The human context of a paper such as this,
must be the horrific attacks on so many, so often, including that on heavily
pregnant 34 year old mother Tali Hatuel who was a social worker for the Gush
Katif Regional Council. Part of her job was to comfort and assist victims of
terrorist attacks. Tali Hatuel was driving with her daughters, Hila (11), Hadar
(9), Roni (7), and Merav (2), when her white Citroen station wagon spun off the
road after the initial shooting. The attackers then approached the vehicle and
shot its occupants at close range.
This atrocity is anything but an isolated
event, yet it stands out for its calculated cruelty and barbarism like the
gloating on the cellphone at Ramallah.
Some brief facts about Gush Katif:
-
21 communities, most of them founded some
20 years ago with close to 8,000 Jewish residents;
-
Over 20 yeshivot, schools and other
educational institutions (not including nurseries and kindergartens);
-
900 acres of greenhouses growing pest
free lettuce, cherry tomatoes, organic vegetables, spices, flowers, plants and
more;
-
$60 million a year in exports – an
average of $7,500 for every man, woman and child;
-
Manufactures 70% of all of Israel’s
organic produce grown for export;
-
Has faced over 4,000 mortar shells and
Kassam rocket attacks, as well as 10,000 shooting incidents, at the hands of
Palestinian terrorists over the past 3.5 years.
-
I will make my analysis under a number of
headings:
-
Arab Attitudes
-
The Impact on Arab Attitudes of Another Retreat
-
The Impact on Democracy in Israel and on the Likud
Ideology
-
The Effect on the Zionist Enterprise in Principle
(Darom Declaration)
-
The Strategic Value of a Jewish Presence in Gaza
-
The significance of the Quartet, the EU and the USA
wanting Gaza Judenrein
-
International Law
-
Concluding Comments
1. Arab Attitudes
If one could
honestly say that such hideous events could be stopped by withdrawal; that
disengagement would be just that, disengagement, then I would be putting forward
a case equally weighted on both sides of the argument because I would be
inviting you to consider them as balanced. But in my opinion, to do so, would be
a serious distortion of the reality. I am unable, therefore, to present logic
and good sense for both sides. In Oxford, where good technique and undergraduate
work depend on avoiding polemic, this may appear doubly unfortunate.
Nonetheless, the Disengagement plan is not only misnamed and ill-founded; it is
also bad for Israel.
Any Israeli
disengagement requires that the Palestinians themselves want to disengage. This
premise is currently, unfortunately, impossible to accept.
A study of the
Palestinian opinion polls reveals a constant 60-70% support for the use of
homicide bombing against Israelis. Notoriously, polls conducted in authoritarian
dictatorships reveal what is thought to be the politically correct opinion, lest
dissenting voices be revealed to the authorities by the pollsters. Furthermore,
whenever Arafat or Khaddoumi have been reported in the West for incitement, the
idea that they are only catering for their constituency is paraded as if it were
exculpation rather than an indictment of their rule and the society which
cringes under it!
Dr. Mordechai
Nisan of the Rothberg Institute at the Hebrew University has written:
At every opportunity and signing ceremony in Washington, Arafat
has declared Palestinian commitment to peace in accord with the PLO’s adoption
of the peace strategy. At the White House on September 13, 1993, he declared
that, “The battle for peace is the most difficult of our lives.” However the
language of jihad remains as always the mental prism of Arafat’s vision.
This was the case, as in 1970 in Beirut, when he addressed the Palestinians with
the message of “We must fight a holy war (jihad) against the Zionist
enemy.” Arafat broadcast the same message of war through the years after 1993.
At a rally in Gaza in November 1994 he said that, “Our people will continue its
jihad.” Addressing a rally in Hebron in February 1995 he declared, “Our
people is a people of sacrifice, struggle, and jihad.” Speaking at a
rally at Deiheishe near Bethlehem in October 1996, he declared that, “We know
only one word, jihad, jihad, jihad.”
The West and Israel have lived in a world of trance as the
Palestinians have deftly juggled the language of war and peace, mouthing their
verbal commitments while in essence violating them. From the first Oslo
Agreement to Wye Plantation, the PLO-PA (Palestinian Authority) has consistently
refused to limit the police forces to the prescribed number, to disarm terrorist
organizations, to extradite murderers of Israelis, and to stop anti-Israeli
propaganda and incitement to violence. Arafat’s culture-code tactic conforms to
the “Fahlawi” personality portrait proposed by Dr. Hamid Ammar for the
clever person: that is, to convey “a readiness to express superficial agreement
and fleeting amiability which is meant to conceal the situation and his true
feelings”.
