saddam, The
Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Analysis
Paper number 2, March 2004. |
30 |
Ha’aretz, January 2, 2003. |
31 |
Gal Luft, “The Mirage of Demilitarized
Palestine”, Middle East Quarterly, vol. VIII, no. 3, p. 57. |
32 |
Opinion poll # 3, conducted by the
Palestinian Center for Policy & Survey Research, between 19-24 December
2001.
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/
2001/p3a.html |
33 |
“A Palestinian Information Center:
There is Serious Thinking about Obtaining Biological Weapons”, Al-Manar,
August 13, 2001, translated by and quoted in Middle East Media Research
Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch-PA, August 14, 2001, No. 255. |
34 |
Interview with IDF Chief of Staff
Moshe Ya’alon, Ha’aretz Friday |