The war-and-peace strategy allows Arafat to talk of peace but
prepare for war, while his Israeli partner offers territories and guns in quest
of accommodation and security. This utopian experiment wins concessions and
lulls the protagonist with the dream of peace.2
We have also been told by
Professor Moshe Sharon, also of the Hebrew University, that,
The Palestinian program as seen in the current policies of the
Palestinian Authority’s educational system, media, and literature is clear: The
eye, ear, and heart of future generations of Palestinians should be recruited to
one and only aim, the removal of Israel. For external consumption, this
ideological bundle is covered in the necessary verbal wrapping, pleasant to the
Western eye, this dish of deceit is spiced to suit the European and American
palate.3
2. The Impact on Arab Opinion of the Disengagement Plan
In a recent poll
recorded by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Judea,
Samaria and the Gaza Strip (Yesha), taken between March 14 and 17, 2004, 73% of
the Palestinians welcomed Sharon’s plan to evacuate 17 settlements in the Gaza
Strip and a few more in the so-called “West Bank” (Judea and Samaria). Residents
of Gaza were more welcoming of the plan (82%) than
those of Judea and Samaria (68%). Yet, the percentage of those who believe that
the plan will increase the chances for a political settlement with Israel does
not exceed 32%, with 24% believing that it will decrease
such chances and 39% believing that it will have no effect on the peace
process...
Despite belief in
Ariel Sharon’s malicious intent, two thirds of the Palestinian public
see his plan to be a victory for the Palestinian
armed struggle while only one third believes it is not a victory. Moreover, 68%
believe that a majority of Palestinians see the plan as a victory for armed
struggle. Given the actual results, the assessment of the respondents is highly
accurate which indicates that this is indeed the normative attitude prevailing
among Palestinians. But the percentage of those believing that a majority of
Israelis sees the plan as a victory for the Palestinians is 44%, with 48%
believing that most Israelis do not see it as a victory for Palestinians. The
belief that the plan is a victory for Palestinian armed struggle increases in
the Gaza Strip (72%) compared to Judea and Samaria (62%), in refugee camps (72%)
compared to cities (61%), among men (70%) compared to women (62%), and among
supporters of Hamas and
Fatah (70% and 69% respectively) compared to the unaffiliated
(59%).....
If Israel
withdraws from the Gaza Strip, the level of armed attacks against Israelis from
the Strip would decline according to 41% of the public, while 30% of the public
believe it would increase the number of such attacks, and 24% believe it will
have no impact. The percentage of those believing that withdrawal will lead to a
decrease in attacks from Gaza increases in the Gaza Strip (49%) compared to
Judea and Samaria (36%). It also increases among men (44%) compared to women
(38%), among the oldest (45%) compared to the youngest (36%), among
professionals, the retired, and farmers (60%, 56%, and 48% respectively)
compared to students (33%), among those working in the public sector (51%)
compared to those working in the private sector (44%), among the married (43%)
compared to the unmarried (36%), and among Fatah
supporters (45%) compared to supporters of Hamas
and Islamic Jihad (40% and 38% respectively).4
The Israeli
casualty figures make this poll result both illuminating and sad. But not
surprising. Indeed Arafat denounced the plan as he insisted that refugee rights
to ‘return to their homes’ would never be given up. Other Palestinian leaders,
in agreement, were reported as insisting the borders of a new state should be
based on the 1967 borders – before Israel took control of Yesha. It should be
remembered that the PLO was formed in 1964 and that the Oslo process and the
subsequent withdrawals are all part of the Plan of Stages (1974).
Palestinian Prime
Minister Ahmed Qurei said Mr Bush had apparently given “himself the right to
make concessions on behalf of the Palestinians... we cannot accept this under
any circumstances”.
“He is the first
president who has legitimized the settlements in the Palestinian territories
when he said that there will be no return to the borders of 1967.” This is of
course nonsense if the correct interpretation of UNSCR 242 is adopted.
About 92,500 Jews
live in the six settlements in Judea and Samaria that Mr Sharon wants to keep –
out of a total of 240,000 – or 400,000 if east Jerusalem is included.
Another 7,500
live in enclaves in the Gaza Strip, alongside 1.3 million Palestinians.5
This might be regarded as neither threatening nor bad for relations but rather
an opportunity to practice good neighborliness and peaceful inter-communal
relations. This is what does not happen since the Palestinians cannot abide the
presence of Jews near them or practicing the very apartheid that they accuse
Israelis of, despite the fact that Arab states are entirely devoid of Jews
(Jordan and Saudi Arabia to name but two). How kowtowing to this helps good
relations beats me.6
It is not borne out by the figures either.
According to the
IDF Spokesperson on February 5, 2003: 5,063 Israelis injured, 724 killed, 16,347
attacks from September 29, 2000 through to February 5, 2003. These figures are
made up of:
-
Injured: 3,594 Civilians +
1,469 Security Forces = 5,063 Total Israeli Injured
-
Killed: 506 Civilians + 218
Security Forces = 724 Total Israeli Killed
-
Total Attacks*: 7,230 Judea &
Samaria + 8,455 Gaza Strip + 662 Home Front = 16,347 Total
* Does
not include attacks with rocks or firebombs.
These, it has
been pointed out, constitute one attack almost every 60 minutes 24 hours a day
for each of the seven days of the week, 365 days a year.7
The current
figure for September 27, 2000 through April 20, 2004 is 920 Israelis killed. Of
these 715 were non combatants killed by the Arabs of whom 280 were female.8
Those horrible murders may be the first of many, if it can be demonstrated that
the Israelis fled under fire and in fear, with their tail between their legs.
Hizbullah showed how to do it before and they have been training the
Palestinians. Since Sharon’s plan was announced there has been an escalation in
the numbers murdered and the effect has, as predicted, been to encourage the
Left in Israel and the world’s press to push for withdrawal all the harder – an
encouraging clamour as far as the murderers are concerned and an exhortation, no
less, to attack “Yaffo, Haifa...etc.” as the old Arab street cry went.
Professor Alan Dershowitz has written an
important book on why terrorism works (Why
Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge, Yale
University Press, 2003).
No clearer signals could have been sent than
those proceeding via Oslo to the Disengagement Plan that this is so. The reward
for the Palestinian campaign from the 1960s to now is statehood perhaps and
Jewish and Western retreat. The frontier with Islam lay in South Lebanon and now
even more so lies with the Gaza Jews and they are being sold out without respect
for their views, by a plan that will cost financially, morally and
strategically.
Dr. Yuval
Brandstter, a veteran of IDF intelligence and a medical doctor has written of
the Disengagement Plan:
On the surface, the notion appears attractive, taken directly out
of the peace-troop vocabulary. “We are here, they are there.” The peace-troop
seems to suffer from selective amnesia. “There” used to be under Jordanian and
Egyptian and Syrian rule, which did nothing to curtail the daily fedayeen
genocidal attacks on the Jews. The PLO was formed “there”, prior to 1967. Still,
if we could amicably separate, go our different ways, act like Abraham, we could
share this land; that is the peace-troop reasoning. A New Middle East where
respect for the individual and the other community prevails.
But “here” is not exactly “us”, is it? United Jerusalem is 32%
Arab, the Galilee is 50 % non-Jews, the Negev is 30% Bedouins, with the highest
fertility rate in the world, and on the periphery of the Jewish demographic core
of the coastal region there lurk a million Arabs in Taibe, Baka, the Irron
Valley, Gisr-a-zarka, Fureidis, etc. Disengagement is apparently but a catch
word.
The truth is in the reverse. Disengagement does not really mean
seamless separation. It really means further friction. The first phase of the
disengagement is a pullout from Gaza. Does anyone seriously think that when Gaza
becomes Judenrein, the Arabs will be content? Not on your life! Gaza,
strangled against the sea and the Philadelphia Road Corridor on the southern
border, will explode with warfare activity. Once it is mildly sovereign, free
from the daily activity of the IDF inside this territory, the production of
rockets and launchers and explosives and Shahids will increase
exponentially. This will drive their cohorts in Judea and Samaria to do the
same, so as not to be outdone. The Philadelphia Corridor will be attacked like
never before, causing an outcry for abandonment. The Prime Minister will cave
in. Gaza will then be open to Sinai. The IDF will maintain a constant pressure
on the sources of warfare, using all means. Militants from Judea and Samaria,
instead of incarceration in Israeli prisons will be remitted to the care of the
combined PLO-Hamas entity forming in Gaza. They will foment further
confrontations and warfare, and will force the IDF to escalate the war. Need we
say more?9
3. The Impact on Democracy in Israel and on the Likud
Ideology
Ariel Sharon
declared that the consultation with the Likud membership was the right thing to
do but would not be binding on the government. Why then was it the right thing
to do? Because it fractured the belief system and range of ideological
commitments within the party. Why was it not binding? Because he knew what was
right and the government was the policy and decision making body and anyway
Sharon refused to resign because...moral decisiveness simply does not rule the
roost in Israeli politics. Since at least the surrender of Hebron and the Wye
accords under Binyamin Netanyahu, if not well before, the Likud has stood for
compromise on many aspects of its fundamental principles. This vote against the
Disengagement has shown that it has suffered more; that the threat of a
Labor-Likud coalition may preserve a discredited PM and his discredited policy;
and that democratic accountability is at a low ebb again. By way of example –
maybe the leader of the no vote, Dr. Uzi Landau should be asked by the Likud
Central Committee to stand for the leadership....Shimon Peres, as ever, stands
in the wings....
Professor Paul
Eidelberg, a political science expert, sometime of Bar-Illan University, has put
things rather well:
Sharon, like supporters of unilateral disengagement such as Ehud
Olmert and Benjamin Netanyahu, poses as a “pragmatist”. Apparently, political
circumstances have changed since last year, when Sharon opposed Labor leader
Amram Mitzna’s plan to withdraw unilaterally from Gaza. Politicians who cannot
think in terms of black and white must of course accommodate themselves to
ever-changing circumstances. This is “realism”. It is also called “opportunism”.10
What puts the lie
to Sharon’s “realism” or “pragmatism” is that it is rooted in a heart that
cannot face the enormity of Evil, the Arab-Islamic Culture of Hatred, which is
based on a satanic conception of God. One may see Sharon’s psychological flaw in
the media, even in “centrist” writers of The Jerusalem Post: its many-sided
editor-in-chief, Bret Stephens, its middle-of-the-road executive editor Amotz
Asa-El, its very retired lecturer in political science, Yosef Goell – to name
but three who supported the Sharon plan on “pragmatic grounds”. (Like so many
other “Middle Israelis”, Goell deplores “ideological purity” – hence those who
think in black and white terms.)
I mention these
pundits because their “centrism” or apparent “realism” – like Sharon’s – is more
dangerous than the extremism of the Left. Only the incorrigible are deceived by
the likes of Messrs. Peres, Beilin, and Burg. It is precisely the “centrists”
that lead people astray, for they obscure the genocidal objectives of Israel’s
enemies even while admitting them. Even when they acknowledge the blood-thirsty
objectives of the Arabs, they proceed, in all haste, to anaesthetize the public
with placebos – self-effacing concessions or self-defeating compromises.
Unfortunately accommodationism will also be found among the so-called Right.
Returning to
Sharon – we really haven’t left him – is it not remarkable that this
“pragmatist” so utterly miscalculated the sentiments of the Likud rank-and-file?
Does this not make nonsense of his “pragmatism”? If he can so misjudge the
members of his own party, must we not also suspect that he is even more
susceptible to misjudging the Americans, and what is worse, the Arabs who have
long cultivated the art of ingratiation, that is, of dissembling?
4. The Impact on the Zionist Enterprise
Professor Gerald
Steinberg, the Director of the Program on Conflict Management at Bar Ilan
University, has mounted a reasoned analysis of the usefulness of thinking about
what best makes sense and has accused the anti Disengagement party of emotion
and sentiment wrongly guiding their thinking, since in fact there is neither
chance of democracy nor Arab outlooks changing even after the fall of Arafat.
...in reality, the chances of achieving a Palestinian surrender
in the foreseeable future (20 to 40 years) are close to zero. After Arafat
disappears from the scene, new leaders will emerge to carry on the war against
“the Jews”. The incitement and hatred will continue, fueled by the firm belief
that the rapidly growing Palestinian and Israeli Arab population, supported by
hundreds of millions of Arabs and one billion Moslems, will eventually overwhelm
“the Zionist enemy”.
Despite the IDF’s best efforts and short-term successes, terror
attacks will continue to be a major dimension of this all-out war, as they have
been for over 75 years. In parallel, the false prophets of the “international
community”, ensconced in Europe and the United Nations, will continue to try and
impose their own initiatives. In this environment, and without deep political
and social change in the Arab world, Israel’s situation will not improve for
very long, and a policy based entirely on a military victory is reduced to
wishful thinking...
...despite the outcome of the Likud referendum, unilateral
disengagement remains Israel’s least bad and most realistic option. This
strategy will make terrorism more difficult to conduct, reduce the demographic
threat of a Palestinian Arab majority, allow for managing the conflict through
deterrence and interdiction, and reduce daily friction. When the alternatives
are examined in detail, none of them are able to offer even these limited
benefits. And as a result, after the emotions have cooled and rationality
returns, unilateral disengagement is still the only game in town.11
But on this
basis, there is no hope for the entire Zionist enterprise at all. Nor was there
ever. Professor Steinberg thinks that there would be some benefits in
withdrawal. I think he is badly awry. Is not the whole enterprise based on
belief and reason together and the Declaration of Independence of the State
itself which includes phrases such as “It is, moreover, the self-evident right
of the Jewish people to be a nation, as all other nations, in its own sovereign
State...by virtue of the natural and historic right of the Jewish people and of the
Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations...”?
Can we really say
along with the late Yitzhak Rabin that the Bible and their prayers offer no clue
as to where Jews should live as if history counted for nothing? “All we are
saying is give peace a chance” – and co-existence.
Here are some
estimated costs:
The immediate
cost to Israelis: $7 BN (Similar to the annual defense budget).12
-
FACT:
The cost of the Rafiah Salient Giveaway (to Egypt) was 15BN shekels in
June 1990 (3.30 shekels per dollar), which is equal to 30BN shekels in
2004 (4.50 per dollar and a one third decrease in the value of the
dollar).
-
FACT:
The cost of the Gaza and No. Samaria Giveaway could skyrocket to 44BN
shekels, since it pertains to 8,000 residents with a 30 year tenure,
compared with 5,000 residents with a 5 year tenure in Rafiah.
-
FACT:
A minimalist estimate (ignoring the Rafiah precedent) could bring the cost
down to 26BN shekels: 13.5BN for homes (including furniture and
improvements), a two year adjustment payment and a 30 year compensation;
9.5BN shekels for jobs infrastructure; 3BN Shekels for roads,
communications, electricity, water, sewage, classrooms, community
structures and relocation of military installations.
-
FACT:
The huge cost could halt the current economic recovery, worsen
unemployment, increase taxes, impose mandatory government bonds,
cut infrastructure expenditures, etc. The expected rise in terrorism would
impose further cost.
-
FACT:
The added cost would not be in return for a peace accord. Rather than Land
For Peace, this one will be Land For Nothing, or - probably – Land For
Terrorism, or Land For Recycled Non-Binding Friendly Presidential
Declarations.
5. The Strategic Value of Gaza and of a Jewish Presence
There and Intelligence Gathering; Water
Prime Minister Sharon:
Israeli evacuation of Gaza...would transform Gaza’s main square
to a launching platform of missiles to Israel’s Ashqelon... Terrorism can be
destroyed, if we control its bases...In 1970, Gaza was controlled by terrorists,
because Israel evacuated the populated areas and the refugee camps...A flight
from populated areas, and a failure to annihilate of the threat in its incept,
would require a much longer and a more difficult effort... (Ma’ariv, June
12, 1992).
Sharon’s
recommendation is doubly relevant in 2004, with a less predictable world (than
in 1992), a more explosive Mideast, more armed rogue regimes, a more horrific
terrorism, and a systematically and terroristically non-compliant PLO/PA.
FACT: Former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs-of-Staff, General Earl Wheeler:
Occupation of the Gaza Strip by Israel would reduce the hostile
border by a factor of five, and eliminate a source for raids and training of
[Palestinian terrorists]...The Strip serves as a salient for introduction of
Arab subversion and terrorism, and its retention would be to Israel’s military
advantage...By occupying the Strip, Israel would trade 45 miles of hostile
border for eight. (June 29, 1967 Memo on Israel minimal requirements for
security).
All the
intelligence chiefs disagree with PM Sharon’s statement that terrorism would be
diminished. Opinion polls suggest that Likud voters agree with this view.
In the event that
there was a Palestinian participation in a major conflict these communities
would have to be taken first so early warning would go; intelligence gathering
would go; a first target would go; observation and surveillance would go; Shin
Bet information gathering would go; inter-communal information gathering would
go.
There would be no
north-south highway control and isolated control of port and airport facilities
as well as increased difficulty policing the Rafah tunnel syndrome from Egypt.
The entire hue and cry apparatus would be damaged and there would be no friendly
and expert bases from which any Israeli enterprises could enforce security.
Quite apart from
the change in “frontier” and positioning of Katyushas and the like, there is
already clamor that Israel would be boxing in the Palestinians and not allowing
an independent state free access to the outside world through airport and port
security controls and the line of access to Egypt and the tunnel area at
Raf(i)ah.
Once the
Palestinian damage to the coastal aquifer is total the Judea-Samaria aquifer
will be demanded as some kind of equally validated requirement further
pressuring Israel and the communities on those regions. Not only will security
have got worse but the “water war” scenario will have been brought nearer.
Dr. Plaut’s 23
points are powerful and emphasizes, inter alia, the precedent which would be set
and to this may be added the link with Force 17, al Aqsa Martyrs’
Brigade, Fatah, Hizbullah and Hamas hopes for violence
succeeding – exactly what drives on al Qai`dah: the very terrorism
against which the West is supposed to be fighting.
6. A Nation that Dwells Alone? Judenrein – The
Quartet, the EU and the USA
President Bush is
not the Israel favoring figure portrayed by the Western and Arab press and
electronic media. He is the first to espouse a Palestinian state. He has
approved in a sense strikes against terrorists but that is almost impossible to
avoid doing generally as well as for him. He has constantly spoken the mantra of
cycle of violence and demanded restraint. He has effectively saved Arafat’s life
for no good reason. And he has let the PA and its evil forces such as Force 17
and the Tanzim off as well as doing next to nothing to hammer
Hizbullah, Hamas and Islamic jihad. As Dr. Ehrenfeld has shown
in a series of studies, the evil funding goes on and on. The Road Map was and
remains an absurdity. And anti Israeli security and UNSCR 242 therefore.
The EU has
maintained its Venice Declaration stand, as my friend Yohanan Ramati of the JIWD
has put it, trying to be more pro Arab than the Americans. The Quartet wants to
undo the effects of 1967 and 1973 just as Kissinger also wanted so rewarding the
aggressor and flouting Nuremberg and international law principle nullum
crimen sine poena – no crime without punishment. A negotiated settlement
under the banner of ‘every inch of Arab land’ and with guns on and under the
table as well as at Arafat’s hip in the halls of the UN, this would be
unthinkable for any country except Israel. I ask – Disengagement for what
purpose therefore? To satisfy whom? The answer always lies in the oil, arms,
Eurabia realm.
Is not
Judenrein racism? How are states getting away with it and the western
democracies supporting it? Whatever the answers to these questions, how does the
Plan help Israel to deal with these fundamental issues?
8. International Law
UNSCR 242 has had
its real meaning often forgotten.
The Authors of Resolution
242:
The former British Ambassador to the UN, Lord Caradon [the
chief-author of 242], tabled a polished draft resolution in the Security Council
and steadfastly resisted all suggestions for change... Kuznetsov of the USSR
asked Caradon to specify “all” before the word “territories” and to drop the
word “recognized”. When Caradon refused, the USSR tabled its own draft
resolution [calling for a withdrawal to the 1967 Lines] but it was not a viable
alternative to the UK text... Members [of the UN Security Council] voted and
adopted the [UK drafted] resolution unanimously... (UN Security Council
Resolution 242, The Washington Institute For Near East Policy, 1993, pp. 27-28).
Arthur Goldberg, Former US Ambassador to the UN, a Key Author of 242:
...The notable omissions in regard to withdrawal...are the words
“all”, “the” and “the June 5, 1967 lines...” There is lacking a declaration
requiring Israel to withdraw from all of the territories occupied by it on, and
after, June 5, 1967... On certain aspects, the Resolution is less ambiguous than
its withdrawal language. Resolution 242 specifically calls for termination of
all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the
sovereignty of every State in the area. The Resolution also specifically
endorses free passage through international waterways...The efforts of the Arab
States, strongly supported by the USSR, for a condemnation of Israel as the
aggressor and for its withdrawal to the June 5, 1967 lines, failed to command
the requisite support... (Columbia Journal of International Law, Vol. 12,
no. 2, 1973)
Prof. Eugene Rostow, Former
Undersecretary of State, a Key Author of 242, International Law Authority:
UN SC 242 calls on Israel to withdraw only from territories
occupied in the course of the Six Day War – that is, not from “all” the
territories or even from “the” territories...Ingeniously drafted resolutions
calling for withdrawal from “all” the territory were defeated in the Security
Council and the General Assembly one after another. Speaker after speaker made
it explicit that Israel was not to be forced back to the “fragile and
vulnerable” [1949/1967] Armistice Demarcation Lines... (UNSC Resolution 242,
1993, p. 17).
The USSR and the Arabs supported a draft demanding a withdrawal
to the 1967 Lines. The US, Canada and most of West Europe and Latin America
supported the draft, which was eventually approved by the UN Security Council.
(Yale University, American Society of International Law, 1970)
Law Professor
Eliav Shochetman of the Hebrew University told an audience at the Israel
Resource News Agency, Beit Agron International Press Center, Jerusalem, under
the title “The Implications of Forcible Expulsion in the Light of Israeli Civil
Rights Law and in Light of International Law” that the State of Israel preserves
its democratic system under the constraints of The Israel Basic Human Dignity
Law which oversees Israeli democratic institutions in matters of human rights
and civil liberties, much as the US Bill of Rights ensures that the US
government can never trample on the human rights and civil liberties of American
citizens.13
The Israeli law
is also based on the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which all
democratic governments are adherents.
Prof. Shochetman
quoted numerous court cases in which Israeli Chief Justice Aharon Barak invoked
the Israel Basic Human Dignity Law to intervene on behalf of Israeli citizens
whose civil liberties and human rights had been abused.
He asserted that
in the current situation, given the legal precedents from Israeli court cases
and from court cases around the world, any Israeli government decision to expel
people from their homes, even in the context of a diplomatic move, would
represent a wanton violation of basic human rights and civil liberties that are
protected under Israeli and international human rights law.
Prof. Shochetman
cited clause 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,which states that it
is illegal for sovereign governments to expel their own citizens from their
homes, their private properties or from their farms.
Prof. Shochetman
applied Universal Declaration of Human Rights constraint to the proposed policy
of the Prime Minister of Israel, whose April 18th plan, would mandate that
Israeli citizens would be expelled from 21 communities in Katif and from four
communities in the Northern Samaria region.14
Since the only
group slated for expulsion would be Jews, it may be recalled that the government
of Serbia was recently held liable for international prosecution at the
International High Court of Justice in the Hague, under the charge of “ethnic
cleansing”, after leaders of Serbia expelled an ethnic minority, solely because
of their religion.
Prof. Shochetman
invoked another aspect of international law, the 1921 San Remo legislation of
the League of Nations, reaffirmed by the United Nations in 1945, which serves to
protect and defend the right of Jews to purchase land anywhere west of the
Jordan River, along with the legal briefs of Dr. Eugene Rostow, the author of UN
Resolution 242, in which Rostow wrote that no peace arrangement should preclude
the eminent right of Jews to settle anywhere in the State of Israel.
Prof. Shochetman
noted that no expulsion of landowners in Katif or Samaria could take place
without a decision of Israel’s Knesset parliament that would hold up under
international human rights law and Israel civil liberties statutes.
In Conclusion, Summary
Israel remains
vulnerable and small in size and relative military capacity. It is not a
superpower in the region as the BBC for example has labeled it and an analysis
of the military balance figures will amply demonstrate this. It is especially
the case since I and others have worked on true military expenditure figures for
Arab states, most glaringly those of Egypt and Syria, who spend vastly more than
their declared amounts and allow massive poverty among huge proportions of their
populations. Israel’s relative strategic position is deteriorating, a picture
reflected by the relevant numerical statistics; and the gap between its own and
its Arab neighbors’ resources is forever widening. Currently its military R&D
has been put on hold and its Merkava tank is threatened, despite it being the
cleverest MBT in the world.
The Bush
administration speaks with a dangerously forked tongue; whereas Congress may draw
a realistic picture of the Arab world at times, and of the Palestinians in
particular, nonetheless, a Palestinian state is still now a basic element in US
foreign policy whereas it was not so only a short time span before now. Colin
Powell is no friend and ally to Israel. The Likud has been brought by Ariel
Sharon into a position whereby it too may speak freely of further partitions of
the remaining Jewish homeland and this remains the context for discussion of the
Disengagement Plan.
“Old Europe”, as
the Americans have called it, has determined to oppose British and American
interpretations of Iraq’s best interests. Yasser Arafat has been caught out by
some MEPs insofar as the kleptocratic corruption of his regime has been exposed
as sponsoring terror with European Union money. Commissioner for External
Affairs Chris Patten has said that the Commission needs an enquiry into PA use
of European funds for terrorist purposes “like a hole in the head”. Meanwhile,
large-scale outbreaks of anti-Semitism have led many Jewish people to a fresh
awareness of its inherent threat potential in many countries in Europe.
While the Arab
states, in many cases, pursue their arsenal-building agendas and Islamism gains
adherents including in Europe and the USA, September 11, as it has become known,
has shown that all the talk that expert analysts uttered in their warnings to
the West has been vindicated. Israel’s position on fighting terror might now, at
least potentially, have borne a slightly less unfavourable interpretation – but
not so. The link between what Israel faces daily and what America received on
that dreadful day has, however, not been one which has been emphasized enough
either by Israeli analysts or those outside Israel. There is still a profoundly
double standard when it comes to “permission” (!) from international diplomats
for Israel to wage an effective and deterrent assault on terrorist bases and
infrastructure. Indeed, Israel’s deterrent capability has been further eroded,
as a number of scholars have pointed out. This again is hardly the time and place
to be discussing uprooting Jews, making places Judenrein and advertising
willingness to cut and run as from South Lebanon – as I have demonstrated the
Palestinians see it as nothing other than this and further vindication of
Hisbollah’s tactics and the triumph of a triumphalist Islamist doctrine.
I concluded the
book on the statistics of the Oslo process with these words:
The years 1951-1955 saw 922 Israelis killed by Arab terrorists
infiltrating from Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt.15
(In 1955 alone, a particularly bad year, 278 were killed by raids from Jordan
and Egypt.) What is alarming is not just the wars’ statistics themselves but
that the time when Israel’s neighbors were openly and officially at war produced
murder figures comparable to a period when there was supposedly a peace process
at work, with matters of dispute between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs meant
to be worked out in peaceful dialogue! That is, there have been 831 fatalities
between September 1993, the start of the Oslo process and April 5, 2002, a
figure that far exceeds the number of Israelis killed during the Six Day War and
represents something like a third of those killed in the Yom Kippur War. For
perspective, the US has a population of 280 million people. Israel has 4.5
million Jews. Based upon this 62:1 population ratio, Israel has lost the
equivalent of 45,000 Jewish lives.16
Some 134 Israelis, soldiers and civiliams were killed in the period of
March-April 6, 2002 alone.
In perspective then, this period of “peace process” is one of the
bloodiest and most violent in the history of the modern State of Israel. It
represents nothing but a stark rebuttal of the design of the Oslo process and an
exposure of the false premises on which it has, for too long, been allowed to
continue influential on Israeli policy. It is time to stop presenting darkness
as light and light as darkness.17
What the
schoolbooks, summer camps and media of the Palestinian Authority have made clear
time and again is their support for violence and their willingness to inculcate
an ethos in Palestinian society favorable to homicide bombing. No amount of
interaction between Arabs and Jews has made any difference at all. This is not
only borne out by a series of opinion polls among the Palestinian Arabs but also
by other sources as well, such as speeches and television transmissions, which
serve to reinforce the tenor of violence among especially the youth. This is a
cultural issue reminiscent of Professor Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”
thesis and evidenced by Palestinian widespread support for Saddam Hussein.
Nothing much has changed since the days of Fatahland in Lebanon and the
atrocities committed against the Lebanese. Nothing much has altered since the
Palestinian gun culture caused bullets to come down and kill Palestinians
following exuberant firing in the air – a normal accompaniment to weddings and
other occasions.
Among the most
brutal, lawless and terror-inculcating societies in the world, the Palestinian
entity spawned by the Oslo process has nothing by way of track record to prove
its acceptability to any straight thinkers in a Western liberal democracy who
have reflected on state building. It has broken every agreement it has made with
Israel, which I and others have documented in considerable detail.18
It has maintained a regime of murder, both of its own citizens indiscriminately
and without trial but also, of course, those of its nearest neighbor. That the
USA and EU want, apparently, to create a state out of this monstrous and ugly
charade of a polity is deeply concerning to any who care about the ethical tenor
of Western political culture. The creation of so hideous a neighbor for the
region’s one true democracy and only non-Islamic state is a serious crime. For
Israel and moral Jews and Christians, it represents a cruelty which rationally
is somewhat hard to understand and totally impossible to justify.
As my late father
used to say, if after putting your arm in the lion’s cage and having it bitten
off, you then put your leg in too, that is asking for trouble. The Oslo process
causes a progressive dismemberment of Israel. That is the aim of the Palestinian
Arabs and of the surrounding Arab states. No peace treaties or agreements have
altered that. We are, very sadly, it appears, almost literally, back to the need
for Jabotinsky’s wall. All the concepts which framed the thinking behind the
Oslo process have progressively been proven bankrupt. The lesson has yet, alas,
properly to be learnt, apparently, when a further withdrawal is advocated and as
a prelude to removal of more communities, so rewarding Palestinian lack of
reciprocity and further terror. That is not a message that anyone, surely, wants
to send the world. It is indeed an ill wind that blows nobody any good and that
is Sharon’s Disengagement Plan.
Endnotes
1 |
This paper originated in preparation for a talk under this
title given at Hertford College, Oxford in May 2004. |
2 |
Mordechai Nisan, “Religious, Cultural and Rhetorical
Aspects in Palestinians Strategy”,
<www.acpr.org.il/ENGLISH-NATIV/03-ISSUE/nisan-3.htm>. |
3 |
Moshe Sharon,
“Palestinian
Ideology And Practice Ten Years After Oslo”,
<www.acpr.org.il/ENGLISH-NATIV/02-ISSUE/sharon-2.htm> |
4. |
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip between March 14 and 17, 2004. |
5 |
BBC News (UK edition), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3627817.stm>. |
6 |
Muslim countries were to have discussed the Israeli plan at a
special meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Malaysia on
May 4, 2004. |
7 |
Middle East Political Forum email, <STREELSH@aol.com>,
February 5, 2003. |
8 |
International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism
website, Statistical Report Summary, An Engineered Tragedy: Statistical
Analysis of Fatalities, Search Database of Incidents and Casualties, <http://www.ict.org.il/casualties_project/stats_page.cfm> |
9 |
Yuval Brandstetter, “The Truth – Always in Reverse”, <www.acpr.org.il/ENGLISH-NATIV/03-ISSUE/yuval-3.htm>. |
10 |
Paul Eidelberg, “Behind Sharon’s Folly”, Email to <list@foundation1.org>
distribution list, May 3, 2004. Other articles by Professor Eidelberg can be
found at the Foundation for Constitutional Democracy website, <http://foundation1.org>.
|
11 |
Gerald Steinberg, “There is No Better Solution”, Jerusalem
Post, May 4, 2004. |
12 |
Yoram Ettinger, Hatikvah Educational Foundation advertisement
in Ma’ariv, April 23, 2004. The series of ads is also being featured
online at <www.acpr.org.il/hatikvah>. |
13 |
Eliav Shochetman,
“The
Implications of Forcible Expulsion in the Light of Israeli Civil Rights Law
and in Light of International Law”,
Press Conference, April 30, 2004. |
14 |
Featured at the Prime Minister's website,
www.pmo.gov.il,. |
15 |
For these, the next figure and other figures, see Herb
Keinon, “Foreign Ministry Arms Israelis Traveling Abroad with Terror
Statistics”, The Jerusalem Post, March 27, 2002. I am grateful to Dr.
Colin Leci for sending me this article. |
16 |
Masada 2000.org website, <www.masada2000.org>. |
17 |
Isaiah, 5:20. |
18 |
See
Enough of Blood and Tears...” (Yitzhak Rabin). A
Chronology of the Oslo Process, Its Agreements and Results, Ariel Center
for Policy Research, June 2002.. |